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Education has long been known as “human capital”, the capital involved in 
producing higher wages and augmenting labor productivity. It has also been associated 
with better nonmarket outcomes, including better health, lower crime and higher social 
cohesion. The high private and social benefits of education have motivated extensive 
research on determinants of schooling choices and skills. My dissertation uses data from 
a developing country, Indonesia, and studies the role of parents in children’s education 
during primary and secondary school in late 1990s, around the period of the East Asian 
Financial Crisis. 
I study two main questions in order to understand the implications of the crisis for 
children. First, I examine whether only children with low expected returns from 
education selected out of schooling during the crisis. I find significant negative effects of 
school dropout soon after the crisis on mathematics test scores, suggesting that the crisis 
induced some parents to pull children out of school even though they had the potential to 
do well. This analysis shows the importance of short-run constraints for school 
enrollments in Indonesia. Second, I explore how parents allocate education resources 
between their children at the intensive margin. I find that, on average, parental education 
spending is not a function of children’s test scores. However, parents are more sensitive 
to the human capital of younger female children and penalize them for having lower 
scores compared to their older siblings of either gender. Thus, girls appear to be more 
vulnerable to resource constraints as parents reduce investments and likely provide them 
with worse quality of education.   
Schooling in Indonesia is associated with high labor market returns. Thus, my 
research shows that much can be gained by insuring children against short-run shocks 
that have long-run consequences. As an extension, I also examine whether the crisis had 
short-run labor market effects as well. I test whether males living in urban areas were less 
willing to take risks when making occupation choices soon after the crisis. The results of 
this analysis, however, are ambiguous. Better data should allow answering this question 
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CHAPTER 1: Introduction 
1. Introduction 
 Education has long been known as “human capital”, the capital involved in 
producing higher wages and augmenting labor productivity (Becker, 1975; Mincer, 1974). 
One pathway of influence, emphasized by the early theoretical literature, has been the 
effect of education on increasing production efficiency (Becker, 1975). Some have also 
argued that education determines the choice of inputs and thus increases allocative 
efficiency (Rosenzweig & Schultz, 1982). The standard approach for estimating the 
relationship between education and earnings has relied on Mincer's (1974) model, where 
log earnings are represented as a linear function of years of schooling and a quadratic 
experience term. Across countries, an extra year of schooling is associated with about 10 
percent higher wages on average with generally higher returns for low income countries 
and lower levels of education (Psacharopoulos & Patrinos, 2004). Dealing with issues of 
endogeneity due to selection into schooling does not cause large changes in the estimates 
and, in fact, even yields higher rates of returns (Card, 2001). In addition to better labor 
market outcomes, education has also been associated with better nonmarket outcomes, 
including better health, lower crime and higher social cohesion (Grossman, 2006; Lochner, 
2011; Wolfe & Haveman, 2002). In developing countries, education has also been 
important because of its spillover effects on future generations lowering fertility and 
improving child health (Breierova & Duflo, 2004; Chou et al., 2010; Glewwe, 1999; Osili 
& Long, 2008).  
While traditionally the literature has focused on years of education as the measure 
of human capital, attention is recently being paid not only on the quantity of education but 
2 
 
also the quality of education. Increasing evidence has shown that measures of cognitive 
ability and achievement are important predictors of economic outcomes independently of 
schooling both in developed countries (Cawley, Heckman, & Vytlacil, 2001; Heckman, 
Stixrud, & Urzua, 2006) and the developing world (Glewwe, 2002; Hanushek & 
Woessmann, 2008). Even at the macro level, test scores have been shown to explain the 
variation in economic growth between countries much better than simple measures of the 
quantity of schooling (Hanushek & Woessmann, 2008). 
The high private and social benefits of education, measured by years of schooling 
or test scores, have motivated extensive research on determinants of schooling choices and 
skills. Formal education may occur in early childhood development programs, primary and 
secondary school, college, or on-the-job training. Education may also involve various 
agents – parents, teachers, children, the government. My dissertation uses data from a 
developing country, Indonesia, and studies the role of parents in children’s education 
during primary and secondary school in late 1990s, around the period of the East Asian 
Financial Crisis. The second chapter focuses on parental investment at the extensive 
margin. I investigate learning outcomes of children who drop out of school. I show that 
while some children select out of school due to low ability, on average, children would 
have benefitted from school in terms of achieving higher test scores had they stayed in 
school longer. The third chapter studies how parents choose to allocate education resources 
between (two) children while their children go to school. I find that, on average, parents 
have a neutral investment strategy. However, parents seem to be more sensitive to the skills 




Next, I motivate my research questions by discussing three of the key factors that 
affect parental investment in the education of their children in developing countries. I 
review the literature on how resource constraints, parental preferences and the return to 
education affect investments at both the extensive and intensive margins. Then, I provide 
some background on the Indonesian context and discuss why Indonesia is a good place to 
study these questions. Finally, I provide details on the data used for the analysis. 
2. Determinants of education investment 
In the standard human capital model, children and parents are forward-looking and 
view schooling as an investment with financial returns. For example, in a seminal 
contribution to the literature, Willis and Rosen (1979) show for the US that the decision of 
whether to attend college depends on the expected lifetime earnings under the two options 
(i.e., college or no college). They find evidence of comparative advantage, showing that 
college graduates would have been worse off if they had not gone to college compared to 
people who actually did not go to college, and vice versa. Keane and Wolpin (1997) 
estimate a structural dynamic model of career choices for young men in the US and 
similarly find that the data supports the investment view of the human capital model: 
schooling, work and occupation choices are consistent with maximization of lifetime utility 
(a function of earnings). People may not always be able to make optimal investment 
choices, however, if they are resource constrained. In addition, parental preferences, 
sometimes irrational, may determine outcomes, too. And as in any investment, schooling 
choices are also largely affected by (perceived) returns.  
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2.1 Constraints  
In developing countries, school fees often represent a significant proportion of 
family income and schooling may also be associated with high opportunity costs of 
foregone child labor. As a result, large disparities in educational attainment by household 
socioeconomic status exist (Filmer, 2000). The positive association between education and 
income, however, is not necessarily causal since poor parents may lack skills or motivation 
and their children may have inherited those characteristics, which may in turn affect school 
performance and school choices. In order to deal with this issue, many studies have used 
exogenous variation caused by income shocks to identify the impact of household income 
on schooling. Financial market imperfections make it difficult for households to save or 
borrow and parents are often unable to insure children against the effects of income shocks. 
Thus, negative macroeconomic shocks have been shown to reduce enrollment and 
attendance rates (Ferreira & Schady, 2009). Similarly, Jacoby and Skoufias (1997) find 
that school attendance in rural India fluctuates during periods of idiosyncratic income 
shocks. In Brazil, Duryea, Lam, and Levison (2007) study the effect of the male household 
head becoming unemployed and show significant increases in the probability of dropping 
out of school permanently and entering the labor force for children between the ages of 10 
and 16. Björkman-Nyqvist (2013) uses regional rainfall variation to identify the effect of 
unexpected decreases in income on child schooling in Uganda and shows significant 
negative impacts on girls’ enrollment (and no impacts on boys). Poor households are 
unable to smooth consumption not only during unexpected income shocks but also during 
times when an income shock is anticipated. Edmonds (2006) studies the effect of the social 
pension income in South Africa and shows large increases in school attendance, especially 
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for boys, when an elderly household member becomes eligible for the pension. In addition, 
child labor decreases after receipt of pension income and thus the study suggests that both 
direct costs such as school fees and indirect costs such as foregone wages may affect 
schooling decisions.  
Studies on reduction or elimination of school fees provide further evidence that the 
direct cost of schooling is an important factor in school participation. Lucas and Mbiti 
(2012) find that the free primary education program in Kenya improved access to schooling 
for disadvantaged populations and increased primary school graduation rates. Similarly, 
Deininger (2003) shows that primary school enrollment in Uganda increased dramatically 
after elimination of fees. In addition, once school fees are abolished, Björkman-Nyqvist 
(2013) finds no significant impact of income shocks on enrollment in Uganda. She does, 
however, find that average test scores of girls fall during periods of resource constraints 
and she attributes this finding to parents reducing their school investments at the intensive 
margin or girls having to work and thus spend less time studying. 
The impact of conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs on accumulation of human 
capital further demonstrates the importance of liquidity constraints (Fiszbein & Schady, 
2009). Evidence from around the world, from Mexico (Parker, Rubalcava, & Teruel, 2008) 
to Malawi (Baird, McIntosh, & Ozler, 2011) and Cambodia (Filmer & Schady, 2009) 
shows increased enrollment rates and years of education for individuals and communities 
that benefit from cash transfers. Importantly, these programs condition cash transfers on 
child enrollment and often on child attendance, as well. While unconditional cash transfers 
have had positive effects on schooling in some cases (Edmonds, 2006), conditioning 
transfers on school attendance has been found to be more effective, possibly because of 
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households’ competing financial needs (Baird, McIntosh, & Ozler, 2011; de Brauw & 
Hoddinott, 2011). CCTs have also been effective at insuring children’s education against 
unexpected income shocks (Cameron, 2009; de Janvry et al., 2006). 
One caveat of these findings, however, is that the evidence on the success of CCTs 
in improving children’s test scores has been mixed. Several studies have looked at the 
effect of the extra education on home-administered test scores (thus avoiding the 
nonrandom selection into schooling). In Nicaragua, Barham, Macours, and Maluccio 
(2013) find that boys between the ages of 9 and 12 who lived in communities that benefitted 
from CCTs stayed in school longer and had higher mathematics and language test scores 
ten years after the conclusion of the program compared to a control group. Baird, McIntosh, 
and Ozler (2011) reach similar conclusions for the effects of a CCT program targeted at 
girls aged 13 to 22 in Malawi, two years after the start of the program. In addition, unlike 
the Barham, Macours, and Maluccio (2013) study, they also find significant gains in 
cognition (measured by Raven’s Colored Progressive Matrices assessment). On the other 
hand, Filmer and Schady (2009) study a scholarship program in Cambodia allocated to 
children in lower secondary school according to an individual dropout risk score. Using a 
regression discontinuity design, they find no effects of the extra schooling on scores of 
mathematics and vocabulary tests 18 months after the program start. The scholarship 
recipients did not do better on the tests even when they attended schools of higher quality. 
In Mexico, Behrman, Parker, and Todd (2009) use differential exposure to the popular CCT 
program Progresa/Oportunidades to study its impact on schooling. While children who 
started receiving the transfers earlier had more years of education compared to those who 
became beneficiaries later, no significant differences in language and mathematics test 
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scores between the two groups existed. These studies suggests that if the goal of the 
program is to improve children’s skills, then special school interventions that focus on low-
performing students may be needed or investments may need to be aimed at younger 
children, who are more likely to benefit from them. The lack of effect on test scores may 
be part of the reason why Progresa (the longest-running CCT program) is found to have no 
impact on employment, wages or intergenerational occupational mobility despite the extra 
schooling its beneficiaries received (Rodríguez-Oreggia & Freije, 2012). 
2.2 Parental preferences  
If parents prefer to have more children, then may have to sacrifice the “quality” of 
those children when resource-constrained. In a seminal contribution to the literature on 
household economic behavior, Becker and Tomes (1976) and Becker and Lewis (1973) 
model household utility as a function of the number of children and their quality. Since 
quality is increased by investments and households are budget constrained, poor parents 
may be expected to trade off quantity vs. quality of children. While the empirical evidence 
has been ambiguous and context-dependent, a few studies provide support for the quantity-
quality tradeoff in developing countries. Joshi and Schultz (2007) study a randomized 
family-planning program in Bangladesh that took place between 1974 and 1996. They find 
that women in villages that benefitted from the door-to-door outreach program and 
contraceptive services had fewer children and their children obtained more education. 
Other studies use twin births as a way to model exogenous fertility changes and study the 
causal relationship between household size and investment in children. For example, 
Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1980) show that having twins reduces the average educational 
attainment of children in Indian households, while Rosenzweig and Zhang (2009) find 
8 
 
negative effects on years of schooling, college enrollment and mathematics and language 
test scores of Chinese twins. 
Becker and Tomes (1976) and Behrman, Pollak, and Taubman (1982) were the first 
to model the important interactions within households comprised of heterogeneous 
individuals. In the wealth model developed by Becker and Tomes (1976), parents choose 
whether to invest in children so as to increase their adult earnings potential or whether to 
provide them transfers when they are adults to compensate for their low earnings. The 
model assumes that parents are concerned with total child wealth rather than the sources of 
wealth. The main conclusion is that parents reinforce endowment differences in children 
by providing human capital investment for the more endowed child, but equalize wealth 
by providing more transfers to the less endowed child. An implicit assumption of the wealth 
model is that parents have enough resources to allocate between children (Behrman, Pollak, 
& Taubman, 1995). An alternative model was proposed by Behrman, Pollak, and Taubman 
(1982) who argued that parental preferences are separable in earnings and transfers (SET). 
In this setting, parents solve a two-stage problem where they allocate total resources 
between earnings and transfers in the first stage and then, in the second stage, they allocate 
earnings investments (and transfers) among their children. This assumption allows for 
analyzing the distribution of human capital investments independent of any possible future 
transfers, and was widely adopted in the subsequent literature. Behrman, Pollak, and 
Taubman (1982) show that whether parents follow a compensatory, reinforcing, or a 
neutral investment strategy depends on parental inequality aversion and on the properties 
of the child earnings function.  
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Studying education in Burkina Faso, Akresh et al. (2012) confirm that educational 
investments reinforce differences between siblings. In particular, they find that having a 
higher-ability sibling lowers current enrollment by 15 percent and having two higher ability 
siblings lowers enrollment by 30 percent. Research on Ethiopia also supports the finding 
that parents invest in children of higher cognitive ability (Ayalew, 2005). In addition, 
recent work suggests that parents may also consider the multidimensional nature of human 
capital when making investments, although the empirical evidence is mixed. For example, 
Conti et al. (2011) use data on twins in China and show that parents provide fewer 
educational resources to children who experienced an early life health shock, measured 
restrospectively. On the other hand, Leight (2014) finds that Chinese parents allocate more 
of the discretionary educational spending to the child with lower health endowment, 
measured by height-for-age and instrumented by early life climatic shock to nutrition. 
In addition to child ability and health, education investments in developing 
countries have been shown to vary greatly depending on child gender and birth order. For 
example, Parish and Willis (1993) show that in Taiwan having an older sister is associated 
with higher educational attainment, especially for older cohorts. Younger children in the 
Philippines have better educational outcomes compared to their older siblings (Ejrnaes & 
Portner, 2004). In Indonesia, on the other hand, Pradhan (1998) finds that having younger 
siblings decreases the probability of delayed enrolment and thus the first-born in the family 
receive better education. In South and East Asia, as well as in other regions of the world, 
there is also a strong preferential allocation of resources to males. Gender preferences are 
manifested in higher mortality and worse health outcomes of girls as well as lower 
educational investments in girls (Filmer, Friedman, & Schady, 2008). Significant 
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differences in school enrollment between girls and boys exist in many countries both at the 
primary and secondary schooling level (Alderman & King, 1998). While gender 
preferences may often be due to cultural norms, some of the education gap could also be 
explained by the (perceived) difference in returns to education by gender. 
2.3 Returns 
Opportunity costs and returns to education are two important factors that affect 
investment in children’s education in developing countries. For example, expansion of 
manufacturing and higher demand for low-skill labor in Mexico was associated with rises 
in school dropout rates as the opportunity costs of education rose (Atkin, 2012). Further, 
Mexican parents in areas with higher demand for low-skilled labor reduced the education 
investments in their children at the extensive margin as well, spending less time helping 
children with school and spending less money on school supplies (Majlesi, 2014). 
Conversely, Oster and Steinberg (2013) use Indian data to show that the creation of a new 
IT center increases primary school enrollment rates by 5%, as returns to English-language 
education rise. A recruitment intervention in India, which made job opportunities for 
women more salient and accessible, increased enrollment in school for younger girls and 
enrollment in training programs for older girls (Jensen, 2012). Similarly, an increase in 
garment sector jobs in Bangladesh, targeted at girls, was found to be associated with higher 
probability that young girls are enrolled in school (Heath & Mobarak, 2011). Jensen (2010) 
finds that students in the Dominican Republic perceive the labor market returns to 
secondary school to be very low, despite the high measured returns. Students who were 
provided with information about the actual returns stayed in school an average of 0.20-0.35 
years longer than a control group without the information intervention. Nguyen (2008) 
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finds similar magnitudes for the effect of provision of labor market return information in 
Madagaskar. 
Even with high labor market returns, education spending may also depend on the 
time horizon for reaping benefits from these investments. Jayachandran and Lleras-Muney 
(2009) use data from Sri Lanka to show that a fall in the maternal mortality increases female 
life expectancy and increases girl literacy and years of education attained. Similarly, 
Fortson (2011) uses data on geographic and time variation from 15 countries in sub-
Saharan Africa to show negative relationship between HIV prevalence and educational 
attainment. Despite the different possible pathways of influence, the results suggest that 
the link is likely due to a longevity-related decline in the expected returns to schooling. A 
recent paper in Malawi shows that availability of AIDS treatment resulted in increased 
spending on children’s human capital (Baranov & Kohler, 2014). Baranov and Kohler 
(2014) argue that the mechanism of action is through changing perceptions about longevity. 
Education investments may also depend on the heterogeneity in the return to years 
of education. If parents recognize the heterogeneity in labor market returns, they may be 
less likely to invest in poor-quality education. For example, Lloyd et al. (2003) show that 
Egyptian girls, in particular, are more likely to drop out when schools have lower quality 
measures such as multiple shifts, poor physical facilities, more temporary teachers. While 
choice of school is potentially endogenous, Lloyd et al. (2003) rely on the fact that school 
choice in Egypt is limited and residential migration is low. Similarly, Hanushek, Lavy, and 
Hitomi (2008) study dropout behavior in Egypt and show that high-achieving students are 
more likely to stay in school than low-achieving students. Conditional on their skills, 
however, students attending schools of lower quality are more likely to drop out of school 
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and complete fewer grades. Another educational outcome that may be affected by school 
quality is enrollment. Case and Deaton (1999) use data from South Africa during the 
apartheid when Black families had limited residential mobility and school resources were 
controlled centrally. They show that pupil-teacher ratios had significant effects on 
achievement as well as school enrollment. Studying determinants of enrollment age in 
Tanzania, Bommier and Lambert (2000) also find that quality influences household 
educational investments. In particular, they show that higher quality of mathematics 
teaching is associated with younger enrollment age and higher quality of Swahili teaching 
is associated with longer school duration. While school quality measures that serve as 
direct inputs in children’s human capital production function could be expected to matter, 
even physical quality of schools are found to be important determinants of schooling 
choices. For example, Paxson and Schady (2002) study an increase in government 
spending on school facilities in Peru and find a plausibly causal relationship between the 
physical quality of schools and school attendance of children between the ages of 6 and 11. 
The lack of data on any accompanying improvements in pupil-teacher ratios or time spent 
in school, however, may mask one channel through which physical infrastructure affects 
child achievement and future labor market returns. 
3. The Indonesian context  
3.1 Overview 
Indonesia is the fourth most populous country in the world with 250 million people, 
spread on thousands of islands. A lower-middle-income country, it has GDP per capita of 
$3,500 in current USD, less than 7% of US GDP per capita.  For a period of 20 years 
starting in the 1970s, Indonesia experienced a rapid economic growth, following a change 
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in the political leadership and liberalization of the economy. Using foreign aid and oil 
revenues, the government invested heavily in infrastructure and social programs. The 
proportion of the population living under poverty fell from 40.1% in 1976 to 11.3% in 1996 
(Lanjouw et al., 2001). Between 1973 and 1979, the government constructed more than 
61,000 primary schools, raising enrollment rates of primary school students from 69% to 
83% (Duflo, 2001). It also created the National Family Planning Coordinating Board which 
promoted small families and, in particular, a two-child norm. Volunteer and village mid-
wife services were used to promote and distribute different contraceptives, and those were 
made available free of charge during the 70s and 80s (Frankenberg, Sikoki, & Suriastini, 
2003). As a result, total fertility rates decreased from 5.6 children per woman in the late 
1960s to 3.4 in 1984-1987, and 2.8 in 1995-1997 (Permana & Westoff, 1999). 
Unlike many Asian countries, Indonesia shows no male gender bias in parental 
preferences in birth outcomes or nutrition, and the gender gap in educational attainment 
has been declining (Kevane & Levine, 2000). In 2012, school enrollment rates of girls and 
boys were similar: 92.8% of primary school-aged girls and 91.7% of primary school-aged 
boys were enrolled in primary school; overall enrollment in secondary school was lower 
but again a larger proportion of secondary school-aged girls (77.5%) than boys (74.8%) 
were enrolled in secondary school (The World Bank). At the same time, girl education may 
be a luxury good. For example, Cameron and Worswick (2001) study household capacity 
to smooth consumption after crop loss and find that when hit by an income shock, 
households with girls of school age (and not those with boys of school age) reduce 
education expenditures. Similarly, Thomas et al. (2004) show that during the economic 
crisis of late 1990s households with more boys experienced lower reductions in the 
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education budget shares compared to those with more girls. Thomas et al. (2004) also find 
that households tended to protect the education of the older children at the expense of the 
younger ones. This is consistent with Pradhan (1998) who finds that having younger 
siblings decreases the probability of delayed enrolment and thus the first-born in the family 
receive better education. 
The educational system in Indonesia is characterized by three schooling levels – 
primary school for ages 7 to 13, then three years each for junior high school and senior 
high school. In 1994, mandatory school going age was increased to 15 years. Yet, while 
primary school enrollment is almost universal, junior high school enrollment in 1997 was 
only 72.2%, while senior high school enrollment was less than 50%  (Lanjouw et al., 2001). 
Repetition, especially during primary school, is fairly common with 14.2% of students in 
grade one and 4.5% of those in grade five of primary school repeating the grade in 1993 
(Jones & Hagul, 2001). After each level, students take state exams and their performance 
determines placement in higher-level schools. School attendance usually requires an 
annual registration fee, as well as monthly fees. Even in public schools, where annual 
registration fees have been abolished, parents are expected to pay monthly fees 
(Suryadarma et al., 2006). In public primary schools, Suryadarma et al. (2006) find a 
positive relationship between fees and school performance, which they attribute to the use 
of the money for better school inputs.  
Education in Indonesia has been traditionally associated with a high return in the 
labor market. Earlier studies estimated Mincerian models of log wages as a function of 
years of schooling using household fixed effects to account for any household-level and 
community-level unobservable characteristics that affect both schooling choices and wages 
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(Behrman & Deolalikar, 1993, 1995). Yet, these models ignored individual-level 
heterogeneity and differences in ability between siblings. A different approach to estimate 
the causal effect of education on earnings is the use of an instrumental variables model. 
Duflo (2001) uses the rapid construction of primary schools in the 1970s as a natural 
experiment that provides exogenous variation in access to schooling by region of birth and 
date of birth. She finds that an additional school per 1,000 children led to an average of 
0.12 to 0.19 additional years of education. In 1995, each additional year of education 
caused 6.8% to 10.6% higher wages. More recently, Carneiro et al. (2011) examine return 
to secondary education in Indonesia. They use distance from the community of residence 
to the nearest secondary school as an instrument for years of education, which they 
plausibly argue is not correlated with individual ability or motivation in the Indonesian 
context. They find that in the year 2000, returns to upper secondary schooling are even 
higher than those estimated by Duflo (2001): a year of secondary schooling yields labor 
market returns of 27% for the average student. 
3.2 The East Asian Financial Crisis 
Thailand’s financial crisis and currency devaluation in the summer of 1997 rapidly 
spread to the countries of the region. While Indonesia’s currency was volatile in 1997, most 
Indonesians were only affected in the beginning of 1998 when the rupiah sharply declined 
after a government budget announcement. In 1998, inflation reached 80% but prices of 
basic goods increased between 100% and 400%, while real wages fell by 40% (Setiawan, 
2000). The timing and magnitude of the economic shock were largely unexpected and 
households struggled to smooth consumption. Faced with liquidity constraints, households 
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sold assets (such as gold) and decreased nonfood consumption, including spending on 
health and education (Frankenberg, Smith, & Thomas, 2003). 
The effects of the economic shock were heterogeneous. There was substantial 
geographic variation. For example, the increase in the price of rice varied between 110% 
in South Sumatra to 280% in South and Central Kalimantan (Levinsohn, Berry, & 
Friedman, 1999). Certain sectors of the economy were also affected more than others: 
while mining and service sectors contracted by 4.5%, the construction and finance sectors 
contracted by 40% and 27% respectively. In addition, urban unemployment rose but 
employment in rural areas increased as people (women, in particular) increased labor 
supply (especially in agriculture) (Setiawan, 2000). School dropout rates in 1998 increased 
for all income quartiles and for children in both urban and rural areas (Frankenberg, 
Thomas, & Beegle, 1999). Children in the lowest income quartile, however, seem to have 
been affected more than those in the other quartiles. Similarly, young children (7 to 12) in 
rural areas experienced higher increases in dropout rates than young children in urban 
areas, while older children in urban areas saw higher dropout rates than their counterparts 
in rural areas. 
In July 1998, the government launched several social safety net programs, known 
as JPS. Those included provision of subsidized rice, creation of public works projects and 
school scholarships. The scholarship money was in the form of monthly cash transfers, 
conditional on school attendance. The goal of the program was to reach about 6% of 
primary school students, 17% of junior high school students, and 10% of senior high school 
students. Another goal of the program was to allocate at least half of the scholarships to 
girls. The scholarships were allocated in a decentralized manner to the poorest households 
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in the poorest districts (Pritchett, 2002; Sparrow, 2007). While targeting of the program 
was imperfect, the JPS scholarships were found to be effective in mitigating the effects of 
the economic crisis and the associated income shock, reducing school dropouts (Cameron, 
2009; Sparrow, 2007). Yet, the coverage of the program was limited and its rollout 
delayed.1 
3.3 Why Indonesia? 
Indonesia in the late 1990s is a good setting to study questions of school dropout 
and resource allocation between children for several reasons. First, Indonesia has very high 
school enrollment rates and as progress is made on increasing the quantity of schooling, 
attention is being shifted to improving its quality of education. Teacher absenteeism rates 
in primary school have been estimated at 19% (Chaudhury et al., 2006). Absenteeism has 
been linked to low test scores in Indonesia (Suryadarma et al., 2006) as well as other 
countries (Das et al., 2007). In addition, Indonesian children consistently underperform in 
international tests such as PISA and TIMSS (Pradhan et al., 2011). Thus, examining 
whether school dropout is associated with a loss in potential skill accumulation, accounting 
for selection out of schooling, is an important question, relevant to this context.  
Second, there are few gender differences in educational outcomes in Indonesia. At 
the same time, as discussed above, research by Cameron and Worswick (2001) and Thomas 
et al. (2004) has shown that boy education may be prioritized over girl education when 
households are resource constrained. These studies considered total investment, not 
distinguishing between gender bias in school enrollment and gender bias in school 
                                                     
1 A very small proportion of the households interviewed in the Indonesian Family Life Survey data used for 
the analysis in this dissertation had received JPS scholarship money for one or more of their children before 
the year 2000. All results of the analysis were found to be robust to controlling for JPS status or excluding 
JPS households from the sample. 
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spending. In my study on resource allocation, I only study investments at the intensive 
margin for children who continue to go to school.  
Third, while households in many developing countries may face a tradeoff between 
the quantity of children and their quality, the extensive family planning programs in 
Indonesia make it a good setting to study investments in children, independently of 
household fertility decisions.  
Fourth, the Indonesian Family Life Survey (IFLS) dataset used for analysis is one 
of the very few datasets in developing countries that include cognitive assessments for all 
children in the household. This allows me to study the effect of school dropout on test 
scores in chapter 2 and then, in chapter 3, to directly incorporate children’s test scores in 
the parental investment decision problem and show whether parents respond to differences 
in children’s skills.  
Finally, two of the waves of this longitudinal dataset, IFLS2 from 1997 and IFLS3 
from 2000, span the period of the East Asian Financial crisis – a period of large social and 
economic turmoil, accompanied by important changes in school enrollments and 
investments. Studying schooling decisions during a period of resource constraints is 
important as it provides insight on household coping mechanisms. It also uncovers the 
vulnerable populations that may need more protection from a short-run income shock that 
may have long-run negative consequences. 
4. Data  
This dissertation uses data from the Indonesian Family Life Survey (IFLS): a 
longitudinal dataset which tracks individuals and households over time. The IFLS was first 
administered in 1993. The survey sampled households from 13 of Indonesia’s 27 provinces 
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containing 83% of the population: four provinces on Sumatra (North Sumatra, West 
Sumatra, South Sumatra, and Lampung), all five of the Javanese provinces (DKI Jakarta, 
West Java, Central Java, DI Yogyakarta, and East Java), and four provinces covering the 
remaining major island groups (Bali, West Nusa Tenggara, South Kalimantan, and South 
Sulawesi). The second wave of the survey, IFLS2, took place between July and November 
1997, while the third wave, IFLS3, took place between June and December 2000. A total 
of 6,564 households were interviewed in all three waves of the survey – 90.9% of the 
original IFLS1 households. In addition, individuals who moved out of their IFLS 
households were followed with a special attention being paid to children and young adults 
(Strauss et al., 2004). Thus, while there is attrition, as in any longitudinal survey, the re-
contact rate at both the household and individual level is relatively high, ensuring the high 
quality of the data and minimal attrition bias. 
In my analysis, I use information only from IFLS2 and IFLS3 for several reasons. 
First, both waves collect information on all children in the household unlike IFLS1, where 
only selected children of the household were interviewed. Second, unlike IFLS1, both 
IFLS2 and IFLS3 include cognitive assessments for all individuals between the ages of 7 
and 24. The survey in 1997 included questions on Indonesian language and mathematics. 
Children were categorized in four age groups (7 to 9, 10 to 12, 13 to 15, and 16 to 24) and 
received a test depending on their group. The assessment in 2000 included a general test of 
cognition (8 or 12 questions on Raven’s Colored Progressive Matrices) and a mathematics 
test (5 questions). Different tests were administered for children under the age of 15 and 
individuals aged 15 and above. The data from these two survey waves also provide child-
specific information on education attainment and parental education spending for the 
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academic years 1997/1998 and 1999/2000, including annual registration fees, monthly 
fees, and other expenses for food, travel and extracurricular activities. Third, the 1997 and 
2000 data span the period of the East Asian Financial crisis, allowing for the study of 
changes in enrollments and investments during a period of resource constraints. Finally, as 
mentioned earlier, the attrition rate between the two survey waves is small. While a fourth 
wave in 2007 was administered with the same cognitive assessments as in 2000, close to 
30% of individuals aged between 15 and 25 in the year 2000 were not tracked in 2007. 
Thus, had I used information from the later wave, the results would have been subject to 




CHAPTER 2: Learning outcomes of Indonesian children after dropping out of school  
1. Introduction 
Traditionally, human capital has been measured by years of schooling. As progress 
is made around the world on reaching universal primary education and increasing quantity 
of schooling, more attention is being given to the quality of education and the skills 
obtained in schools. The evidence on whether more schooling is associated with more 
learning, however, is inconclusive. For example, Barham, Macours, and Maluccio (2013) 
find that boys between the ages of 9 and 12 who lived in communities that benefitted from 
conditional cash transfers (CCTs) in Nicaragua, stayed in school longer and had higher 
mathematics and language test scores ten years after the conclusion of the program 
compared to a control group. Baird, McIntosh, and Ozler (2011) reach similar conclusions 
for the effects of a CCT program targeted at girls aged 13 to 22 in Malawi, two years after 
the start of the program. In addition, unlike the Barham, Macours, and Maluccio (2013) 
study, they also find significant gains in cognition (measured by Raven’s Colored 
Progressive Matrices assessment). Importantly, both of these programs were implemented 
at the community level and the treatment effects being estimated are averages across the 
affected children.  
On the other hand, Filmer and Schady (2009) study a scholarship program in 
Cambodia allocated to children in lower secondary school according to an individual 
dropout risk score. Using a regression discontinuity design, they find no effects of extra 
schooling on scores of similarly home-administered mathematics and vocabulary tests 18 
months after the program start. The scholarship recipients did not do better on the tests 
even when they attended schools of higher quality. Filmer and Schady (2009) attribute their 
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findings to selection issues as the marginal children who are brought into school are of 
lower abilities. The authors suggest that special school interventions that focus on low-
performing students may be needed if children are to learn more when they stay at school 
longer.2  
The studies by Barham, Macours, and Maluccio (2013), Baird, McIntosh, and Ozler 
(2011) and Filmer and Schady (2009) have all evaluated programs that generally target 
poorer communities and households and have thus examined the effect of mitigating long-
run resource constraints on child schooling and achievement. My analysis provides 
evidence for how learning is affected by school dropout due to short-run constraints. I use 
household panel data from the period of the Indonesian economic crisis in late 1990s to 
estimate the effect of missed schooling on the accumulation of skills learned in school, as 
well as on general cognition, of girls and boys between the ages of 7 and 15. I identify the 
effect of dropout on test scores for the population of children who wouldn’t have dropped 
out had the economic crisis not occurred.3 I find that getting less education because of 
binding short-run budget constraints is associated with significantly lower mathematics and 
Raven’s scores. The policy implication of these results is that, if Indonesian parents hit by 
an unexpected income shock had been given cash transfers, they could have afforded to 
keep their children in school and the additional years of schooling would have allowed 
their children to obtain valuable skills. However, a government may not be able to 
distinguish the households who would withdraw their child from school irrespective of 
                                                     
2 Alternatively, these findings could offer support for policy interventions at early ages, which in the US 
have been shown to be more effective in improving learning and reducing dropout (Garces et al., 2002; 
Heckman & Masterov, 2007). 
3 This effect is conceptually similar to the one identified in Filmer and Schady (2009). They estimate the 
effect on the marginal children induced to stay in school by the scholarship policy (the decrease in long-run 
budget constraints). I identify the effect on the marginal children induced to drop out by the crisis (the 
increase in short-run budget constraints). 
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income shocks from those who would keep their child in school if not resource constrained. 
Therefore, I also estimate the policy-relevant effect of treatment on the treated (which is 
conceptually similar to the effect identified in the CCT studies discussed above). While 
less schooling is still associated with lower mathematics test scores, the effect on Raven’s 
scores is reduced and loses statistical significance once I control for child work status.  
In order to estimate the causal effect of dropping out, the reasons why children stop 
going to school need to be considered. Factors may include child preferences and ability, 
school quality and returns to education, as well as resource constraints. In the standard 
human capital model, children and parents are forward-looking and view schooling as an 
investment with financial returns. However, Oreopoulos (2007) studies the impact of 
compulsory schooling laws in the US, Canada and the UK and shows that schooling 
decisions may not always be governed by investment motives. Rather, students may 
discount future benefits and non-pecuniary costs such as school distaste may influence their 
dropout decisions. Eckstein and Wolpin (1999) estimate a structural model of school 
progression and work choices in the US and find that high-school graduates are inherently 
different from high-school dropouts in terms of preferences. They also differ in terms of 
abilities and have comparative advantage at jobs done by nongraduates. Li, Poirier, and 
Tobias (2004) show that, on average, dropping out of high school in the US has a large 
negative effect on senior year math scores as students miss in-class learning (Li et al., 
2004). However, they find little difference between counterfactual test scores and observed 
test scores for dropouts, arguing that they would have benefitted little from extra schooling. 
On the other hand, Cascio and Lewis (2006) and Brinch and Galloway (2012) show that 
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the increase in education brought about by compulsory schooling laws in the US and 
Norway was associated with an increase in cognition.   
How long children stay in school also depends on the quality of schooling and 
perceived returns to education. For example, Hanushek, Lavy, and Hitomi (2008) study 
dropout behavior in Egypt and show that high-achieving students are more likely to stay in 
school than low-achieving students. Conditional on their skills, however, students 
attending schools of lower quality are more likely to drop out of school and complete fewer 
grades. Glewwe and Jacoby (1994) further show that the effect of school quality on child 
achievement of Ghanaian children is both through improved learning rates and increased 
school attainment. Case and Deaton (1999) use data from South Africa during the apartheid 
when Black families had limited residential mobility and school resources were controlled 
centrally. They show that pupil-teacher ratios had significant effects on school enrollment 
and achievement. One of the reasons why school quality affects the dropout decision may 
have to do with the expected returns to schooling. A recruitment intervention in India made 
job opportunities for women more salient and accessible and increased enrollment in 
school for younger girls and enrollment in training programs for older girls (Jensen, 2012). 
Similarly, students in the Dominican republic who were provided with information about 
the higher than perceived returns to secondary school stayed in school longer (Jensen, 
2010).     
In developing countries, resource constraints are another important determinant of 
schooling decisions due to high opportunity costs or households’ inability to finance formal 
education. That is why the school construction program in Indonesia in the 1970s, which 
decreased distance travelled and thus reduced monetary and time costs of schooling, 
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increased school attendance (Duflo, 2001). Similarly, abolishing school fees for primary 
school in Uganda led to dramatic increases in enrollment (Deininger, 2003). Resource 
constraints are also evident in that parents often fail to insure children against the effects 
of income shocks. Thus, negative macroeconomic shocks have been shown to reduce 
enrollment and attendance rates (Ferreira & Schady, 2009). Similarly, Jacoby and Skoufias 
(1997) find that school attendance in rural India fluctuates during periods of idiosyncratic 
income shocks because financial market imperfections in rural India prevent households 
from borrowing against future income. For Brazilian children between the ages of 10 and 
16, Duryea, Lam, and Levison (2007) study the effect of the male household head 
becoming unemployed and show significant increases in the probability of dropping out of 
school permanently and entering the labor force. While income shocks affect schooling 
outcomes negatively, their effect on some children may often be disproportionate as parents 
insure some children better than others. For example, Björkman-Nyqvist (2013) uses 
regional rainfall variation to identify the effect of decreases in income on child schooling 
in Uganda, showing negative impacts on girls’ enrollment and no impacts on boys. 
Given the many factors that affect schooling decisions, I use a variety of empirical 
approaches in order to account for the possibility of children selecting out of school.  If 
selection is based on pre-treatment heterogeneity where students who drop out differ from 
those who don’t in unobserved factors such as ability or motivation, the ordinary least 
squares (OLS) estimates of the effect of school interruption on achievement will be biased. 
Therefore, I use a value-added model, controlling for past mathematics test scores in order 
to account for any time-constant unobservables that govern both past and present test scores 
as well as the schooling decision. A more general approach to account for endogeneity in 
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the dropout decision is to use an instrumental variables model. I take advantage of the fact 
that the Indonesia Family Life Survey data spans the period before and after the Indonesian 
economic crisis of late 1990s. I use age and gender-specific differences in predicted and 
observed non-enrollment rates in the year of the crisis as the source of identifying variation. 
These serve as exogenous instruments for the individual decision to drop out of school. 
While the different estimation methods account for different econometric assumptions, 
they also identify different parameters. The IV model identifies the effect of dropout on 
test scores for the population of compliers who wouldn’t have dropped out had the 
economic crisis not occurred. From a policy perspective, however, the relevant policy 
parameter and my preferred estimate is the effect of treatment on the treated - the average 
effect across all children who dropped out, correcting for selection out of school. It is 
estimated using an endogenous switching regression model which also allows for treatment 
effect heterogeneity. 
The next section provides some descriptive statistics on the data used for this 
analysis. In section 3, I present the conceptual framework that governs the empirical 
specification of section 4. Section 5 contains information on the sample construction and 
variable definitions, while section 6 discusses the instrument choice. Section 7 presents the 
findings from the various analyses that quantify the effect of school interruption on learning 
achievements and cognition. Section 8 includes sensitivity analyses in which I examine the 
potential effects of changes in school quality at the community level, and test the 
effectiveness of the government scholarship program instituted during the crisis. Section 9 
concludes.    
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2. Background   
Frankenberg, Thomas, and Beegle (1999) present school dropout rates in Indonesia 
in 1997 and 1998 by age group, urban versus rural area of residence and income quartile, 
which is included here as figure 1. Figure 1 shows that dropout rates in 1998 increased for 
all income quartiles and for children in both urban and rural areas. Children in the lowest 
income quartile, however, seem to have been affected more than those in the other 
quartiles. Similarly, young children (7 to 12) in rural areas experienced higher increases in 
dropout rates than young children in urban areas, while older children in urban areas saw 
higher dropout rates than their counterparts in rural areas. Using the second and third wave 
of the IFLS data, I present further evidence of the effect of the crisis on school enrollments. 
Table 1 shows the results from a linear regression of enrollment status on year fixed effects 
(2000 compared to 1997), age fixed effects and interaction between the year and age 
dummies. The results suggest that the likelihood of being in school in 2000 is lower than 
in 1997 at each age level. Figure 2 plots the proportion of children attending school in 1997 
and 2000 and shows the same pattern.  
If school dropout is to have a negative effect on achievement for a random 
individual forced to drop out, then more schooling should yield higher test scores. The 
quality of education in Indonesia, however, has been shown to be very poor. Teacher 
absenteeism rates in primary school have been estimated at 19%, which is about the 
average of absenteeism rates in seven developing countries surveyed by Chaudhury et al. 
(2006). Absenteeism has been linked to low test scores in Indonesia (Suryadarma et al., 
2006) as well as other countries (Das et al., 2007). In addition, Indonesian children 
consistently underperform in international tests such as PISA and TIMSS (Pradhan et al., 
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2011). Still, children with more years of education perform better in the IFLS home-
administered tests compared to those with fewer years of education. Figure 3 plots the 
mean number of correct answers in the mathematics and Raven’s assessment in 2000 by 
years of schooling and test group. There is a clear upward trend for both test scores.  
The positive correlation between education and test scores is reassuring. The 
graphs, however, do not imply causality as children may select into schooling. Indeed, this 
seems to be the case in Indonesia during the study period. For example, figure 4 shows the 
distribution of mathematics scores in 1997 by future dropout status for children who 
completed 5 and 8 years of schooling in 1997. The score distribution for those who 
subsequently drop out is shifted to the left of that of the comparison group (more on the 
definition of the dropout and comparison groups is given below).4 Thus, while previous 
evidence suggests a negative effect on achievement could be expected for a random 
individual, children who dropped out apparently did not do so randomly. This complicates 
the estimation of the effect of dropout on learning. The next section presents a simple 
conceptual framework to illustrate the factors that govern the schooling decision and to 
provide some insights on the appropriate approach to empirical estimation. 
3. The conceptual framework 
Suppose parents derive utility from consumption,(𝐶), and the human capital of 
their child, (𝐻), and parents have a two-period utility function, discounting the second 
period by a factor 𝛿. 5 In the first period, they choose household consumption and the 
                                                     
4 The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test rejects equality of distributions in both cases. 
5 I am assuming a one-child household and ignore any intra-household allocation of resources to simplify 
discussion of the conceptual model. In the empirical specification, I attempt to account for the potential 
substitution between the education of different children by controlling for presence of an older sibling in 
the household, given the strong birth order effects in Indonesia (Pradhan, 1998). In the data, the effect of 
having a younger sibling is not statistically different from zero.  
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fraction of time the child spends in school, 𝑇, subject to a within-period budget constraint 
where no saving or borrowing is allowed. While extreme, this assumption serves to 
illustrate the point that households are budget constrained, and are either myopic or lack 
access to formal credit markets.6 Parents pay schooling fees, 𝑓, if the child attends school, 
or receive the child’s wage if the child works. Child labor is remunerated based on the 
average wage of unskilled workers, 𝑤𝑢̅̅ ̅̅ . Parental income is denoted by 𝐼
𝑝. In the second 
period, the child is an adult and parents only choose the level of household consumption 
based on their income level in that period and any transfers their adult child makes to them. 
Potential transfers are assumed to be a proportion, 𝜇, of the child’s adult income, 𝐼𝑐, which 
is a function of the human capital of the child, other personal characteristics, 𝑋, as well as 
market-level wage determinants, 𝐽. Human capital in both periods evolves according to a 
value-added production function: learning occurs at school as well as at home or at work, 
represented by an index of other non-school investments, 𝑔, and past human capital proxies 
for missing past inputs, as well as unobserved ability. 
𝑉 = max
Ct,𝑇𝑡,𝐶𝑡+1 
𝑈𝑡(𝐶𝑡, 𝐻𝑡) + 𝛿𝑈𝑡+1(𝐶𝑡+1 , 𝐻𝑡+1) 
𝑠. 𝑡.  𝑝𝑡𝐶𝑡 + 𝑓𝑡𝑇𝑡 = 𝐼𝑡




𝐻𝑡 = ℎ(𝐻𝑡−1, 𝑇𝑡, 𝑔𝑡) 
𝐻𝑡+1 = ℎ(𝐻𝑡, 𝑔𝑡+1 ) 
𝐼𝑡+1
𝑐 = 𝑖(𝐻𝑡+1, 𝑋, 𝐽𝑡+1) 
                                                     
6 While households could potentially have access to informal insurance from friends or neighbors, the 




In this setup, parents choose to send their child to school (𝑇 > 0) if 𝜕𝑉/𝜕𝑇 = 0. 

























< 𝜆1𝑤𝑢̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝜆1𝑓𝑡 
where 𝜆1 and 𝜆2 are the Lagrange multipliers or shadow prices associated with the budget 
constraints in periods 1 and 2, respectively. The expression on the left represents the 
marginal benefit of schooling. The first two left-hand terms stand for the marginal utility 
that parents derive in both periods from an increase in the child’s human capital, as 
governed by the child’s human capital production function. The last term shows the 
monetary benefits parents derive in the second period from having invested more in their 
child’s education. The right-hand side represents the marginal cost of schooling in terms 
of fees and the opportunity cost of schooling in terms of foregone wages. Thus, the 
schooling first-order condition in this maximization problem suggests that a positive level 
of schooling is not optimal when the marginal benefit of schooling is less than its marginal 
cost. Specifically, the model suggests that the schooling decision is determined by factors 
such as parental preference for education, child abilities and the related effectiveness of 
human capital investment, future returns to schooling, and parents’ insurance capacity and 
resource constraints. This presents a challenge for empirical estimation of the effect of 
school dropout on cognitive outcomes because some of these factors also likely affect child 
cognitive outcomes directly rather than only through schooling investment. The next 
section presents the empirical approaches used to deal with these issues.  
4. The empirical approach 
I examine the effect of school interruption by estimating a reduced-form model for 
cognitive outcomes. If parents are utility maximizers in choosing inputs for the production 
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of human capital of their child as described above, then the first-order conditions of their 
optimization problem yield demand functions for the various inputs governed by prices 
and income. By replacing inputs in the production function with these expressions, 
reduced-form demand functions for human capital are obtained as a function of prices and 
income (Rosenzweig & Schultz, 1983). If prices are constant across observations, their 
effect is absorbed in the intercept term (Todd & Wolpin, 2007). Thus, I estimate test scores 
in 2000 as a function of household per capita consumption to account for missing inputs, 
as well as other variables that may affect unobserved parental preferences for inputs and 
household constraints such as child gender, mother’s age and years of education, household 
composition (i.e., presence of an older sibling in the household), urban/rural area of 
residence, and province fixed effects. In addition, in order to account for the fact that 
children in the sample are at different schooling levels, I include fixed effects for years of 
completed schooling in 1997. By controlling for the fixed effects of education in 1997, I 
implicitly define the effect of school interruption to be the effect of extra schooling 
foregone between 1997 and 2000, averaged over estimates for children who were at the 
same schooling level in 1997.7 Due to delayed entry into schooling and repetitions of grade 
levels, considerable differences exist between age and years of education. As a result, I 
also include child age in the main regression model. Since the survey occurred over a six-
month period, I also include dummy variables for the month of interview.  
                                                     
7 In other words,  I compare, for example, the scores in the year 2000 of two children who were in 5th 
grade in 1997, but one of them moved on to 8th grade by 2000, while the other dropped out. The effect of 
dropout is computed as the average effect for children at all schooling levels. This approach identifies the 
counterfactual outcome based on peer comparison. It is also helpful in dealing with any selection that has 
already occurred that is not captured by the data.  For example, a potential concern could be that the pool of 
young children includes those of low, average, and high ability, while the pool of older children going to 
school in 1997 may only include children of high ability. Given the inclusion of grade fixed effects, 
however, this potential selection concern is eliminated. 
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The main model I attempt to estimate is: 𝑌𝑖 = 𝛽𝑋𝑖 + 𝛼𝐷𝑖 + 𝑈𝑖, where 𝑌𝑖 is the 
measure of the cognitive outcome of child i in the year 2000, 𝑋𝑖 is a function of child and 
household characteristics as discussed above, and 𝐷𝑖 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
child interrupted schooling between 1997 and 2000, and 0 otherwise (more specifics on the 
definition of a dropout are provided below).  If 𝑌1 is the potential test score when 
individuals are “treated” (i.e., drop out of school) and 𝑌0 is the potential test score when 
individuals are “not treated” (i.e., don’t drop out of school), then the potential outcome can 
be written as a function of the observable characteristics, 𝑋𝑖, and the unobservable error 
terms 𝑈𝑖,1 and 𝑈𝑖,0, where 𝑌𝑖,1 = 𝛽1𝑋𝑖 + 𝑈𝑖,1 and 𝑌𝑖,0 = 𝛽0𝑋𝑖 + 𝑈𝑖,0. Where the latent 
propensity to be treated explained by some exogenous shifters Z and an error term V 
follows 𝐼𝑖 = 𝑍𝑖𝛾 + 𝑉𝑖 , I represent the observed binary outcome of school interruption as 
𝐷𝑖 = 1 if 𝐼𝑖 ≥ 0 and 𝐷𝑖 = 0  if 𝐼𝑖 < 0. For each child, I observe either his treated or his 
untreated outcome and never both. The observed outcome can then be re-written as: 
 𝑌𝑖 = (1 − 𝐷𝑖) ∗ 𝑌𝑖,0 + 𝐷𝑖 ∗ 𝑌𝑖,1 = 𝛽0𝑋𝑖 + 𝐷𝑖(𝛽1 − 𝛽0)𝑋𝑖 + 𝑈𝑖,0 + 𝐷𝑖(𝑈𝑖,1 − 𝑈𝑖,0).        (1) 
If the propensity to stay in school is uncorrelated with unobservables 
(𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑉𝑖, 𝑈𝑖) = 0 ) and unobservables are homogeneous (𝑈𝑖,1 = 𝑈𝑖,0 = 𝑈𝑖), then this 
model can be estimated using OLS. However, if the error term 𝑈𝑖 contains unobservable 
characteristics that also affect the decision whether to pull the child out of school (i.e., 
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑉, 𝑈𝑖) ≠ 0), then OLS estimation is biased. In this case, the variable 𝐷𝑖 and the error 
term 𝑈𝑖 in equation (1) will be correlated even if 𝑈𝑖,1 = 𝑈𝑖,0 = 𝑈𝑖 in the empirical 
specification above. This is the pre-treatment heterogeneity bias where students who drop 
out differ from those who don’t in terms of ability or socioeconomic characteristics, and 
33 
 
the same unobserved factors that determine the difference also affect the decision to drop 
out. Controlling for covariates is required to reduce or eliminate this bias.  
I utilize test scores from 1997 before the dropout decision to estimate a value-added 
model. Past test scores could be used to proxy for parental preference for education, 
previously accumulated child skills and the effectiveness of human capital investment (the 
factors that affect the marginal benefit in the conceptual model presented above). If a child 
drops out of school because of low marginal cognitive benefit then, under certain 
conditions, controlling for past scores may help eliminate the bias. This model, however, 
yields unbiased estimates for past test scores only under restrictive assumptions about the 
degree of correlation of the error terms in test scores over time (Todd & Wolpin, 2003). If 
the coefficient on past test scores is biased and the dropout decision is correlated with past 
test scores, then the dropout coefficient would still be biased. In addition, past test scores 
may not be a good proxy for unobserved ability and preferences, and may not account for 
other unobservables that may govern both the dropout decision and skill accumulation, 
such as the time household members spend in different activities (which is likely to change 
during the crisis).  
As a result, I also employ an instrumental variables approach to account for 
endogeneity in the schooling decision related to omitted variable bias. I use age and gender-
specific difference in predicted and observed non-enrollment rates in 1998 (during the 
crisis) as the source of identifying variation (more details on instrument choice and validity 
are given below). If the endogeneity in the schooling decision is based on omitted variable 
bias related to the marginal benefit from schooling, then the IV estimates of the impact of 
dropout, as well as the value-added estimates, could be expected to be lower than the OLS 
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estimates (i.e., IV corrects for a negative bias because omitted ability affects test scores 
positively but ability and dropout are negatively corrected). If some children drop out 
because of resource constraints (high marginal cost), however, then the IV estimates may 
be larger than OLS estimates as has been consistently shown in the literature on labor 
market returns to schooling (Card, 2001). In this context, higher IV estimates could be 
expected if poorer families (those affected most by the income shock) have fewer 
opportunities to provide compensatory time or money investments. 
A different type of bias often considered in the human capital literature is treatment 
effect heterogeneity bias, or sorting on the treatment effect. This bias exists if 𝑈𝑖,1 ≠ 𝑈𝑖,0. 
In this case, any instrument that is a good predictor of the propensity to interrupt school 
will by definition be correlated with 𝐷𝑖 and thus with the error term in the observed 
outcomes equation, 𝑈𝑖,0 + 𝐷𝑖(𝑈𝑖,1 − 𝑈𝑖,0). The individual error terms could be different 
under different scenarios if, for example, some children learn better out of school (e.g., at 
home or at work) because of the quality of schooling they receive or the nature of their 
human capital production function (note that the model does not constrain the coefficients 
associated with the various inputs in cognitive achievement to be equal in the different 
regimes). Thus, when children are heterogeneous in the manifestation of their skills and 
family effects, and when the decision to stay in school is endogenous and related to these 
skill and family effects, an endogenous regime-switching regression model can be used to 
estimate the effect of dropout on child cognitive and achievement scores.  
Using the notation above, the endogenous regime-switching regression model is 
estimated by maximizing the following likelihood function: 
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[𝑓(𝑌𝑖|𝐷𝑖 = 0) ∗ 𝑃(𝐷𝑖 = 0)]
1−𝐷𝑖 
where 𝑃(𝐷𝑖 = 1) = 1 − 𝑃(𝐷𝑖 = 0) stands for the probability of dropping out of school, 
and 𝑓(𝑌𝑖|𝐷𝑖 = 1) and 𝑓(𝑌𝑖|𝐷𝑖 = 0) are the conditional distributions of the observed 
outcomes. As in the previous model, the probability of dropping out of school is modelled 
as a function of the variables included in the outcome equation as well as an excluded 
shifter. I use the same age and gender-specific instrument to help with the empirical 
identification of the model. 
Under the assumption of joint normality of the error terms, the first term in the 
likelihood function can be represented as: 
























where 𝜎1is the standard deviation of the error term 𝑈𝑖,1, 𝜌1 is the correlation coefficient 
between 𝑉𝑖 and 𝑈𝑖,1, and 𝜙(. ) is the standard normal probability distribution function. 
Similar manipulations are applied to the second part of the likelihood function to yield a 
final log-likelihood function 
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This likelihood function accounts for the fact that the error terms are possibly not 
independent. In the case when both correlation coefficients, 𝜌1 and 𝜌0, are zero (i.e., 
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑈1, 𝑉) = 0 and 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑈0, 𝑉) = 0), OLS estimation of the effect of dropout is 
consistent.  If at least one of the coefficients is found to be statistically different from zero, 
then an endogenous switching model is appropriate. If the two coefficients have opposite 
signs and 𝜌1 > 0 while 𝜌0 < 0, then the results provide evidence for comparative 
advantage. The reason is that individuals who choose to be in regime 1 (i.e., have high 
values of the unobservable 𝑉 term) also have high outcomes in regime 1 (high 𝑉 implies 
high 𝑈1 when 𝜌1 > 0). In other words, the unobservable factors that make a child more 
likely to drop out of school also make the child have higher test scores when not attending 
school. Similar logic follows for individuals in regime 0.  
A model of comparative advantage is plausible when the outcome of dominating 
interest is future wages of the child and higher wages can be earned in jobs requiring 
different skills (Roy, 1951). For example, in a seminal contribution to the literature, Willis 
and Rosen (1979) show for the US that the decision of whether to attend college depends 
on the expected lifetime earnings under the two options (i.e., college or no college). They 
also find evidence of comparative advantage, showing that college graduates would have 
been worse off if they had not gone to college compared to people who actually did not go 
to college, and vice versa. In the present study, however, the outcome of interest is test 
scores. Yet, as mentioned above, there could be comparative advantage if some children 
learn best at school, while other children learn best in other settings such as work. Studies 
have indeed shown that skills can be accumulated in a variety of settings in addition to 
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learning at school (Hull & Schultz, 2001). Work, however, is unlikely to completely 
replace formal training in mathematics.  
In order to quantify the effect of school interruption on cognitive outcomes, I 
estimate the policy-relevant parameter of the effect of treatment on the treated.8 It is 
calculated as the difference in potential outcomes for the individuals who had a school 
interruption obtained by predicting their expected counterfactual cognitive scores (if they 
had not dropped out of school) based on observed characteristics and the returns to those 
characteristics in the other regime, given the selection process. It can be expressed as 𝑇𝑇 =
𝐸[𝑌1 − 𝑌0|𝐷 = 1] = (𝛽1 − 𝛽0) ∗ 𝑋1 + (𝜌1𝜎1 − 𝜌0𝜎0) ∗ 𝜆1𝑖, where the selection term is 
given by 𝜆1𝑖 = 𝜙(𝑍𝑖𝛾)/Φ(𝑍𝑖𝛾).
9,10 If children select into schooling based on comparative 
advantage, so that students who benefit less from formal education drop out while those 
who benefit more stay in school, then the TT effect should be small. This result was found 
to be true for high-school seniors in the US (Li, Poirier & Tobias, 2004). In the context of 
school dropout during the Indonesian crisis, however, resource constraints that govern 
school decisions appear to be a more plausible explanation than comparative advantage. If 
so, sorting on the treatment effect would not occur and no difference would be found 
between the effect of school interruption on dropouts and the effect of interruption on a 
random individual made to drop out. 
                                                     
8 The standard errors for these treatment parameters are estimated by bootstrapping the maximum 
likelihood estimation with 1000 replications. 
9 Similarly, the effect of treatment on the untreated is the difference in predicted potential outcomes for 
those individuals who stayed in school given by 𝑇𝑈𝑇 = 𝐸[𝑌1 − 𝑌0|𝐷 = 0] = (𝛽1  − 𝛽0) ∗ 𝑋0 +
(𝜌1𝜎1 − 𝜌0𝜎0) ∗ 𝜆0𝑖, where 𝜆0𝑖 = −𝜙(𝑍𝑖𝛾)/(1 − Φ(𝑍𝑖𝛾)). The average treatment effect of school 
interruption on cognitive and achievement outcomes, i.e., the effect on a random person forced to drop out, 
can be calculated as 𝐴𝑇𝐸 = 𝐸[𝑌1 − 𝑌0] = (𝛽1𝑋1 − 𝛽0𝑋0). 
10 Note that IV estimation assumes no heterogeneity in unobservables. With IV, ATE = TT = TUT.  
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5. Construction of the sample for estimation 
I estimate the effect of school interruption on two outcomes measured at the time 
of the survey in 2000: Raven’s scores and mathematics scores. To avoid the problem of 
limited dependent variables (since the potential number of correct and wrong answers is 
predetermined), I standardize both test scores, as is common practice in the literature (e.g., 
Malamud & Pop-Eleches, 2011; Paxson & Schady, 2007; Todd & Wolpin, 2007).11 Since 
children were given different tests according to their age group, scores were standardized 
by test group (with a mean 0 and a standard deviation 1). All regressions control for gender 
to account for the potentially different distribution of scores by gender. 
I restrict the sample to nuclear households from 1997, excluding extended families 
or families where any young members (under age 25) are not children of the household 
head or spouse. The reason for this restriction is to ensure that parents have decision-
making ability over child investments, and to avoid issues of resource allocation among 
cousins.12 At the individual level, observations are used only for children between 7 and 
15 years of age who are attending school and have completed 9 or fewer years of education 
as of 1997. In addition, individuals who provide inconsistent answers (for example, who 
report years of schooling in 1997 higher than years of schooling in 2000) or who have 
missing values for any of the variables used in the analysis, are excluded.13  
                                                     
11 A related concern regarding the dependent variable is that the mathematics test only contained five 
questions. A test of robustness of OLS results to model specification by using a count-data model with a 
Poisson distribution shows that results remain qualitatively similar.   
12 In Chapter 3, I examine parental education investment in this period and find that, on average, parental 
resource allocation among siblings is not affected by child ability. This may not be the case for extended 
family members.   




The resulting sample of children (3,414) is comprised of four different groups. One 
group is the group of children who are not in school in the year 2000 and have zero or one 
year of extra education completed by 2000 (258, or 7.56% of the sample). Those are the 
children most likely to have dropped out because of the crisis due to resource constraints 
during the large negative income shock. A second group contains the children who are not 
in school in 2000 but have completed 2 or 3 years of schooling since 1997 (220). These 
children drop out after the crisis and their school decision is likely due to other 
considerations such as age or low abilities. The third group of children (1,253) is comprised 
of children who are still in school in 2000 but are lagging behind in their expected years of 
education (e.g., only have 1 or 2 years of schooling more in 2000 than in 1997). The reason 
children lag behind may be because of temporary school interruption due to the crisis or 
because of grade repetition (which may or may not be associated with absences during the 
crisis). In addition, the large proportion of children in this group suggests that some parents 
and children may have misreported the years of schooling and that the definition of this 
group may suffer from measurement error (see more on this below). Finally, members of 
the fourth group (1,683) are children who are in school in 2000 and have completed at least 
three years of education between 1997 and 2000. The fraction of dropouts in the sample 
may not be representative of the population because of the various sample restrictions 
imposed on the data. However, my findings are broadly consistent with Thomas et al. 
(2004) who show that in 1998 the proportion of male (female) children not enrolled in 
school at age 10 is 4.2% (3.8%), 8.2% (7.4%) at age 12, and 21.5% (22.3%) at age 14.  
For analysis of the effects of school dropout on cognitive and achievement 
outcomes, I compare outcomes of group 1 to the outcomes of the counterfactual sample 
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comprised of groups 2 and 4. By including group 2 as part of the comparison group, I 
recognize that some of the children who drop out during the crisis may have stopped going 
to school later anyway because of age and parental inability to finance further education, 
or because of low learning abilities, but the crisis induces them to do so earlier. While the 
sample restrictions on the group of permanent dropouts aims to reduce the endogeneity in 
the schooling decision and isolate children who drop out because of the crisis rather than 
because of low abilities or low quality of education, this group may also include children 
who would have dropped out at the same time during their schooling career in the absence 
of the income shock. Thus, the effect I identify is an average across these children. If 
children who would have dropped out anyway select out of school due to low abilities, then 
my estimates would be biased downward. With a crisis-related instrument for the decision 
to drop out, the effect on the population of “compliers” can be better identified (more on 
instrument choice is given in the next section).  
It should be noted that I exclude group 3 from the comparison sample because some 
(but not all) of the temporary school interruptions are likely caused by the crisis. I also do 
not consider them as part of dropout sample because of the potential measurement error 
problem.14,15   
Table 2 lists the number of dropouts by completed years of schooling in 1997 in 
the sample used for analysis. It shows that a large proportion of children drop out after 
                                                     
14 This is of concern because the measurement error in a binary variable representing school interruption is 
not classical; the direction of the bias is unknown (rather than an expected attenuation bias). 
15 Including the population of students who interrupt schooling temporarily in the analysis would also 
necessitate the use of a different conceptual and empirical model where some students decide whether to 
drop out of school in period 1, and then in period 2 those who dropped out decide whether to go back to 
school. While this would be an important behavior to study, this type of analysis is beyond the scope of this 
paper. Furthermore, the data used here are not well suited to study such dynamic decision-making. 
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completing 6 years of primary school or 3 years of junior high school.16 Table 3 presents 
descriptive statistics of the characteristics of the dropout group (group 1) compared to 
groups 2 and 4 combined. Dropouts are on average 2.2 years older and have 2.15 more 
years of education in 1997, although by the year 2000 they lag behind by 0.34 years in 
education. Despite their higher education in 1997, dropouts have lower math scores on 
average (although this may be a function of the different types of tests taken based on age). 
Dropouts also come from families with lower per capita expenditure in 1997 and are more 
likely to live in a rural area.  
6. Instrument choice 
In order to better isolate the effect of school dropout on the population of children 
who would not have stopped their schooling except for binding budget constraints, a crisis-
related instrument is needed for the decision to drop out. One potential instrument is the 
geographical variation in unemployment rates during the crisis. This is an instrument often 
used to model schooling decisions in the US especially at the transition between high-
school and college (Carneiro, Heckman, & Vytlacil, 2011). In Indonesia, unemployment 
rates during the crisis did not vary much, but real wages fell substantially. One problem 
with using inflation rates or average wage rate changes as potential instruments for the size 
of the crisis is that these instruments are found to be either correlated with pre-crisis 
outcomes or affect post-crisis outcomes independently of schooling decisions. This is 
likely to be the case when the variation in inflation and wage rates is measured at the 
                                                     
16 The regression results are robust to dropping children with zero years of completed education. Similarly, 
imposing a restriction for common support of the data does not affect results. Following Carneiro et al. 
(2011), I define common support as the intersection of the support of the probability of dropout given D = 1 
and the support of the probability of dropout given D = 0. Restricting the empirical estimates to the 
common support (0 to 0.84) excludes only 9 observations.  
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provincial level and the quality of education differs between provinces in a similar way, as 
well as when the crisis has independent effects on outcomes through nutrition, variation in 
parental and government investments, and other outside factors. In addition, these 
instruments likely do not have a monotonic effect on school dropout in Indonesia because 
high inflation increases the direct costs of schooling, while also decreasing the opportunity 
cost of schooling, as child labor becomes less profitable.  
In their paper on the effect of the crisis on school enrollments in Indonesia, Thomas 
et al. (2004) use a series of national socioeconomic surveys (SUSENAS) and estimate 
predicted non-enrollment rates in 1998 based on the enrollment trend from previous years. 
Then, they compare their predictions to the observed non-enrollment rates in 1998 by age 
and gender and find a large discrepancy between the two rates that could be attributed to 
the crisis. Similarly, I use the SUSENAS data for my restricted sample of 13 provinces to 
estimate linear prediction for non-enrollment rates in 1998 for children with ages 7 through 
15. I use the age-gender specific differences between the predicted and observed non-
enrollment rates as the instrument that provides identifying variation.17  
Figure 5 presents plots of the observed non-enrollment rates by age and gender 
from 1993 to 1998, showing the long-term downward trend in non-enrollment and the 
unexpected increases in 1998. While children of most ages had higher non-enrollment rates 
than expected, figure 6 shows that the largest deviations from the long-term trend in non-
                                                     
17 For 1998, observed rates for all but 11-year old boys are significantly different from the predicted rates. 
At the same time, even for 1997, the observed rates (for all but 10-year old boys and 8- and 12-year old 
girls) deviate significantly from the trend of the previous years. This suggests that the difference between 
predicted and observed non-enrollment rates in 1998 is comprised of the effect of the negative economic 
shock, as well as any period-to-period fluctuations. Comparing the deviations from the long-term trend for 
1998 and 1997, however, shows that the deviations in 1998 are significantly larger than those of 1997 and 
usually have a positive sign (i.e., more non-enrollments), while those in 1997 are usually negative. This 
result supports the hypothesis that identification is not based simply on natural yearly variations in 
enrollment rates and that the instrument identifies the effect of short-run budget constraints.      
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enrollment in 1998 are at ages 12, 13 and 14 for both girls and boys. This is consistent with 
children failing to enroll in secondary school after having completed six years of primary 
school.18 Analysis of the 1997 self-reported expenditure data in the IFLS dataset shows 
that overall education expenses as well as registration fees and monthly fees are 
significantly higher for children in junior high school than in primary school, including 
higher registration and monthly fees. Therefore, the observed increased dropout rates after 
primary school are consistent with household inability to pay fees due to short-term budget 
constraints. In addition, seven-year old girls also experienced very high non-enrollment 
rates, which suggests that parents may have postponed girl enrollment in school or may 
have withdrawn girls who were just starting school. In my sample, however, only one child 
aged 7 who was in school in the beginning of the 1997/1998 academic year dropped out of 
school permanently. Thus, the effect is largely identified off of the older children, 
transitioning out of primary school. I also perform a robustness check excluding seven-
year olds from the estimation sample. The regression results remain similar.  
The relevance of the instrument could be tested using a linear probability model of 
dropout status on only a constant term and the instrument. It yields a coefficient of 0.07, 
significant at the 5% level, clustering standard errors at the level of the instrument. The 
first stage results, adding various controls, are further discussed below. In terms of validity, 
the main assumption is that the instrument only affects the outcome through dropout and 
thus has no direct, independent effect on test scores. Adding the instrument to the main 
outcome equation confirms that it has not significant impact on test scores and also does 
not affect the coefficients on the other explanatory variables. Intuitively, if ability is the 
                                                     
18 The effect is seen at a range of ages because some children enroll in school later or repeat a grade. 
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omitted variable that determines both the individual schooling decision and child test 
scores, then using an indicator of the group-level probability of dropout to predict 
individual decisions isolates the non-endogenous component of dropout. However, since 
both group dropout rates and individual test scores generally vary linearly with age, group 
rates may still be directly correlated with test scores. Using the difference between 
predicted and observed rates as the instrument accounts for this possibility since the effect 
of the crisis on group probability of dropout varies nonlinearly with age. In other words, 
the instrument identifies the effect of dropout on children who were more vulnerable during 
the economic crisis and who had higher probability of dropout than what would have been 
expected given their age and gender – largely, the children transitioning between different 
school levels.  
One concern about using this instrument could be that it is a generated variable. 
However, Wooldridge (2010) shows that typical two-stage least squares estimation yields 
consistent estimates of the standard errors even with a generated instrument. The first-stage 
results, however, may be biased. To account for that, I present a robustness analysis for the 
decision to drop out where I use a two-step bootstrap estimation procedure, following 
Ashraf and Galor (2013). I draw a random sample with replacement from the SUSENAS 
data, estimate new values for the generated regressor, and use those to perform the first-
stage regression using my IFLS sample. The process is repeated 1,000 times and the 
standard errors in the first-stage model are calculated as the standard deviation of the point 
estimates of the estimation coefficients. 
Another concern could be that this instrument varies only at the age and gender 
levels. When grouped variables in OLS are matched to individual-level variables, the 
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standard errors are biased downward (Moulton, 1990). Similarly, for IV regressions, Shore-
Sheppard (1996) has shown that standard errors may be biased when using grouped data 
for the instrument. Therefore, in order to account for having an aggregate instrument and 
thus clustered errors, I estimate the second-stage standard errors using the correction for 
the covariance matrix, presented in Shore-Sheppard (1996).  
Having a small number of clusters (18), however, presents additional challenges. 
Cameron, Gelbach and Miller (2008) show that cluster bootstrap of the t-statistic performs 
better than the traditional clustered standard errors (as well as better than the cluster 
bootstrap for the standard errors) when the number of clusters is small. Therefore, I also 
present robustness analysis for the second-stage bootstrapping the t-statistic. I re-sample 
clusters with replacement and perform two-stage estimation, clustering standard errors in 
each stage at the level of the instrument.19  
The previous literature described important differences in the effect of the crisis by 
urban/rural area of residence and per capita expenditure quartile in 1997. I perform 
robustness checks of the main results by interacting the instrument with these variables. 
This analysis avoids the need to cluster at the instrument level and provides support for the 
fact that identification is based on variation in resource constraints.  
Further, I present evidence that the population of compliers identified by the 
instrument is the population of children with binding budget constraints by splitting the 
sample in two based on province inflation levels and studying differences in the effect of 
dropout.   
                                                     
19 The bootstrap t-statistic is computed as 𝑡∗ = (𝛽𝑗
∗̂ − 𝛽 ̂)/𝑠𝑒(𝛽𝑗
∗̂), where 𝛽𝑗
∗̂ (𝑠𝑒(𝛽𝑗
∗̂) ) is the IV estimate of 
the coefficient (standard error) from the j-th bootstrap sample, while 𝛽 ̂is the coefficient estimate from the 









∗ > ?̂?)]𝐵𝑗=1 (Davidson & MacKinnon, 2010). 
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7. Effect of school interruption on cognitive and achievement outcomes 
7.1 The basic model 
The effect of permanent school interruption on test scores is first estimated using 
OLS (Table 4), clustering standard errors at the household level.20 In column (1), the effect 
of dropout on mathematics test scores is found to be about half a standard deviation (-0.50) 
with a standard error of 0.060. As expected, controlling for past mathematics test scores in 
column (2) reduces the size of the coefficient associated with school dropout, although it 
remains large (-0.46) and significant. While school interruption is found to have higher 
effect on school performance than on general cognition, it also affects Raven’s scores. On 
average, in columns (3) and (4), dropout is associated with a reduction of 0.36 standard 
deviations in Raven’s assessment scores (with a standard error of 0.069), which changes 
little in the value-added model.21 Interactions of the dropout indicator by gender, school 
grade, household per capita expenditure, or 1997 test score show no significant 
heterogeneity in the effect of dropout by these observable characteristics. The effect of 
dropout varies significantly by age, where children lose out more if they drop out when 
they are younger. This finding is consistent with early investments in children being more 
productive than later investments.    
                                                     
20 The main results include multiple children per household and allow dropouts to have siblings in the 
comparison group. If parents shift resources to the child that stays in school, the skill accumulation of those 
who stay in school may be overestimated. Excluding siblings of the dropouts from the comparison group 
(97 observations), however, yields similar results.  
21 These models do not control for the test group in 2000, even though the dependent variable is 
standardized by the type of test the child took. The reason is that controlling for test group soaks up 
variation that is not due to the type of test but rather to the age profile of scores. Plotting the age 
coefficients from a regression of mathematics scores on age and the other explanatory variables reveals no 
break in the linear relationship between age and test scores (either in terms of change of slope or change in 
intercept) at the age cutoff (age 15 in 2000) for the two test groups. As a result, I do not include test group 
in the regressions I report in the main analysis.     
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The estimates on the effect of school dropout are comparable to findings in the 
related literature. The CCT program in Nicaragua increased schooling of 9-12 year-old 
boys by about half a grade and increased test scores on average by 0.2 standard deviations 
for math scores and 0.13 standard deviations for Raven’s scores (Barham, Macours & 
Maluccio, 2013). Cascio and Lewis (2006) find that an additional year of schooling due to 
compulsory schooling laws in the US increased AFQT (a general measure of literacy) test 
scores of black minorities by 0.31 standard deviations. To better relate the estimation 
results to the particular context of schooling in Indonesia, I fit a linear trend line through 
the coefficients for each completed grade level. The slope of the trend line is 0.118 for 
mathematics and 0.129 for Raven’s score. This suggests that, on average, an increase of 
one year of schooling yields an increase of 0.118 and 0.129 standard deviations in 
mathematics and Raven’s scores, respectively. Therefore, a coefficient of -0.36 associated 
with the dropout variable in the Raven’s equation is consistent with an average loss of close 
to three years of schooling. The dropout coefficient on mathematics scores is somewhat 
larger than expected. One potential explanation is that mathematics skills obtained only 
through formal training are more easily eroded than is general cognition that may be a 
better measure of innate ability or may be developed outside of school as well. 
While OLS results are informative, the estimates are biased if dropout is 
endogenous. If the decision to stay in school is a function of the difference between 
marginal benefits and marginal costs, a reduction in marginal benefit and an equal increase 
in marginal cost have the same effect of raising the probability of dropping out. If a child 
drops out of school because of low ability (low marginal benefit) then under certain 
conditions, controlling for past scores may help eliminate the bias, as discussed previously. 
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The value-added models in columns (2) and (4) yield support for this hypothesis as the 
estimates of the dropout effect are lower than (but close to) the OLS estimates. Similarly, 
if endogeneity in the schooling decision is based only on omitted ability bias, the IV 
estimates could be expected to be lower than OLS estimates. If some children drop out 
because of resource constraints (high marginal cost), however, then the IV estimates may 
be larger than OLS estimates. The next section presents the associated results. 
7.2 The instrumental variables model 
Table 5 shows the first-stage linear probability regression model results using the 
differences in predicted and observed enrollment rates as an instrument for school dropout. 
Model (1) presents results clustering standard errors at the level of the instrument. The 
results provide evidence for the relevance of the excluded instrument. The R-squared for 
the first stage equation is 0.219. The excluded instrument has a high predictive power with 
an F-statistic (calculated as the square of the t-statistic) of F(1,17) = 21 with a p-value less 
than 0.01. The positive sign associated with the instrument is also as expected. An increase 
in the group probability of non-enrollment increases dropout. Other factors that increase 
the propensity to dropout significantly include lower household per capita expenditures, 
rural area of residence, a less educated mother, and not having an older sibling in the 
household (who presumably could work and help insure the younger sibling against the 
effects of the income shock). Grade level is a significant determinant of school dropout as 
well. Broadly, the probability of dropout increases with the number of completed years of 
education (although the effect is nonlinear). The probability of dropout is highest for 
students in junior or senior high school as of 1997. Females are not significantly more 
likely to drop out than males. 
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In column (2), I perform a robustness analysis for having a generated regressor in 
the model. Jointly bootstrapping the “zeroeth-stage” and first-stage estimation yields larger 
standard errors associated with the coefficient on the instrument but it remains significant 
at the 5% level.   
The second-stage results are presented in Table 6. Columns (1) and (2) use the 
Shore-Shepard correction of the variance-covariance matrix to account for using a grouped 
instrument, clustering at the level of the instrument (at the age-gender group). The IV 
estimates are about 1.6 times larger than the OLS estimates for mathematics scores and 
about 1.2 times larger for Raven’s scores. This finding suggests that the dropout decision 
is driven by considerations of marginal cost rather than marginal benefit, as argued above. 
Thus, the population of compliers, induced to drop out of school by the instrument, is likely 
the population unable to pay school fees or facing high opportunity costs of schooling. 
These children are shown to have high returns to formal education. The effect on math 
scores, -0.81, is larger than the effect on Raven’s scores, -0.56, and is also more precisely 
estimated. Accounting for a small number of clusters by using t-percentile bootstrap further 
increases the size of the standard errors so that only the effect on math scores remains 
significant at the 10% level. 
The next section presents results using an endogenous regime switching model 
which allows for differences in unobservable characteristics and enables calculation of the 
effect of treatment on the treated. It also relaxes the constraint imposed by the regression 
models so far that restricts the coefficients for both the dropout and comparison group to 
be equal, which may introduce an interaction bias if human capital production functions of 
children who drop out during the crisis differ from those who stay in school. This may be 
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the case if production technologies vary by age when children who drop out in the study 
period are significantly older that children who stay in school, as suggested by Table 3. In 
addition, the government may not be able to distinguish households who would have 
withdrawn their child from school irrespective of the income shocks from those who would 
have kept their child in school if they had not been income constrained (the population of 
compliers identified in the IV model). From a policy perspective, the effect of treatment on 
the treated, which is estimated using an endogenous switching regression model, is the 
relevant policy parameter and thus is my preferred estimate. 
7.3 The regime switching model 
 Table 7 presents the parameter estimates from the maximum likelihood estimation 
of the regime switching models where “regime 1” denotes outcomes for children who 
dropped out of school during the crisis and “regime 0” reflects outcomes for the 
comparison group (the results for the dropout equation are not presented as they are similar 
to the results on determinants of dropout from the first-stage regression of the IV model). 
For the comparison group, higher household per capita expenditures in 2000 are associated 
with better mathematics (column (2)) and Raven’s assessment scores (column (4)), and the 
size of the effect is similar for the two outcomes. Having an older sibling in the household 
is associated with higher Raven’s scores but has no effect on mathematics scores. 
Conditional on school grade, older children have lower scores on both assessments. Each 
additional year of mother’s education increases mathematics scores by 0.029 standard 
deviations and Raven’s scores by about half as much. More schooling of the child is also 
associated with higher test scores. Not many variables are statistically significant 
51 
 
determinants of either outcome for the group of dropouts (columns (1) and (3)), although 
this may be due to the relatively small sample.  
As discussed earlier, 𝜌0 represents the correlation coefficient between the error 
term in the test score equation for non-dropouts (𝑈0) and the error term in the choice model 
(𝑉), and similarly for the term 𝜌1 in the dropout equation (𝑈1). The correlation terms are 
not significant for the model on mathematics scores. This suggests that unobserved 
heterogeneity does not affect the dropout decision and that children who do not drop out 
during the crisis do no better or worse in math than a random individual would have done 
by staying in school, and similarly for children who do drop out during the crisis. These 
results imply that there is no sorting on the gains and that an IV model may be sufficient. 
The Raven’s model, however, provides some evidence of comparative advantage: 
children who drop out (i.e., have high values of the unobservable 𝑉 term that drive the 
probability of dropping out) have high outcomes in the drop-out regime (𝜌1 > 0) and 
children who stay in school (i.e., have low probability of dropout and low values of the 
unobservable 𝑉 term) have high outcomes in the school regime (𝜌0 < 0). Only the 𝜌1 term 
is significantly different from zero. This suggests that compared to a random individual, 
children who drop out during the crisis may lose out less in terms of general cognitive skill 
accumulation.  
One of the main assumptions of the endogenous switching model is that the error 
terms in the outcome and choice equations are jointly normally distributed. I test this 
assumption using an approach, suggested by Pagan and Vella (1989). The test is based on 
the two-step estimation of the endogenous switching model. In the first step, the selection 
terms for the outcome equations for dropouts (𝜆1,𝑖) and non-dropouts (𝜆𝑜,𝑖) are calculated 
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from a probit model for the choice equation. Then the outcome regression model is run 
separately for dropouts and non-dropouts, controlling for the respective selection terms. 
The test for joint normality is like a regression specification error test, where the selection 
terms are additionally multiplied by the linear prediction from the first-step probit model 
(raised to the power 1, 2 and 3). If the coefficients on these three additional terms are jointly 
equal to zero, there is little evidence for model misspecification. 
Performing this test for joint normality, I cannot reject lack of misspecification for 
Raven’s test scores. For mathematics scores, the null hypothesis of the additional terms 
being jointly equal to zero cannot be rejected for the outcome equation of the dropouts. 
However, it is rejected at the 5% level for non-dropouts, suggesting that the endogenous 
switching model, assuming joint normality, may not be appropriate for studying the effects 
of dropout on mathematics test scores. This may also explain the lack of significance for 
the correlation terms in the mathematics outcome model.  
Next, I relax the assumption of joint normality for the mathematics model and again 
test whether there is sorting on gains, this time using a semi-parametric approach as in 
Carneiro, Heckman, and Vytlacil (2011). I regress mathematics test scores on the vector of 
explanatory variables, the predicted probability of dropout, the product of the predicted 
probability of dropout and the explanatory variables, and a polynomial of the predicted 
probability of dropout. The polynomial terms are not jointly significant for mathematics 
scores, confirming that there is no sorting on gains in this model. For mathematics scores, 
the IV model may therefore be sufficient. 
Table 8 presents a summary of the results from all analyses thus far, including 
estimates of the TT effect from the endogenous switching regression model. The TT 
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parameters are significantly different from zero with an effect size of -0.61 standard 
deviations for mathematics scores and -0.26 standard deviations for Raven’s scores. For 
mathematics scores, the effect of treatment on the treated is not significantly different from 
the IV estimates. For Raven’s scores, the 95% confidence interval of the effect of TT does 
not include the IV estimate.  
The TT effect is averaged across children who would have dropped out anyway and 
children who only dropped out because of the crisis-induced variation in the instrument. 
The fact that the effect of treatment on the treated is smaller than the IV yields support to 
the hypothesis that children differ in their marginal benefit of schooling and suggests that 
the treated group may be sorting out of school based on the expected gains in test scores. 
The fact that the TT effects are significantly different from zero, however, shows that the 
marginal benefits of schooling for dropouts are not zero. Thus, unlike the case of US 
dropouts examined by Li, Poirier and Tobias (2004), the negative effect of school dropout 
for those who drop out is large and significant for both school-acquired skills and general 
skills.  
7.4 Do children learn out of school? 
 In the analysis presented to this point, school dropout is found to have a large 
negative effect on cognitive and achievement outcomes. The magnitude of this effect, 
however, may be an underestimate (in absolute value) if skills can be acquired not only in 
school but also outside of school, as suggested by Hull and Schultz (2001) and Saxe (1988). 
About 48.8% of the sample children who dropped out of school soon after the crisis report 
having worked in the past year when interviewed in the year 2000 (compared to 6.7% in 
the comparison group). If working increases test scores and dropping out of school is 
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positively correlated with the probability of working, then working offsets some of the 
negative effect of dropout and the estimates of dropping out of school are biased downward 
(i.e., true effect should be larger in absolute terms). Alternatively, if working erodes skills, 
the negative effect of dropping out would be biased upward (i.e., true effect should be 
smaller in absolute terms). For example, Gunnarsson et al. (2006) provide evidence that 
child labor in Latin American countries is associated lower mathematics and language test 
scores, although their results are for school-going children, rather than children who 
dropped out of school and may be looking for an alternative source of learning. 
In order to test for these hypotheses, I include an additional dummy variable 
reflecting working status as a control in all regression models. The findings are presented 
in Table 8. Generally, including an indicator for work status reduces the absolute size of 
the negative coefficient on dropout, suggesting that working is associated with lower 
scores. This suggests that working is not a good substitute for formal schooling and 
potentially reflects the fact that children who work have less time to engage in other 
informal learning activities.  
In the preferred estimation for Raven’s scores, the TT effect of dropout on Raven’s 
scores is reduced by 40% (from -0.261 to -0.156) and loses statistical significance when 
controlling for work status. This finding implies a strong negative correlation between 
working and Raven’s scores. The results therefore suggest that children of lower cognition 
are more likely to drop out and start working. This would be consistent with the previous 
finding that children who drop out of school are less able to improve their cognition at 
school than are children in the comparison group.   
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Controlling for work status also reduces the effect of dropout on mathematics 
scores in both the endogenous switching regression model and the IV model, although the 
change is much smaller (1% and 5%, respectively). 
8. Robustness checks 
8.1 Using a different set of instruments 
While the main IV results are based on age-gender specific variation in the effect 
of the crisis, figure 1 suggests important differences by urban/rural area of residence and 
by income quartile. In order to better identify the effect on the affected population of 
children, as well as to allow more variation in the instrument, I include three additional 
variables as instruments: an interaction of the main instrument with a dummy for urban 
area, an interaction of the main instrument with a dummy for the households in the lowest 
per capita expenditure quartile, as well as a triple interaction term between the main 
instrument, area of residence and per capita quartile. I then adjust the main model to also 
control for the lowest per capita expenditure quartile and for its interaction with area of 
residence. I cluster standard errors at the household level.  
The first stage yields results that are consistent with findings by Thomas et al. 
(2004): poor children and children in urban areas are those affected most by the crisis. In 
addition, the sign of the triple interaction term is negative, suggesting that children in rural 
areas and in the bottom quartile of the income distribution are affected the most (again 
confirming previous findings). The IV estimate of the effect of dropout in this case is 
broadly consistent with the previous results, yielding larger negative results for 
mathematics scores (-0.75, standard error=0.504), and smaller negative results for Raven’s 
scores (-0.16, standard error=0.480). The results, however, are subject to a weak instrument 
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problem (F(4, 1596) = 5.90), which could explain the large standard errors and may also 
result in a bias of the coefficient estimates.  
Next, I present further suggestive evidence that the population of compliers 
identified by the instrument is the population of children with resource constraints that bind 
during the crisis. I split the sample in two based on province inflation levels. Inflation levels 
in 1998 ranged between 67% and 95% in the thirteen provinces studied. I perform separate 
analysis for the provinces with inflation levels under 80% (6 provinces) and above 80% 
(the remaining 7). This results in a roughly equal split in the sample, with about 12% of 
children being dropouts in each of the two subsamples. The effect of dropout on 
mathematics scores is about twice as large for the subsample with higher inflation (-1.04 
SD vs. -0.54 SD). This provides some suggestive evidence that supports that hypothesis 
that school dropout identified by the instrument is driven by resource constraints rather 
than low ability. 
8.2 Using the panel nature of the data 
The main analysis of this chapter identifies the effect of school dropout based on 
differences between observations in cross-sectional data. As a robustness check, I have also 
utilized the panel nature and household-level structure of the data. If the unobserved factors 
that determine both schooling decisions and schooling outcomes are common within a 
household so that the individual error term is comprised only of a random error and a family 
error component (i.e., 𝑈𝑖 = 𝜖𝑡 + 𝑈ℎℎ), then a siblings fixed effects estimation would yield 
unbiased results on the effect of school dropout. This assumption is likely to be violated 
when parents selectively allocate resources among children and when siblings learn from 
each other. In addition, this method assumes away any individual-level error component. 
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Even if the siblings fixed effects estimation was appropriate, however, it would identify 
the effect of schooling based on variation among siblings, which may not be large. This 
method also reduces the sample substantially as only households with two or more school-
going children with ages 7 through 15 in 1997 are used for the analysis (477 households).  
Alternatively, child fixed effects could be used to allow both a family and an 
individual error component. The data used in the analysis, however, is not well suited for 
applying a child fixed effects approach because of the difference in the mathematics 
assessment tests in 1997 and 2000 in both the type and number of questions (in addition, 
no Raven’s assessment was administered in 1997). Child fixed effects would also assume 
away any time-varying unobservables.  
Given these caveats of the fixed effects analysis, I briefly discuss the robustness 
checks using the siblings and child fixed effects estimation. Overall, the fixed effects 
estimation confirms that school dropout during the crisis had a negative impact on 
mathematics test scores. In the sibling fixed effects model, the effect of school dropout on 
mathematics scores in 2000 is found to be a quarter of a standard deviation (-0.25) with a 
standard error of 0.108. A similar effect is also obtained with a child fixed effects 
estimation, where dropping out is associated with a reduction of 0.28 standard deviations 
in mathematics scores (with a standard error of 0.073).  
8.3 Testing for changes in school quality over time  
The preceding analysis has provided evidence that more schooling is associated 
with more learning and that children who dropped out during the crisis were likely to 
benefit from more schooling in terms of improving their mathematics as well as Raven’s 
scores. While this estimated effect has internal validity with respect to the time period 
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studied, it may not have external validity when other time periods are considered if any 
changes in school quality took place between 1997 and 2000 because of the nature of the 
aggregate income shock. For example, if in a given community many children dropped out 
of school, then class sizes would have been reduced, which may lead to more effective 
teaching and higher learning than what would have occurred otherwise. This would lead to 
an upward bias in the estimated learning loss from dropout. At the same time, if parents 
are unable to pay school fees, schools may have reduced the use of productive inputs, such 
as books, which may have a negative effect on learning. By estimating the effect of missing 
schooling based on children who remain in this worse learning environment, I might be 
biasing the coefficient of dropout downwards.  
In order to test whether any external validity concerns are justified, I take advantage 
of the fact that the IFLS also collected data at the community level, surveying schools and 
healthcare facilities. For the panel of schools interviewed in both 1997 and 2000, I compare 
the means of various measures of school quality and inputs across the two years by 
performing a t-test. I find that schools had smaller class sizes (down from about 40 to 35) 
and reduced book availability in 2000 compared to 1997. In addition, schools in 2000 were 
open for one week less than in 1997. On the other hand, teachers were less likely to hold 
another job, and worked fewer hours out of school and more hours in school. These simple 
descriptive statistics suggest that the crisis may have worsened school quality on some 
dimensions but improved it on others. In order to understand better the importance of these 
changes, I merged the community data with the child-level data and ran a linear regression 
of mathematics test scores on the community-level school quality measures, while also 
controlling for various child and household characteristics. I find that none of these 
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measures of school quality are significantly correlated with mathematics test scores for 
children who attended school in the year 2000. The only exception is the number of hours 
teachers worked outside of school which has a significantly negative effect on mathematics 
skills in 2000. Results remain unclear with respect to whether the lack of significance for 
the other measures is due to the fact that the sample of students in school in 2000 is a 
selected sample, excluding children who dropped out. 
8.4 Testing the effectiveness of government scholarship grants 
While the government in Indonesia was not able to respond immediately to the 
rising education costs in the middle of the 1997/1998 academic year, the government 
budget from July 1998 allocated scholarship money for the 1998/1999 academic year under 
the Indonesian Social Safety Net (JPS) program. The scholarship money was in the form 
of monthly cash transfers, conditional on school attendance. Several studies have shown 
that the JPS government program was effective in reducing the impact of the economic 
crisis on child education. For example, using census data and geographic variation in 
targeting, Sparrow (2007) performs district-level analysis and shows that JPS was effective 
in reducing school dropout. Using household-level data from the 100 Villages project and 
controlling for selection on observables, Cameron (2009) also finds that the JPS program 
was successful. No one, however, has examined learning outcomes associated with the 
extra schooling obtained. The 2000 wave of the IFLS survey included questions on receipt 
of JPS funds. This provides a unique opportunity to test the hypothesis that students helped 
to stay in school during an income shock would have good schooling outcomes in terms of 
both years of education and learning.  
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One of the challenges of estimating the effect of the JPS program is the non-random 
allocation of the scholarships. The goal of the program was to reach about 6% of primary 
school students, 17% of junior high school students, and 10% of senior high school 
students, as well as distribute at least half of the scholarships to girls. The scholarships 
were allocated in a decentralized manner. First, money was sent to the poorest districts. 
Then, committees were formed to select the poorest schools. Finally, school committees 
were formed to select the eligible students based on poverty and various socio-economic 
indicators (Pritchett, 2002; Sparrow, 2007). Availability of data on the exact socio-
economic index used to distribute the grants would allow me to perform a regression-
discontinuity analysis, while data on the geographic targeting would provide exogenous 
variation in the probability of receipt of the grants. Lacking such information, however, I 
identify the effect of JPS from variation in the receipt of scholarships between children in 
the same household.  
Variation within the household exists because of JPS quotas by schooling level and 
gender. The main assumption of this analysis is that the allocation of funds within the 
household was exogenous and was not determined by the parents based on certain 
characteristics of the child (e.g., was not given to the smarter child or the child that was 
more likely to be kept in school otherwise).  In order to test this assumption, I check 
whether receipt of JPS funds in the academic year 1999/2000 (the year for which 
households report scholarship availability in the third wave of the IFLS survey) is a 
significant predictor of years of schooling and parental expenditures on education in 1997. 
It is not. Mathematics scores in 1997 are not a significant predictor of JPS receipt, either. 
In addition, in order to interpret better the estimate of the effect of JPS receipt, it is 
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important to examine how parents responded to the government support. For budget-
constrained households, if parental and government inputs are complements in the 
production of child human capital, receipt of JPS funds may be associated with higher 
parental investments in the targeted child at the expense of his or her siblings, which would 
bias the coefficient associated with JPS receipt upwards. Alternatively, if parental and 
government inputs are substitutes, overall investments in JPS and non-JPS children should 
not be different. The results suggest that the latter hypothesis is more plausible. There is 
no significant impact of JPS receipt on the probability that a child works, on number of 
hours spent in school, or on total education expenses.   
The sibling fixed-effects regressions, which investigates the effects of the 
government program are based on 220 children in 87 households with at least two children, 
one or more of which received JPS funds. The results show that receiving JPS in 1999/2000 
increased the probability of staying in school in the fall of 2000 by 12 percentage points, 
controlling for age, gender, and years of education in 1997. The effect of a JPS scholarship 
on years of schooling in 2000 is also both statistically and economically significant. For 
every two children who received the JPS funds, overall schooling increased by 
approximately one year compared to children who did not receive support but were 
potentially eligible for it (their siblings). Looking at the effect of a JPS scholarship on test 
scores, I find positive but not statistically significant effects on mathematics scores and 
positive and marginally significant effects at the 10% level on Raven’s assessment scores 
(controlling for mathematics test scores in 1997, age, gender, and years of education in 
2000). These results suggest that keeping marginal children in school, i.e., those who were 
most likely to drop out during the crisis, does not necessarily lead to more learning. This 
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result is contrary to previous findings of a large impact of dropping out. However, these 
estimates of the impact of JPS on test scores are based on a very small sample size (170 
children in 67 households) because of missing test score information for some children. In 
addition, they are identified from within-household variation, which is not ideal because 
effects of one child receiving more schooling may have important spillover effects on 
siblings’ skill accumulation.   
9. Conclusion 
Children may drop out of school for a variety of reasons, including low ability or 
motivation, low expected returns from education, or budget constraints. In this chapter, I 
use a variety of estimation approaches to identify the causal effect of missed schooling 
during the Indonesian crisis in late 1990s on test scores. All approaches yield significant 
negative effects of school dropout on mathematics test scores. The OLS estimates suggest 
that missing an average of three years of schooling is associated with 0.5 standard 
deviations lower mathematics scores. Some of this effect, however, could be explained by 
the fact that some dropouts have lower learning ability and select out of school. Indeed, 
controlling for past test scores in a value-added model reduces the effect of lack of 
schooling.  
Similarly, IV estimates could be expected to be lower if unobserved ability is the 
main factor driving the endogeneity in the dropout decision. Using differences between 
predicted and observed dropout rates at the age-gender level as the source of crisis-induced 
identifying variation in propensity to dropout, I find IV estimates that are larger than OLS 
estimates (1.6 times larger). These results are consistent with children primarily dropping 
out because of short-run binding resource constraints during the Indonesian crisis.  
63 
 
Estimating an endogenous switching regression model, I also find evidence that 
children sort out of school based on their general cognitive skills (but not their mathematics 
scores). In addition, the effect of treatment on the treated for general cognition, measured 
by Raven’s Colored Progressive Matrices assessment, is not significantly different from 
zero once I control for child work status. This result suggests that children of lower 
cognition and lower potential to improve their cognition at school are more likely to drop 
out of school and start working, whether they have lower mathematics learning abilities or 
not. This finding may be due to parents making decisions about the schooling of their 
children based on observation of children’s general cognition, rather than their school 
performance.  
Schooling in Indonesia has significant returns. One year of extra education is 
associated with an increase in hourly wages of 6.5% to 10.8% (Duflo, 2001). In addition, 
the literature on labor markets in the US as well as in developing countries (Glewwe, 2002;  
Hanushek & Woessmann, 2008) suggests that school-acquired skills have independent 
effects on labor outcomes.  Therefore, much can be gained by insuring children against 
income volatility in order to prevent school interruptions when children who would have 
stayed in school in the absence of an income shock might otherwise be forced to drop out. 
Keeping these children in school would be an effective way to improve the long-term labor 







Figure 1: School Dropout rates in 1997 and 1998
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Figure 3: Mean number of correct test responses in 2000 by years of schooling for the comparison group
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Table 1: School attendance by age
Variable In school
Year 2000* Age=8 -0.0281
(0.0264)
Year 2000* Age=9 -0.0464*
(0.0265)
Year 2000* Age=10 -0.0460*
(0.0263)
Year 2000* Age=11 -0.0627**
(0.0263)
Year 2000* Age=12 -0.0332
(0.0261)
Year 2000* Age=13 -0.0463*
(0.0259)
Year 2000* Age=14 -0.0700**
(0.0256)
Year 2000* Age=15 -0.0840**
(0.0262)
Year 2000* Age=16 -0.0551**
(0.0261)
Year 2000* Age=17 -0.0899**
(0.0260)
Year 2000* Age=18 -0.1446**
(0.0264)
Year 2000* Age=19 -0.0951**
(0.0277)
Year fixed effects Yes





[1] Results based on a linear regression for all children 
between the ages of 7 and 19 in the two waves of the 
IFLS survey in 1997 and 2000.
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Completed years of 
school in 1997
Stayers Dropouts Total
0 139 0 139
1 127 2 129
2 258 6 264
3 295 12 307
4 185 11 196
5 247 55 302
6 340 64 404
7 133 9 142
8 116 71 187
9 63 28 91
Total 1,903 258 2,161
Age in 1997 Stayers Dropouts Total
7 249 1 250
8 246 4 250
9 222 3 225
10 232 11 243
11 256 31 287
12 182 53 235
13 184 50 234
14 154 64 218
15 178 41 219
Total 1,903 258 2,161
Table 2: Number of children who drop out by 









Age in 1997 10.64 12.84 <0.001
(2.54) (1.63)
Female 0.50 0.49 0.834
(0.5) (0.5)
Years of education in 1997 4.19 6.34 <0.001
(2.39) (1.84)
Years of education in 2000 7.27 6.93 0.020
(2.29) (1.88)
Math score in 1997 0.12 -0.18 <0.001
(0.92) (0.76)
Math score in 2000 0.29 -0.27 <0.001
(0.91) (0.82)
Raven's score in 2000 0.26 -0.08 <0.001
(0.88) (0.97)








Number of Children 1903 258
Notes:
[1] P-values based on a t-test.
Table 3: Characteristics of children who drop out vs. the comparison 
group
Real per capita expenditure in 
1997, '000 Rps
Real per capita expenditure in 
2000, '000 Rps





Table 4: The effect of school dropout on cognitive outcomes
Variable OLS OLS-VA OLS OLS-VA
(1) (2) (1) (2)
-0.5001** -0.4604** -0.3628** -0.3511**
(0.0600) (0.0635) (0.0690) (0.0754)
0.1664** 0.1234**
(0.0263) (0.0252)
-0.0884** -0.0777** -0.1008** -0.0879**
(0.0188) (0.0197) (0.0206) (0.0225)
0.0844** 0.0889** -0.1729** -0.1836**
(0.0371) (0.0393) (0.0351) (0.0379)
0.1328* 0.0786 0.3245** 0.2406**
(0.0737) (0.0799) (0.0777) (0.0854)
0.3320** 0.3019** 0.6096** 0.5479**
(0.0782) (0.0839) (0.0787) (0.0855)
0.4361** 0.4094** 0.6485** 0.5955**
(0.0972) (0.1065) (0.1014) (0.1113)
0.5101** 0.4149** 0.8858** 0.7813**
(0.0979) (0.1061) (0.1050) (0.1147)
0.6786** 0.5374** 0.9428** 0.8064**
(0.1158) (0.1243) (0.1275) (0.1407)
0.7743** 0.6199** 0.9168** 0.7891**
(0.1463) (0.1566) (0.1632) (0.1781)
0.8880** 0.7335** 1.2476** 1.1057**
(0.1535) (0.1642) (0.1728) (0.1904)
0.9810** 0.7075** 1.2886** 1.1739**
(0.1802) (0.1904) (0.1850) (0.2024)
0.0305** 0.0226** 0.0162** 0.0145**
(0.0060) (0.0064) (0.0057) (0.0061)
0.0029 0.0038 0.001 0.0003
(0.0033) (0.0033) (0.0031) (0.0033)
0.0622 0.0301 0.1407** 0.1341**
(0.0397) (0.0425) (0.0378) (0.0409)
0.0773** 0.0693* 0.0733** 0.0475
(0.0359) (0.0364) (0.0368) (0.0379)
0.0446 0.0522 0.0221 0.0198
(0.0342) (0.0358) (0.0334) (0.0349)
0.1844** 0.1495** 0.1450** 0.0945**
(0.0432) (0.0456) (0.0407) (0.0439)
YES YES YES YES
YES YES YES YES
Constant -1.0672** -1.4872** -0.7049 -0.4032
(0.4965) (0.5128) (0.4920) (0.5013)
Observations 2161 1864 2161 1864
Number of clusters 1597 1409 1597 1409
Notes:
[1] Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the household level.
[2] * significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level




Mother years of education
Has older sibling who lives 
in household 
Math score in 1997
Mother age
Having a completed 9th 
grade in 1997
Having a completed 7th 
grade in 1997
Having a completed 8th 
grade in 1997
Having a completed 2nd 
grade in 1997
Having a completed 3rd 
grade in 1997
Having a completed 4th 
grade in 1997
Having a completed 5th 
grade in 1997
Having a completed 6th 
grade in 1997
Month of interview fixed 
effects
Province fixed effects
Urban area of residence
Log of per capita 
expenditure in 2000





Table 5: Determinants of school dropout (first-stage regression)
Variable
Clustered at instrument 
level
Two-step bootstrap 









































Number of clusters 18
R-squared 0.2193
Notes:
[1] Analyses performed using a linear regression model.
[3] * significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level
Standard error sensitivity models
[2] Model 2 accounts for the fact that the instrument is a generated variable. It 
is performed usign a two-step bootstrap procedure of the "zeroth" and first 
stage. Standard errros are clustered at the instrument level in the first-stage 
regression, which is being bootstrapped. Number of bootstrap 
replications=1000.




Having a completed 8th 
grade in 1997
Having a completed 9th 
grade in 1997
Mother years of education
Mother age
Has older sibling who lives 
in household 
Log of per capita 
expenditure in 2000
Having a completed 2nd 
grade in 1997
Having a completed 3rd 
grade in 1997
Having a completed 4th 
grade in 1997
Having a completed 5th 
grade in 1997
Having a completed 6th 
grade in 1997




Log of per capita 
expenditure in 1997




Table 6: The effect of school dropout on cognitive outcomes
Math score Raven's score Math score Raven's score
Variable Second Stage Second Stage Second Stage Second Stage
(1) (2) (3) (4)
-0.8126** -0.5588* -0.8126* -0.5588
(0.4004) (0.3165) (0.072) (0.126)
-0.0899** -0.1018** -0.0899** -0.1018**
(0.0163) (0.0149) (<0.001) (<0.001)
0.0791** -0.1762** 0.0791** -0.1762**
(0.0340) (0.0279) (0.042) (<0.001)
0.1412** 0.3298** 0.1412** 0.3298**
(0.0439) (0.0605) (0.002) (0.006)
0.3476** 0.6194** 0.3476** 0.6194**
(0.0821) (0.0658) (<0.001) (<0.001)
0.4539** 0.6597** 0.4539** 0.6597**
(0.0600) (0.0987) (<0.001) (<0.001)
0.5732** 0.9253** 0.5732** 0.9253**
(0.0988) (0.1021) (<0.001) (<0.001)
0.7353** 0.9783** 0.7353** 0.9783**
(0.0913) (0.1246) (<0.001) (<0.001)
0.8021** 0.9342** 0.8021** 0.9342**
(0.1281) (0.1534) (<0.001) (<0.001)
1.0214** 1.3313** 1.0214** 1.3313**
(0.2279) (0.2060) (0.002) (<0.001)
1.1051** 1.3665** 1.1051** 1.3665**
(0.1669) (0.2086) (0.008) (0.008)
0.0268** 0.0139* 0.0268** 0.0139**
(0.0052) (0.0078) (<0.001) (0.022)
0.0029 0.001 0.0029 0.001
(0.0032) (0.0025) (0.258) (0.571)
0.0444 0.1295** 0.0444 0.1295**
(0.0551) (0.0419) (0.368) (<0.001)
0.0685** 0.0678* 0.0685* 0.0678**
(0.0336) (0.0361) (0.072) (0.024)
0.0335 0.0152 0.0335 0.0152
(0.0273) (0.0306) (0.104) (0.527)
0.1700** 0.1359** 0.1700** 0.1359**
(0.0524) (0.0550) (0.008) (0.006)
YES YES YES YES




Number of clusters 18 18
Notes:
[3] * significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level
[2] Equal tail p-values in models (3) and (4) are estimated using a t-percentile bootstrap model.
Month of interview fixed 
effects
Province fixed effects
p-values from t-percentile 
bootstrap in parentheses
Clustered standard errors in 
parentheses
[1] Standard errors in models (1) and (2) are estimated using the Shore-Shepard (1996) correction of 
the second-stage errors, accounting for having a grouped instrument.
Mother years of education
Mother age
Has older sibling who lives 
in household 
Log of per capita 
expenditure in 2000
Log of per capita 
expenditure in 1997
Urban area of residence
Having a completed 4th 
grade in 1997
Having a completed 5th 
grade in 1997
Having a completed 6th 
grade in 1997
Having a completed 7th 
grade in 1997
Having a completed 8th 
grade in 1997





Having a completed 2nd 
grade in 1997




Table 7 - Switching regression for school dropout
Variable Regime 1 Regime 0 Regime 1 Regime 0
(1) (2) (3) (4)
-0.023 -0.099** -0.024 -0.104**
(0.058) (0.021) (0.068) (0.015)
0.133 0.081 -0.327** -0.159**
(0.130) (0.043) (0.160) (0.030)
0.166 0.153** -0.394 0.342**
(1.057) (0.050) (1.466) (0.068)
0.906 0.343** 0.231 0.612**
(0.953) (0.085) (1.355) (0.071)
0.560 0.484** -0.214 0.692**
(0.999) (0.063) (1.450) (0.099)
1.297 0.529** 0.581 0.897**
(1.310) (0.085) (1.381) (0.089)
1.139 0.762** 0.323 0.999**
(1.192) (0.105) (1.359) (0.110)
0.797 0.859** 0.563 0.932**
(0.994) (0.153) (1.604) (0.122)
1.651 0.929** 0.988 1.184**
(1.643) (0.170) (1.308) (0.175)
1.559 1.142** 1.064 1.297**
(1.649) (0.205) (1.383) (0.244)
0.000 0.029** 0.004 0.016**
(0.058) (0.004) (0.035) (0.005)
0.000 0.003 0.011 -0.001
(0.007) (0.003) (0.013) (0.002)
-0.082 0.056 -0.007 0.171**
(0.206) (0.043) (0.105) (0.040)
0.010 0.078** -0.051 0.080**
(0.102) (0.038) (0.102) (0.038)
-0.015 0.040 -0.016 0.025
(0.208) (0.022) (0.103) (0.032)
0.332 0.163** 0.067 0.145**
(0.224) (0.048) (0.149) (0.055)
YES YES YES YES
YES YES YES YES
Constant -1.926 -1.128** -0.908 -1.104**






[1] Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the instrument level.
[2] * significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level
Having a completed 5th 
grade in 1997
Having a completed 6th 
grade in 1997
Having a completed 2nd 
grade in 1997
Having a completed 3rd 
grade in 1997
Having a completed 4th 
grade in 1997
Permanent dropout
Math scores Raven's scores
Age in 1997
Female
Having a completed 7th 
grade in 1997
Having a completed 8th 
grade in 1997
Having a completed 9th 
grade in 1997
Mother years of education
Mother age
Province fixed effects
Has older sibling who lives 
in household 
Log of per capita 
expenditure in 2000
Log of per capita 
expenditure in 1997
Urban area of residence














Math scores -0.5001** -0.4604** -0.8126** -0.8126* -0.6136**
(0.0600) (0.0635) (0.4004) pvalue=0.0721 (0.1143)
Raven's scores -0.3628** -0.3511** -0.5588* -0.5588 -0.2609**








Math scores -0.4255** -0.4000** -0.7719* -0.7719 -0.6065**
(0.0662) (0.0701) (0.4683) pvalue=0.1261 (0.1842)
Raven's scores -0.3449** -0.3554** -0.5717 -0.5717 -0.1561
(0.0757) (0.0819) (0.3779) pvalue=0.1902 (0.1209)
[3] The percentile t-bootstrap IV model is performed using block random sampling (clustered at the level of the instrument) and 
estimating a two-step regression model with clustered OLS standard errrors in each step.
[4] The endogenous switching model is estimated with robust standard errors, clustered at the level of the instrument. The standard 
errors of the Treatment on the Treated (TT) effect are obtained by cluster-bootstrapping the parameter estimate (with 1000 
replications).
[5] ** denotes significance at the 5% confidence level, * denotes significance at the 10% level.
Table 8: Summary of treatment effects of permanent school dropout
Not controlling for work
Controlling for work
Notes:
[1] The OLS and OLS-Value added models have standard errors clustered at the household level.
[2] The basic IV model is estimated using the Shore-Shepard correction for standard errors clustered at the level of the instrument 
(a total of 18 clusters).
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CHAPTER 3: Parental preference for equality in education outcomes 
1. Introduction 
While investment in children’s education depends on the returns and costs of 
schooling, it may also depend on parental preferences for resource allocation among their 
children. For example, Parish and Willis (1993) show that in Taiwan having an older sister 
is associated with higher educational attainment, especially for older cohorts. Younger 
children in the Philippines have better educational outcomes compared to their older 
siblings (Ejrnaes & Portner, 2004). In Indonesia, on the other hand, Pradhan (1998) finds 
that having younger siblings decreases the probability of delayed enrolment and thus the 
first-born in the family receive better education. In addition to gender and birth order 
preferences, parents may also exhibit inequality preferences. Within a resource-constrained 
household, parents may have equity motives and choose to invest more in the child with 
lower endowments in order to compensate for the initial differences between siblings, may 
choose to act based on efficiency considerations and thus reinforce those differences, or 
may follow a neutral investment strategy (Behrman, Pollak, and Taubman, 1982). 
Understanding how parents make investment decisions could help identify groups of 
children that may be at a disadvantage if their parents are income-constrained and may be 
more vulnerable to income shocks. For example, Behrman (1988) studies the distribution 
of nutrients in rural India and shows that in surplus seasons, parents favor the child with 
lower health outcomes. When food is scarce, however, parents favor the male child because 
of higher marginal returns to nutrient investment in males and because of parental 
preference for males. Pitt, Rosenzweig, and Hassan (1990) provide similar evidence for 
Bangladesh, where allocation of calories serves to reinforce health endowments because of 
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the strong linkage between health and productivity. On the other hand, Ayalew (2005) 
studies household investment decisions in Ethiopia and finds that investments in health are 
compensating. He also extends the evidence to education and finds that investments in 
education are reinforcing. Similarly, Akresh et al. (2012) show that schooling investments 
are reinforcing in Burkina Faso, and that children of higher cognitive ability are more likely 
to be enrolled in school and receive more discretionary expenditures. 
In this chapter, I use data for Indonesia and provide further evidence for whether 
parents have efficiency or equity preferences when they invest in the education of their 
children. I contribute to the literature in three main ways. First, the Indonesian Family Life 
Survey contains information on mathematics test scores – a direct measure of school 
performance. School performance is affected by ability as well as noncognitive skills such 
as motivation and self-efficacy (Rosen et al., 2010). Heckman, Stixrud, and Urzua (2006) 
show that in the US both cognitive and noncognitive skills have significant positive effects 
on wages. Several studies in developing countries similarly have shown that test scores are 
significant determinants of wages while measures of innate intelligence are not (reviewed 
in Glewwe, 2002). Thus, if parents invest in order to maximize children’s future earning 
potential, then mathematics scores may be more relevant for parental investment decisions 
than the ability measures used by Akresh et al. (2012) and Ayalew (2005). In addition, the 
data also contains detailed information on education expenses. Thus, I can study separately 
spending on school fees and other spending (e.g., on extracurricular activities) and thus 
better understand parental investment strategies. While Akresh et al. (2012) provide some 
evidence on investments at the intensive margin, the literature has generally used outcomes 
such as school enrollment or years of education as proxies for investment (Ayalew, 2005; 
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Behrman, Rosenzweig, & Taubman, 1994). A couple of recent papers study how 
educational investments are allocated according to child health endowments (likely 
correlated with cognitive endowments). The evidence is mixed. For example, Conti et al. 
(2011) use data on twins in China and show that parents provide fewer educational 
resources to children who experienced an early life health shock. On the other hand, Leight 
(2014) finds that Chinese parents allocate more of the discretionary educational spending 
to the child with lower health endowment, measured by height-for-age and instrumented 
by early life climatic shock to nutrition. 
Second, I provide estimates of the parental preference parameter from estimation 
of a structural model. One possible approach to estimation would be the use of an 
instrumental variables model, as in Leight (2014). The lack of a suitable instrument for 
child school achievement that differs between children within the household renders this 
approach infeasible. Thus, following the methodology of Behrman (1988) and Rosenzweig 
and Schultz (1982), I estimate a system of equations comprised of production functions for 
children’s test scores and an investment equation, representing the first-order condition, 
derived from a utility-maximization problem for a household with two children. More 
recently, this methodology of joint estimation was used by Bernal and Keane (2010) who 
apply it to the problem of child achievement and a mother’s childcare choices. This 
approach is more general than a sibling fixed effects estimation, as used in Akresh et al. 
(2012), which assumes that test scores are not a function of any child-specific 
unobservables that may be correlated with child-specific shocks to investment. While I 
provide results from a sibling fixed effects model as a robustness check, I recognize that a 
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sibling fixed effects model is only valid if any unobserved heterogeneity is at the household 
level only.   
Finally, one of the advantages of using the Indonesian data to study how parents 
invest in their children is that information on spending and test scores is available in 1997, 
before the East Asian Financial Crisis hit Indonesia, and in 2000, after the crisis. The effects 
of both aggregate and idiosyncratic income shocks on child school attendance and 
enrollment are well documented (Ferreira & Schady, 2009; Jacoby & Skoufias, 1997). Less 
is known, however, about changes in investments at the intensive margin. In a recent paper 
on Uganda, Björkman-Nyqvist (2013) uses district-level data to show that income shocks 
are associated with lower average test scores for girls (but not for boys) when school fees 
are abolished. Bjorkman-Nyqvist attributes this finding to parents providing fewer 
resources to girls or requiring more time spent on domestic labor while going to school. In 
this chapter, I use household-level data and provide some suggestive evidence on how 
parents may have responded to the economic crisis in Indonesia by changing education 
investments at the intensive margin. 
I find that contrary to previous studies, on average, parental resource allocation 
between children is not a function of the difference in the test scores of their children. 
Looking at the effects of child birth order and gender, however, I find that when the 
younger child has lower test scores, then that child receives lower investment if it is a 
female. This is consistent with research by Cameron and Worswick (2001) and Thomas et 
al. (2004) which shows that girl education in Indonesia may be a luxury good. Households 
with more girls of school age reduce education expenditures when hit by an income shock 
due to crop loss or a macroeconomic crisis. Thomas et al. (2004) also find that households 
80 
 
tended to protect the education of the older children at the expense of the younger ones. 
One of the shortcomings of these studies, however, is that their measure of expenditures 
includes investment at the extensive margin as well, not distinguishing between gender 
bias in school enrollment and gender bias in school spending. I focus on expenditures on 
the intensive margin only. Decomposing school spending into monthly fees and other 
school expenditures, I show that investment differences between siblings are driven by 
fees. This implies that younger female children may be attending schools of lower quality. 
Importantly, such differences in investment allocation did not exist prior to the crisis in 
1997 which may suggest that one of the mechanisms parents used to cope with the negative 
income shock was to move young girls to schools of lower quality. 
2. Conceptual model 
Becker and Tomes (1976) and Behrman, Pollak, and Taubman (1982) were the first 
to model the important interactions within households comprised of heterogeneous 
individuals. In the wealth model developed by Becker and Tomes (1976), parents choose 
whether to invest in children so as to increase their adult earnings potential or whether to 
provide them transfers when they are adults to compensate for their low earnings. The 
model assumes that parents are concerned with total child wealth, rather than the sources 
of wealth. The main conclusion is that parents reinforce endowment differences in children 
by providing human capital investment for the more endowed child, but equalize wealth 
by providing more transfers to the less endowed child. An implicit assumption of the wealth 
model is that parents have enough resources to allocate between children (Behrman, Pollak, 
& Taubman, 1995). An alternative model was proposed by Behrman, Pollak, and Taubman 
(1982) who argued that parental preferences are separable in earnings and transfers (SET). 
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In this setting, parents solve a two-stage problem where they allocate total resources 
between earnings and transfers in the first stage and then, in the second stage, they allocate 
earnings investments (and transfers) among their children. This assumption allows for 
analyzing the distribution of human capital investments independent of any possible future 
transfers, and has been widely adopted in the subsequent literature.  
Following Behrman, Pollak, and Taubman (1982), I assume that the parental utility 
function is additively separable in consumption (S) and human capital (C). It can therefore 
be represented as: 𝑉 = 𝑈∗(𝑆) + 𝑈(𝐶). As in Behrman, Pollak, and Taubman (1982), I also 





, where parents trade off the human capital of n different children. Parental 
preferences for one child over another are given by the 𝜋𝑖 weights where ∑ 𝜋𝑖
𝑛
𝑖 = 1. The 
elasticity of substitution is a function of the parameter 𝜌 and is defined by 1/(1 − 𝜌 ). In 
each time period 𝑡, parents choose levels of consumption and investment in the human 
capital of each child 𝑖 subject to a budget constraint, that is binding in each period, and a 
cumulative human capital production technology given initial child endowments (𝜂𝑖) at 
time 𝑡 = 0: 
max
𝑆𝑡,𝐼𝑖,𝑡…𝐼𝑛,𝑡








𝑠. 𝑡.  ∑ 𝐼𝑖,𝑡
𝑛
𝑖
+ 𝑝𝑆𝑡 = 𝑌𝑡  𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐶𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑓(𝐼𝑖,𝑡, 𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1, … 𝐼𝑖,0, 𝜂𝑖) 
where 𝑌𝑡 is household income at time 𝑡, p is the price of the consumption good, and 𝐼𝑖,𝑡 
represents education investment in child 𝑖 at time 𝑡. If the shadow price of income is 
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denoted by 𝜆, then the remaining first-order conditions of this problem for a household 










− 𝜆 = 0. 
This implies that parental allocation of resources between child 𝑖 and child 𝑗 will be 









⁄⁄ .                                                                                                   (1) 
This model rests on three assumptions. First, parents are assumed to maximize a 
one-period model. This assumption is made to reflect the fact that formal and informal 
insurance opportunities during this aggregate shock are limited and budget constraints bind 
in each period. Second, parents do not trade off investments across time periods. In other 
words, if parents reduced their investment in the first time period, they do not compensate 
for it by increasing investment in the next time period. Again, this is plausible in the case 
when parents are budget-constrained and cannot save or borrow. This seems particularly 
appropriate because my data (from 2000) are from soon after the Asian Financial Crisis. 
Third, parents’ utility is a function of the human capital accumulated in their children, 
rather than the value of that human capital (i.e., the potential earnings). This is valid if 
parents invest in the human capital of their children for altruistic reasons, or if returns to 
human capital do not vary between children. Either way, accounting for potential gender 
differences in returns, 𝑟𝑖, to human capital across children (i.e., modelling 𝑟𝑖 ∗ 𝐶𝑖 as 
opposed to 𝐶𝑖) does not affect the conclusions of the model. The reason is that under the 
                                                     
22 This relationship holds for any two children in a given household. For the main case analysis, however, 




log-linearization used in the estimation, the ratio of returns is absorbed in the intercept of 
the equation. 
For the empirical estimation, I use households with two children (more on sample 
construction below). A Cobb-Douglas form of the production function is used where 
current stocks of human capital, measured by mathematics test scores, depend on past 
stocks (i.e., past test scores) and current investments, measured by parental education 
spending. This value-added specification relies on past test scores to proxy for past, 
unobserved, investments and has been widely used in the previous literature (e.g., Todd 
and Wolpin 2003) (for derivation of the value-added specification, see the Appendix). It 
also fits the data well. I perform two specification tests to determine whether the value-
added functional form of the production functions for child 𝑖 and child 𝑗 is supported by 
the data. First, I test whether past investment belongs in the production function. The F-
statistics for the older child (F(1,439)=5.18) and the younger child (F(1,439)=3.99) imply 
that I reject the hypothesis that the restricted model fits the data better. As a result, I use 
the “value-added plus” specification for both production functions. This specification has 
been found to fit US data better as well (Todd & Wolpin, 2007). Second, using the modified 
version of the model, I test whether the log-linear specification is appropriate by estimating 
a translog production function and testing whether the interaction terms are jointly 
significant. While for the younger child the null hypothesis is rejected (p-value=0.01), for 
the older child I cannot reject the null hypothesis that the production function is of the 
Cobb-Douglas form (p-value=0.93). For ease of estimation, I use the log-linearized Cobb-
Douglas specification of the production function for both children. 
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Given the Cobb-Douglas value-added specification of the production function, the 
log-linearized first-order condition (1) for household ℎ takes the form:  
 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐼𝑖,𝑡,ℎ − 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐼𝑗,𝑡,ℎ = 𝜌(𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐶𝑖,𝑡,ℎ − 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐶𝑗,𝑡,ℎ) + 𝛼𝑡,  
where the constant term,𝛼𝑡, is a function of the parental preference weights 𝜋. The 
coefficient 𝜌 represents substitution between the cognitive stocks of the two children in the 
parental utility function of human capital. If 𝜌 → −∞, parents’ valuation of child human 
capital is described by infinite inequality aversion, so that they will value improved 
cognitive stocks of one child, only if his or her cognitive stocks are lower than the cognitive 
stocks of the other child. If 𝜌 ≅ 1, then parental valuation of human capital is governed by 
efficiency motives and investment reinforces differences in human capital between 
children. If 𝜌 = 0, then equity and efficiency motives are balanced and investments are 
allocated between children independently of the child’s relative test scores. 
3. Estimation 
One of the challenges in estimating how investment responds to score differences 
is that education investments and test scores are jointly determined (further details in the 
Appendix). The simultaneity in investments and skill production may bias the coefficient 
associated with the differences in test scores. Econometrically, the simultaneity bias can 
be illustrated in the following stylized version of the model developed above. Scores of 
child 𝑖 of household ℎ in period 𝑡, 𝐶𝑖,𝑡,ℎ, are a function of current education investment, 
𝐼𝑖,𝑡,ℎ, child and household characteristics, 𝑋𝑖,𝑡,ℎ (such as child age and gender, past test 
scores, past investment, and mother’s education), and an error term, 𝑢𝑖,𝑡,ℎ (keeping the 
intercept implicit). As shown in the conceptual model, current investment levels are a 
function of the expected test scores, child and household characteristics, 𝑍𝑖,𝑡,ℎ (such as 
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child gender and years of education, area of residence, household per capita consumption, 
household size, and mother’s education), and an error term, 𝜖𝑖,𝑡,ℎ (again, keeping the 
intercept implicit):  
 𝐶𝑖,𝑡,ℎ = 𝑎𝐼𝑖,𝑡,ℎ + 𝑏𝑋𝑖,𝑡,ℎ + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡,ℎ  and 
 𝐼𝑖,𝑡,ℎ = 𝑔𝐶𝑖,𝑡,ℎ + 𝑑𝑍𝑖,𝑡,ℎ + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡,ℎ. 
This system of two equations can be re-written in reduced form as: 














The bias of the coefficient 𝑔 when estimating the investment equation alone will 
depend on the correlation between the endogenous variable 𝐶𝑖,𝑡,ℎ in that equation and the 
error term 𝜖𝑖,𝑡,ℎ. From the reduced form, it follows that: 
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝐶𝑖,𝑡,ℎ, 𝜖𝑖,𝑡,ℎ) = (𝑎/(1 − 𝑎𝑔))𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜖𝑖,𝑡,ℎ) + (1/(1 − 𝑎𝑔))𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝜖𝑖,𝑡,ℎ, 𝑢𝑖,𝑡,ℎ).  
In the context of this research, the sign of 𝑎 can be expected to be positive (and less than 
one given the Cobb-Douglas specification of the production functions). Then, if 𝑔 < 0 or 
𝑔 > 0 but 𝑔 < 1, the bias on the estimated coefficient 𝑔 would be positive (when the 
covariance between the two error terms is non-negative, as could be expected when there 
are omitted variables that affect both investment and human capital levels). 
Estimating the differenced equation suggested by the first-order condition derived 
from the conceptual model alleviates the problem of simultaneous determination of 
investment and stocks. The reason is that while individual test scores are endogenous in a 
child-specific investment equation, the difference in test scores of child 𝑖 and child 𝑗 in 
household ℎ may not be endogenous in a model for the difference in investments as long 
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as the error terms 𝜖𝑖,𝑡,ℎ and 𝜖𝑗,𝑡,ℎ contain a household-level error component only (e.g., if 
any shocks to investment are common to all children in the household). In that case, 
estimating a sibling fixed effects model of the relationship between investments and stocks 
would be appropriate, too. In the case when the investment error term is child-specific, 
however, the difference in test scores remains correlated with the error term for two 
reasons: 1) the simultaneous production of skills and investment, and 2) non-zero cross-
equation correlation of the error terms in the production and investment equations.  
The first problem is hard to deal with. In the human capital literature, the use of 
instrumental variables (IV) or fixed effects (FE) have been the preferred approaches to deal 
with endogenous inputs. As discussed, FE models rely on strong assumptions about the 
unobserved factors affecting test scores. A more general method would be the use of an IV 
model. Rosenzweig and Schultz (1983) are the first to try to account for endogeneity of 
human capital investments. They estimate a two-stage least squares regression with health 
input demand as the first stage and health production as the second stage. They use price, 
income and parental education as the instruments in the first stage, which are assumed to 
be unrelated to child endowments. While this approach would be suitable in studying 
differences among households, differences within households could only be identified 
using child-specific exogenous instruments. In his 1986 paper, Rosenzweig considers both 
within-household and across-household heterogeneity (Rosenzweig, 1986). He studies the 
effect of birth spacing on birth outcomes, given the unobserved parental characteristics and 
the unobserved endowments of children already born. To account for both types of 
unobserved variables, he proposes using an IV-FE procedure. Since parental characteristics 
are shared among children, these can be differenced out by sibling FE estimation. The 
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difference in input levels between two siblings, however, is affected by parental differential 
response to individual child endowments. As a result, Rosenzweig proposes using the 
lagged input from the older sibling (before the younger sibling was born) as an instrument 
for the input difference. Finding an instrument for differences in test scores for school-
going children, however, is difficult. 
In the absence of a suitable instrument for the difference in test scores between 
children, I attempt to minimize the potential simultaneity bias by controlling for a variety 
of covariates. For example, the choice of current education investments may be affected 
by the gender of the children if parents have higher preference for one child over another. 
In addition, heterogeneity across households in their budget constraints will matter, too. 
Therefore, in the equation I estimate, I control for child gender, urban versus rural area of 
residence, household per capita consumption, 𝑝𝑐𝑒, household size, ℎℎ𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒, and mother’s 
education, 𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐. Those should reduce the variance in the error term associated with the 
empirical approximation of the first-order condition (𝜖𝑖 − 𝜖𝑗). Similarly, Akresh et al. 
(2012) lack a good instrument for skills and impose various sample restrictions (such as 
looking at younger kids only) in order to minimize the potential bias resulting from reverse 
causality. Any remaining bias on the coefficient associated with the differences in test 
scores, however, is likely to be positive, as explained above. In his paper on nutrient 
allocations in India, Behrman (1988) also notes that it is difficult to find a plausible 
instrument and expects a positive bias in his estimation of parental preference parameters.  
Joint estimation of the first-order condition and the production functions in a three-
stage least squares framework accounts for the second problem of potential correlation 
between the equation-specific error terms. The use of the log-linearized Cobb-Douglas 
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specification of the value-added production functions suggests the estimation of the 
following system of equations for each household with two children of school age 
(derivation in the Appendix): 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐼𝑖,1999/2000,ℎ − 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐼𝑗,1999/2000,ℎ = 𝜌 × (𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐶𝑖,2000,ℎ − 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐶𝑗,2000,ℎ) +  µ𝑖,2000,ℎ +
µ𝑗,2000,ℎ + 𝑑1𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖,ℎ + 𝑑2𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑗,ℎ + 𝑑3𝑢𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛2000,ℎ +  𝑑4𝑝𝑐𝑒2000,ℎ +
𝑑5ℎℎ𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒2000,ℎ + 𝑑6𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐2000,ℎ + 𝛼1999/2000,ℎ + 𝜍1999/2000,ℎ ,         
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐶𝑖,2000,ℎ = 𝑐1𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐶𝑖,1997,ℎ + 𝑎11𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐼𝑖,1999/2000,ℎ + 𝑎12𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐼𝑖,1997/1998,ℎ + 𝛾𝑖,2000,ℎ +
𝑏11𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖,ℎ + 𝑏12𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐2000,ℎ +𝑏10 + 𝑢𝑖,2000,ℎ ,    
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐶𝑗,2000,ℎ = 𝑐2𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐶𝑖,1997,ℎ + 𝑎21𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐼𝑗,1999/2000,ℎ + 𝑎22𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐼𝑗,1997/1998,ℎ + 𝛾𝑗,2000,ℎ +
𝑏21𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖,ℎ + 𝑏22𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐2000,ℎ + 𝑏20 + 𝑢𝑗,2000,ℎ ,       
where µ denotes fixed effects for the level of schooling of each child, included in the 
investment equation, and γ denotes the age fixed effects, included in the production 
functions. Test scores are standardized by age, as is common practice in the literature 
(Paxson and Schady 2007; Todd and Wolpin 2007). Similar to Behrman (1988), I also 
standardize the investments in order to make both outcomes and inputs comparable in scale 
and readily derive the parental inequality aversion parameter from the equation 
representing the first-order condition. Investments are standardized at the school level 
(variation occurs between school levels rather than between different ages). Since these 
variables are then logged, as suggested by the conceptual model, they are all standardized 
around a mean of 100 (with a standard deviation of 1). 
4. Sample construction 
I restrict the sample used for analysis to households from 1997 who were 
interviewed in school year 2000/2001 and had at least 2 children of school age (between 7 
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and 19 years of age) in 1997. I drop households with missing schooling information on any 
one of their children and households who had no children attending school in both 
1997/1998 and 1999/2000. This yields 1,837 households. Households who have at least 
one child who attended school in 1997 but dropped out by 2000 before completing his or 
her education are excluded from the main analysis. This exclusion is imposed because of 
the confounding effect on investment allocation from any selection at the extensive margin. 
Of the remaining households, I consider households with exactly two children of school 
age who attend school in both years and have complete information on investments and 
scores. This results in 440 households. I perform two types of robustness checks to analyze 
the effect of the sample construction on the results on resource allocation. First, I present 
findings from analysis that does not restrict the sample to two-children households only 
(resulting in an expanded sample of 542 households). Second, in the sample of households 
with two children attending school, I also include households who had other children who 
dropped out (for a total of 500 households). Then, I provide results on allocation of 
resources using a selection model.  
5. Results and discussion 
5.1 Main model 
Table 1 presents the results from the estimation of the main model. In column (1), 
the empirical approximation of the first-order condition derived from the conceptual model 
is estimated using ordinary least squares regression. The estimate of the parameter of 
interest, 𝜌, governing parental substitution between the stocks of different children is 
positive but close to zero (0.0376). Overall, differences in tests scores between siblings do 
not have a significant effect on differences in investments (a standard error of 0.0467). 
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None of the other household-specific factors (per capita expenditure, household size, urban 
area of residence, mother’s education) are significant determinants of investment 
differences, either. Next, in column (2), I estimate the investment equation jointly with the 
production function of each child. The results from the 3SLS model yield a coefficient on 
test scores that is two times larger than the one estimated in a single-equation model 
(0.0743) although it is still not statistically different from zero (0.0460).   
These findings suggest that, on average, parental resource allocation between 
children is not a function of the difference in the stocks of their children. In other words, 
parents invest in children by maximizing the total returns of their investment, independent 
of their distribution between children. This implies that both children would be equally 
well (or equally poorly) insured against the impact of an income shock; it would not be the 
case that children with poorer initial outcomes would, on average, suffer more from the 
crisis than their better performing siblings. This result is in contrast to previous studies in 
developing countries, which have shown that education spending is determined based on a 
reinforcing, rather than neutral, investment strategy (Akresh et al., 2012; Ayalew, 2005).  
One reason why parents may respond to children’s skills in a reinforcing way is if 
children serve as an insurance mechanism for old age and higher education investments 
imply higher transfers by children later on (e.g., because of higher income, or because of 
reciprocity motives). In Indonesia, social norms obligate all children to provide old-age 
support to parents and even if parents live with one child, the other children should provide 
monetary assistance (Frankenberg, Lillard, & Willis, 2002). Frankenberg, Lillard, and 
Willis (2002) show that the educational attainment of children is not a significant predictor 
of whether parents receive transfers from their adult children. On the other hand, the study 
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finds that the amount received increases in the children’s education. A study by Park 
(2003), however, finds no systematic relationship between education and transfer amounts, 
while Raut and Tran (2005) show that the result on the effect of education on transfers is 
sensitive to the empirical specification. Overall, for the case of Indonesia, no conclusive 
evidence exists that higher education investments are likely to elicit higher transfers to 
parents later on. This may be one possible reason why, unlike studies in low-income 
countries, I find no reinforcing investment motives in Indonesia.  
Another potential explanation of my findings is that fertility is endogenous and 
parents only have as many children as they can afford to educate well, irrespective of their 
ability. In Indonesia, the National Family Planning Coordinating Board, created in the 70s, 
promoted small families and, in particular, a two-child norm. Volunteer and village mid-
wife services were used to promote and distribute different contraceptives, and those were 
made available free of charge during the 70s and 80s (Frankenberg, Sikoki, & Suriastini, 
2003). As a result, total fertility rates decreased from 5.6 children per woman in late 1960s 
to 3.4 in 1984-1987, and 2.8 in 1995-1997 (Permana & Westoff, 1999). This suggests that 
parents had control over their fertility decisions and that smaller families were preferred. 
Maralani (2008) uses the IFLS data to test the relationship between family size and 
children’s educational attainment for three cohorts: individuals born in 1948–1957, 1958–
1967, and 1968–1977. She doesn’t find household size to be significantly associated with 
school attainment in rural areas for any of the cohorts, although she finds a negative 
relationship for the most recent cohort in urban areas. This suggests that if parents of the 
children in my sample (born between 1982 and 1990) preferred smaller households, they 
may not have faced a trade-off between quantity and quality, investing equally in all 
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children. Any differences in investment allocation patterns should only be visible in urban 
areas or more resource-constrained households. Below, I test for possible heterogeneity in 
the parameter of interest.    
5.2 Heterogeneity in the parameter of interest 
In order to test whether there is heterogeneity in the substitution parameter by 
various socio-economic characteristics of the household, I include interaction terms 
between the difference in test scores of the two children and household per capita 
expenditure, as well as the dummy variable denoting urban area of residence. Poorer 
households, i.e., those with lower per capita expenditure, could be expected to be more 
likely to exhibit efficiency investment motives if they are budget constrained and they 
invest in the smarter child for whom investment may be more productive. Similarly, parents 
in urban areas are more likely to exhibit efficiency motives in investment if there are 
different preferences in urban areas or differences in infrastructure, schooling opportunities 
and labor market returns. For example, parents in urban areas may have more choices for 
the type of school their child attends and the types of extracurricular activities for the child, 
and thus may have more opportunities to discriminate between children. The results from 
the analysis support these two hypotheses. The coefficient on the interaction between test 
scores with per capita expenditure is negative, suggesting that a decrease in income is 
associated with an increase in the substitution parameter. In addition, as expected, the 
coefficient on the interaction with the indicator for urban area of residence is positive. 
However, these coefficients are statistically insignificant, which may be due to the small 
sample size.  
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Next, I examine the role of child gender in parental investment decisions. Unlike 
many Asian countries, Indonesia shows no male gender bias in parental preferences in birth 
outcomes or nutrition, and the gender gap in educational attainment has been declining 
(Kevane & Levine, 2000). Behrman and Deolalikar (1995) show that while wage rates for 
females are lower than for males, there is no evidence that females face lower rates of 
return to education. In addition, both females and males are expected to provide old-age 
transfers to parents and thus parental private expected benefits from investment in one child 
or another should not vary (Park, 2003). A potential implication of these findings is that 
there should be no differences in education spending by gender in households where all 
children attend school. Despite equal returns, however, parents may be more responsive to 
the level of endowments of one child than another. Further, gender differences may exist 
in the opportunity cost of time. Pitt and Rosenzweig (1990) show that, at least in 1980, 
older sisters were more likely to stay home from school and care for sick siblings compared 
to their teenage brothers.  
The results in column (3) of Table 1 show that the gender of the young child, but 
not the older child, is a significant factor in how parents choose to allocate education 
resources (𝜌 = 0.1598, significant at the 10% level). Households where the younger child 
is a female have significantly higher elasticity of substitution between the two children 
compared to households where the younger child is a male.  This could suggest that during 
an income shock, young female children are more likely to see a reduction in education 
investments than their older siblings of either gender.  
In order to better understand the implication of this finding, it is useful to examine 
the results for the production function estimation, as well. Past mathematics scores are 
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significant determinants of current mathematics scores. Consistent with previous studies 
on dynamic production functions in the US (e.g., Cunha, Heckman, & Schennach, 2010), 
the skill production function of older children in Indonesia is characterized by a greater 
degree of state dependence. For older children, a 10% increase in the standardized 
mathematics score in 1997 is associated with 2.4% higher mathematics score in 2000 
compared to a 1.8% increase for younger children. The effect of current education 
expenditures in older children as well as younger children is not precisely estimated. 
Lagged investment matters for both. When tested jointly, given the high degree of 
correlation between the two variables, the two investment variables are significantly 
different from zero for both children. While lagged investment has a stronger effect for 
younger children, I cannot reject equality of parameters between the two children. Yet, the 
results from the production function estimation provide some suggestive evidence that 
early investments are potentially more productive than later investments, as has been 
argued in prior literature (Cunha & Heckman, 2006). If that is the case, then the long-term 
effect of lower investments in the younger girls will be large as they may not be able to 
make up for the lower investments in their early childhood. 
5.3 Reduced-form analysis 
In line with prior literature, I also use a sibling fixed-effects regression framework 
to estimate a reduced-form version of the model for the investment problem only. I test 
whether the interaction between child gender and child order, as well as child gender, order 
and math scores is significant. These regressions yield results for how parents respond to a 
given child’s test scores, thus modelling “absolute” differences between children. In 
addition, as suggested by the structural model, I test whether “relative” differences between 
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children matter, that is, whether parents punish the younger child for having lower scores 
than her sibling (as opposed to having low scores in absolute).  
The difference in interpretation could be seen in the model specification. When 
testing “absolute” differences, the equations for each child are formulated as follows: 
 𝐼𝑘,ℎ = 𝑔𝐶𝑘,ℎ + 𝑑𝑍𝑘,ℎ + 𝑔1𝐹𝑘,ℎ × 𝐵𝑘,ℎ × 𝐶𝑘,ℎ + 𝜖𝑘,ℎ for 𝑘 = 𝑖, 𝑗. 
where 𝐹𝑘,ℎ is an indicator variable for child 𝑘 in household ℎ being a female, and 𝐵𝑘,ℎ is 
an indicator for child 𝑘’s birth order such that the interaction term 𝐹𝑘,ℎ × 𝐵𝑘,ℎ is always 
equal to 0 for child 𝑘 when child 𝑘 is the older sibling. The first-differenced model would 
then yield: 
 𝐼𝑖,ℎ − 𝐼𝑗,ℎ = 𝑔(𝐶𝑖,ℎ − 𝐶𝑗,ℎ) + 𝑑(𝑍𝑖,ℎ − 𝑍𝑗,ℎ) + 𝑔1𝐹𝑗,ℎ × 𝐵𝑗,ℎ × 𝐶𝑗,ℎ + 𝜖𝑖,ℎ − 𝜖𝑗,ℎ.  
On the other hand, when testing “relative differences”, the equations for each child 
are specified as: 
𝐼𝑘,ℎ = 𝑔𝐶𝑘,ℎ + 𝑑𝑍𝑘,ℎ + 𝑔2 𝐷𝑗,ℎ × 𝐶𝑘,ℎ + 𝜖𝑘,ℎ for 𝑘 = 𝑖, 𝑗 , 
where 𝐷𝑗,ℎ is an indicator variable, defined at the household level, for the younger sibling, 
sibling 𝑗, being a female. The first-differenced model would then yield: 
 𝐼𝑖,ℎ − 𝐼𝑗,ℎ = 𝑔(𝐶𝑖,ℎ − 𝐶𝑗,ℎ) + 𝑑(𝑍𝑖,ℎ − 𝑍𝑗,ℎ) + 𝑔2 𝐷𝑗,ℎ × (𝐶𝑖,ℎ − 𝐶𝑗,ℎ) + 𝜖𝑖,ℎ − 𝜖𝑗,ℎ,  
which corresponds to the specification of the structural model estimated earlier. 
Table 2 presents the results of this analysis. First, using total expenditures, I show 
that the results from this analysis are consistent with the previous findings and that the 
results are explained by relative differences between siblings, rather than absolute skill 
levels. Being either a female or the younger child in the household is not a significant 
determinant of differences in investments (column (1) ). Younger children who are females 
do not receive significantly lower levels of investments either, whether their school 
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performance is taken into consideration or not (column (2) ). However, younger females 
who have lower age-adjusted test scores than their older siblings of either gender 
experience lower levels of total education investment (column (3) ). The coefficient on the 
interaction term between the younger child in the household being a female and test scores 
in column (3) is 0.1813, significant at the 5% level. This reduced-form analysis confirms 
the previous findings that if younger female children have lower test scores, then they 
would receive lower education investment compared to their older sibling of either gender.  
5.4 Differences in type of investment 
In order to better understand the source of the differences in investments, I 
decompose the investment variable into fees (comprised of monthly fees, registration fees, 
and exam fees) and other education expenses. Using the sibling fixed-effects model, I find 
no significant differences in expenses for school supplies, special courses, transportation 
and pocket money (grouped under the heading “other”) (Table 2, columns (7), (8), (9) ). 
The main source for the differences in education spending between siblings appears to be 
monthly fees (Table 2, columns (4), (5) and (6) ). This suggests that young female children 
with lower skills compared to their older siblings are likely to attend schools with lower 
fees. If higher fees are an indication of better school inputs and are associated with better 
school performance (as suggested by Suryadarma et al., 2006 ), this may imply that parents 
enroll young female children in schools of worse quality.23 
In order to test whether school choice was potentially affected by the crisis I repeat 
the analysis presented in Table 2 using 1997 data on school spending and mathematics 
scores. Unlike the results for 2000, I find no significant differences in education spending 
                                                     
23 The data does not allow testing this directly as I cannot identify the specific school attended by the child. 
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in 1997 between siblings. This finding is consistent with parents being forced by the 
income shock to move some children (in particular, lower-performing younger girls) to 
schools of lower quality. Another possible explanation may have to do with schools 
reducing their fees shortly after the crisis if lower-grade schools (attended by the younger 
children) reduced fees more than upper-grade schools. While this is plausible, the finding 
that the gender of the younger child matters cannot be explained away by this alternative 
explanation. This study cannot separately identify whether the crisis changed preferences, 
or existing preferences became more important under limited resources, but it suggests that 
not all children were equally well insured from the crisis since after the crisis, parents were 
more sensitive to the human capital of younger girls.   
6. Robustness Checks 
6.1 Households with more than two children and no dropouts 
In order to examine the sensitivity of the results to the sample construction, I 
perform a robustness analysis using all households who had two or more children attending 
school in both 1997 and 2000 and no children who dropped out during that time period. 
This adds 102 more households to the sample, 90 of which have 3 children, 11 – 4 children, 
and 1 – 5 children. The results from the sibling fixed effects estimation confirm the 
previous findings: while gender, sibling order and absolute skill levels do not matter, the 
relative performance of the youngest child matters when that child is a female. The results 
are presented in Table 3. The estimate of the parameter of interest is statistically significant, 
although lower than the main case estimate – 0.1349 vs. 0.1598. Having a lower estimate 
when including multiple-children households is expected. When there are more 
opportunities to spread resources between children (or more ways to decrease overall 
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resources), fewer resources need to be diverted from one specific child (e.g., the youngest 
one).       
6.2 Selection model for households who have two children attending school  
Next, I perform a robustness analysis that uses all households who have two 
children currently attending school, including households where one or more children 
dropped out between the two survey waves in 1997 and 2000. This robustness check 
accounts for the fact that households with no dropouts are a selected sample. For this 
analysis, I need an instrument that exogenously affects the probability that a household will 
have a child who drops out during the study period. I create a measure of this household-
level probability based on the 1998 non-enrollment rates by child age and quartile of 
household per capita expenditure as reported in Thomas et al. (2004). Thus, this measure 
depends on both household size (number of children) and household socio-economic well-
being. Using this instrument, I perform a Heckman two-step estimation. The first-stage 
selection equation is estimated using all households who have two children currently 
attending school. It is a function of all the variables included in the main model in addition 
to the measure of household-level propensity to pull a child out of school. Based on the 
estimates from this model, the inverse mills ratio can be calculated. This selection term is 
then included in the second-stage equation, which is estimated for the original set of 
households with two children who have had no children dropping out during the crisis. 
Table 4 presents the results of this robustness analysis. 
The exogenous instrument is a good predictor of whether the household has a child 
who drops out: the higher the household-level probability of dropout, the lower the 
likelihood of being selected into the main sample for analysis on households with no 
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dropouts. Controlling for the selection effects, the results on resource allocation within the 
household confirm the previous findings: differences in test scores between children are 
not associated with differences in investments unless the younger child is a female. The 
estimate of the parameter of parental preference for equality is 0.1973 for the case when 
the younger child is a female, which is even larger than the size of the parameter in the 
main analysis – 0.1598.  
The finding from this robustness check is consistent with the case when some 
households who may struggle with schooling costs substitute between children at the 
extensive margin and then have equal preference for those who remain in school. Other 
households who struggle but choose to keep their children in school (the main sample used 
in this chapter) may need to substitute between children at the intensive margin, reducing 
investments in some children more than in others. That is why when controlling for 
selection into keeping all children in school, the inequality aversion parameter is larger 
than before. 
7. Conclusion 
This chapter examines the role of parental preferences in human capital 
accumulation. Using data from Indonesia soon after the economic crisis in late 1990s, I 
examine whether parents allocate education resources within the household based on 
efficiency or equity motives. I show that, on average, parental investment in children does 
not reinforce differences in skills. However, parents are more sensitive to the human capital 
of younger female children, penalizing them for having lower skills compared to their older 
siblings of either gender. Decomposing investment into monthly fees and other school 
expenditures shows that investment differences between siblings are driven by fees and 
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implies that younger female children may be attending schools of lower quality after the 
crisis. No differences in investment by child gender or order exist before the crisis, which 
suggests that maybe young female children were less fully insured from the negative effects 
of this income shock compared to their older siblings of either gender. Thus, while I cannot 
identify the causal effect of the crisis on changes in household resource allocation, by 
examining behavior prior to the crisis and after the crisis, I provide some suggestive 
evidence on household coping strategies with the income shock.  





Table 1: Resource allocation between children - Main analysis
(1) (2) (3)
(Expenses1,2000-Expenses2,2000)
Math1,2000 -Math2,2000 0.0376 0.0743 -0.0521
(0.0467) (0.0460) (0.0809)
Older child is a female 0.0005 0.0004 0.0004
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009)
Younger child is a female -0.0006 -0.0002 -0.0003
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009)
Older child is female*(Math1,2000 -Math2,2000) 0.1107
(0.0928)
Younger child is female*(Math1,2000 -Math2,2000) 0.1598*
(0.0928)
Urban area of residence -0.0015 -0.0015 -0.0014
(0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010)
Log per capita expenditures in 2000 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002
(0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0008)
Household size -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0004
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Mother years of education 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)









Mother years of education 0.0005** 0.0005**
(0.0001) (0.0001)









Mother years of education 0.0005** 0.0005**
(0.0001) (0.0001)
Households 440 440 440
Notes:
[3] Standard errors in parentheses; * significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level
[1] The investment equation includes school level fixed effects. The production functions include age 
fixed effects. All equations also include a constant term.
[2] All variables are standardized around mean of 100 with a standard deviation of 1, and then logged. 




Table 2: Fixed effects model for resource allocation between children in 2000 - by type of investment
Basic model Absolute Relative Basic model Absolute Relative Basic model Absolute Relative
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Age 0.00001 -0.00002 -0.00003 0.00008 0.00003 0.00002 -0.00041 -0.0004 -0.00042
(0.00042) (0.00042) (0.00042) (0.00045) (0.00045) (0.00045) (0.00041) (0.00041) (0.00041)
Female 0.00009 0.00034 0.00033 -0.00043 -0.00095 -0.00095 0.00002 0 0.00003
(0.00068) (0.00097) (0.00096) (0.00072) (0.00102) (0.00101) (0.00066) (0.00093) (0.00093)
Sibling order -0.00131 -0.00114 -0.00121 -0.0008 -0.00138 -0.00146 -0.00159 -0.0016 -0.00162
(0.00108) (0.00126) (0.00126) (0.00114) (0.00133) (0.00133) (0.00104) (0.00121) (0.00121)
Math score in 2000 0.03755 0.02123 -0.04623 0.08128 0.06298 -0.02385 0.04178 0.04477 0.01909
(0.04845) (0.05120) (0.06562) (0.05125) (0.05407) (0.06889) (0.04680) (0.04956) (0.06391)
Female*Sibling order -0.35977 -0.00023 -0.42851 0.00135 0.06599 0.00004
(0.36709) (0.00134) (0.38802) (0.00141) (0.35386) (0.00130)
Female*Sibling order*Math score 0.078 0.09325 -0.01432
(0.07966) (0.08420) (0.07679)
Younger child in the household is a female*Math score 0.18128* 0.23279** 0.04886
(0.09628) (0.10178) (0.09339)
Years of education in 2000 -0.00067 -0.00065 -0.00063 -0.00064 -0.00058 -0.00056 -0.0002 -0.00021 -0.00019
(0.00041) (0.00042) (0.00041) (0.00044) (0.00044) (0.00044) (0.00040) (0.00040) (0.00040)
Constant 4.43695** 4.51223** 4.41872** 4.23451** 4.31937** 4.20219** 4.41979** 4.40595** 4.41516**
(0.22314) (0.23587) (0.22302) (0.23607) (0.24909) (0.23536) (0.21556) (0.22836) (0.21627)
N of children 880 875 878
N of households 440 440 440
Notes:
[2] Standard errors in parentheses.
[3] * significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level
monthly fees 2000 other educational expenses 2000
[1] All variables are standardized around mean of 100 with a standard deviation of 1, and then logged. Math scores are standardized by age, investment is standardized by 
school level (primary, junior high, senior high).









Youngest child -0.00045 -0.00047
(0.00098) (0.00098)
Math score in 2000 0.0172 -0.0303
(0.03982) (0.05153)
Female*Youngest child -0.38573 0.00084
(0.30996) (0.00111)
Female*Youngest child*Math score 0.08389
(0.06728)
Youngest child in the household is a female*Math score 0.13494*
(0.07517)




N of children 1199 1199
N of households 542 542
Notes:
[2] Standard errors in parentheses.
[3] * significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level
Table 3: Robustness check - Fixed effects model for resource allocation 
between two or more children in 2000
[1] All variables are standardized around mean of 100 with a standard deviation of 1, 
and then logged. Math scores are standardized by age, investment is standardized by 









Table 4: Robustness check - Selection model for resource allocation between two children in 2000
Selection Model Main model Selection Model Main model
-6.4836** -6.5752**
(0.8085) (0.8276)
Math1,2000 -Math2,2000 -8.2337 0.0511 4.5954 -0.1022
(8.8462) (0.0475) (15.5332) (0.0840)
Older child is female*(Math1,2000 -Math2,2000) -8.6768 0.129
(18.1310) (0.0960)
Younger child is female*(Math1,2000 -Math2,2000) -24.4313 0.1973**
(18.9286) (0.0968)
Older child is female -0.0711 0.0004 -0.0861 0.0003
(0.1908) (0.0009) (0.1938) (0.0009)
Younger child is female 0.2698 -0.0007 0.2966 -0.0009
(0.1941) (0.0010) (0.2000) (0.0010)
Urban area of residence -0.2635 -0.0016 -0.2469 -0.0015
(0.2110) (0.0010) (0.2123) (0.0010)
Log per capita expenditures in 2000 0.0953 -0.0004 0.1196 -0.0004
(0.1743) (0.0009) (0.1774) (0.0009)
Household size -0.2408** 0 -0.2510** 0
(0.0562) (0.0004) (0.0577) (0.0004)
Mother years of education 0.0306 0.0002 0.0269 0.0002
(0.0303) (0.0001) (0.0307) (0.0001)
Older child is in junior high school 0.4701* -0.0037** 0.4667* -0.0037**
(0.2790) (0.0017) (0.2813) (0.0017)
Older child is in senior high school 1.2735** -0.0080** 1.2777** -0.0080**
(0.3417) (0.0019) (0.3433) (0.0019)
Younger child is in junior high school 0.2731 0.0057** 0.3026 0.0056**
(0.2409) (0.0011) (0.2445) (0.0011)
Younger child is in senior high school 0.1499 0.0096** 0.1828 0.0096**
(0.4431) (0.0025) (0.4479) (0.0025)
Constant 1.9747 0.0084 1.7768 0.0085
(2.1386) (0.0108) (2.1681) (0.0108)




[1] Of the 500 households, 440 have no children who dropped out, while 60 have at least one child who dropped out.
[3] Standard errors in parentheses; * significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level
(1) (2)
500 500
Probability of having a child dropout
(at the household level)
[2] All variables are standardized around mean of 100 with a standard deviation of 1, and then logged. Math scores 




A quasi-Cobb-Douglas specification of the production function is assumed: 





Where logarithms are implicit, the linearly additive specification is: 
𝐶𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0𝐼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜙0𝑣𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼1𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜙1𝑣𝑖,𝑡−1 + ⋯ + 𝛼𝑡−1𝐼𝑖,1 + 𝜙𝑡−1𝑣𝑖,1 + 𝛽𝑡𝜂𝑖 + 𝜅𝑡𝐸𝑡
+ 𝜖𝑖,𝑡, (𝐴1) 
where 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 is the measurement error associated with the cognitive outcome at time 𝑡. In this 
model, the expected impact of investment at the beginning of time 𝑡 on an outcome at the 
end of time 𝑡 is given by the parameter 𝛼0, and the impact of an investment at the beginning 
of time 𝑡 − 1 is given by the parameter 𝛼1. As shown in Todd and Wolpin (2003), the 
function for the outcome in time 𝑡 − 1 can be written similarly as:  
𝐶𝑖,𝑡−1 = 𝛼0 𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜙0𝑣𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛼1𝐼𝑖,𝑡−2 + 𝜙1𝑣𝑖,𝑡−2 + ⋯ + 𝛼𝑡−2𝐼𝑖,1 + 𝜙𝑡−2𝑣𝑖,1 + 𝛽𝑡−1𝜂𝑖
+ 𝜅𝑡−1𝐸𝑡−1 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡−1.  
Therefore, subtracting 𝛿𝐶𝑖,𝑡−1 from both sides of equation (A1) for some constant 𝛿 
obtains: 
𝐶𝑖,𝑡 − 𝛿𝐶𝑖,𝑡−1 = 𝛼0𝐼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜙0𝑣𝑖,𝑡 + (𝛼1 − 𝛿α0)Ii,t−1 + (𝜙1 − 𝛿𝜙0)𝑣𝑖,𝑡−1 + ⋯ + (𝛼𝑡−1
− 𝛿𝛼𝑡−2)𝐼𝑖,1 + (𝜙𝑡−1 − 𝛿𝜙𝑡−2)𝑣𝑖,1 + (𝛽𝑡 − 𝛿𝛽𝑡−1)𝜂𝑖 + (𝜅𝑡𝐸𝑡
− 𝛿𝜅𝑡−1𝐸𝑡−1) + (𝜖𝑖,𝑡 − 𝛿𝜖𝑖,𝑡−1) .                                                         (𝐴2) 
Under the assumption that the impacts of each input, shock, and the initial 
endowment deteriorate over time at the geometric rate of 𝛿 so that 𝛼𝑘 = 𝛿𝛼𝑘−1,  𝜙𝑘 =
𝛿𝜙𝑘−1, and 𝛽𝑘 = 𝛿𝛽𝑘−1, the linearized production function, where logarithms are implicit,  
can be presented in a value-added form as follows:                  
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𝐶𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛿𝐶𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛼0𝐼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜙0𝑣𝑖,𝑡 + (𝜅𝑡𝐸𝑡 − 𝛿𝜅𝑡−1𝐸𝑡−1)  + (𝜖𝑖,𝑡 − 𝛿𝜖𝑖,𝑡−1) ,                  (𝐴3) 
where the term (𝜅𝑡𝐸𝑡 − 𝛿𝜅𝑡−1𝐸𝑡−1) is a constant. 
If the 𝑣𝑖,𝑡 shocks, which are assumed to be identically and independently distributed, are 
realized after the investment has been made so that the investment decision is not affected 
by the shock realization, then 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝐼𝑖,𝑡, 𝑣𝑖,𝑡) = 0. The unbiased estimation of equation (A3) 
also requires that the measurement errors in the two time periods are correlated with 
correlation equal to 𝛿 so that 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝐶𝑖,𝑡−1,  𝜖𝑖,𝑡 − 𝛿𝜖𝑖,𝑡−1) = 0 (Todd & Wolpin 2003, 2007). 
While harder to justify, this assumption is common in the human capital literature. Since 
the coefficient on past test scores is not the main parameter of interest, I will take this 
assumption as given. 
In the empirical model, I use data on test scores in 1997 and 2000. The value-added 
specification of the production function then takes the form: 
𝐶𝑖,2000 = 𝛿
2𝐶𝑖,1997 + 𝛼0𝐼𝑖,1999/2000 + 𝛿𝛼0𝐼𝑖,1998/1999
+ (𝜙0𝑣𝑖,1999/2000+ 𝛿𝜙0𝑣𝑖,1998/1999) + 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡2000 + (𝜖𝑖,1999/2000
− 𝛿2𝜖𝑖,1997/1998) . 
Thus, in addition to the assumptions described earlier that allow unbiased 
estimation of the model parameters, I also need to account for the fact that households are 
not surveyed every year. Assuming investments are lumpy and made annually, the above 
formulation suggests that investments in academic year 1998/1999 belong in the model. I 
consider estimation of this equation when data for 𝐼𝑖,1998/1999 are missing. First, if the 
investments in academic years 1999/2000 and 1998/1999 are equal, then estimation does 
not suffer from omitted variable bias. The coefficient associated with current investment 
will represent the sum of current and lagged investment. At the other extreme, if 
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𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝐼𝑖,1998/1999, 𝐼𝑖,1999/2000) = 0, omitted variable bias is also not present. While this 
assumption may seem implausible, it is not unlikely because the economic crisis of 1998 
affected both the cost of schooling and parental ability to pay. Assuming that the correlation 
between investments in 1999/2000 and 1998/1999 is small, the omitted variable bias due 
to missing information on 1998/1999 investments will be small. Alternatively, investments 
in the academic year 1997/1998 can be used to proxy for investments in 1998/1999 since 
both academic years were affected by the crisis of 1998 (even though investment 
information reported in the 1997 survey is likely affected much less by the crisis or by 
expectations of the crisis).  I test whether past investment belongs in the production 
function. The F-statistics for the older child (F(1,439)=5.18) and the younger child 
(F(1,439)=3.99) imply that I cannot reject the hypothesis that the unrestricted model fits 
the data better. Therefore, the final model also includes past investment in the production 
functions. In addition, I include mother’s education to account for other unobserved 
investments at the household level. An additional concern is that while 
(𝐼𝑖,1999/2000, 𝑣𝑖,1999/2000) = 0 ,  𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝐼𝑖,1998/1999, 𝑣𝑖,1998/1999) = 0 and 
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝐼𝑖,1998/1999, 𝑣𝑖,1999/2000) = 0, parents may respond to past shocks to human capital so 
that 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝐼𝑖,1999/2000, 𝑣𝑖,1998/1999) ≠ 0. In other words, current investment is likely to be 
endogenous in a model of human capital production.  
While the main goal of the chapter is not to estimate a production function, but 
rather provide insights on investment allocation, this model is useful in that it explicitly 
shows how investment and human capital are interlinked. Investments affect human capital 
and expectations of the cumulative human capital affect investments.  
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CHAPTER 4: Occupation choice after the crisis  
1. Introduction 
Intergenerational transmission of income in developing countries is often high. 
Even as educational attainment has been increasing over time, breaking the cycle of 
poverty has been difficult. One of the reasons for that could be that poor households are 
often vulnerable and exposed to various shocks. Shocks may be associated with reduced 
willingness to take risks when choosing an occupation. In this chapter, I examine 
determinants of occupation choice of Indonesian males after the East Asian Financial Crisis 
and provide some indirect tests of whether the economy-wide shock increased people’s 
preference for an occupation with lower earnings volatility. This research question is 
related to three interconnected strands of research: occupation choice, household 
consumption and income smoothing, and social learning and expectations about labor 
market returns.  
Labor markets in developing countries are often characterized with strong 
intergenerational transmission of occupations. Emran and Shilpi (2011) study occupation 
choice in rural Nepal and Vietnam, identifying the separate effects of intergenerational 
transmission of ability, of tangible assets such as education and wealth and of intangible 
assets such as social networks. They find that the intergenerational occupation linkages 
between fathers and sons could largely be explained by genetic endowments in both Nepal 
and Vietnam. In Nepal, mother-daughter linkages are also affected by shared intangible 
assets. Similarly, Magruder (2010) shows that in South Africa, when a father’s industry 
grows by 10 percent, the son is 3-4 percent more likely to work in that industry. In this 
case, he attributes the intergenerational transmission of occupations not to accumulated 
skills or inherited human capital but to the importance of parents for social network 
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connections. The lack of occupation and social mobility across generations makes breaking 
the cycle of poverty hard. For example, even with globalization, increased labor demand 
and higher education spending, Krishna (2013) shows that in urban India, sons tend to 
follow their fathers and uncles in informal and low-skilled occupations. 
Intergenerational transmission of income and labor market outcomes is also 
affected by the inherent riskiness of the environment. There is a large literature on 
consumption smoothing during periods of negative income shocks in developing countries. 
Households may sell assets, reduce investments, or borrow in response to an income shock 
(Frankenberg, Smith, & Thomas, 2003;  Rosenzweig & Wolpin, 1993; Townsend, 1994). 
When households lack access to credit and insurance or have lumpy assets they may also 
take actions to smooth income variability prior to the realization of any shocks (Morduch, 
1995). For example, Rosenzweig and Binswanger (1993) study farmers’ agricultural 
investments and find that farmers in riskier environments choose investment portfolios that 
mitigate risk, which results in lower incomes because of the observed trade-off between 
profit variability and average profits. In addition, households may choose to diversify their 
income sources. Shenoy (2014) studies how Thai farmers respond to volatility in 
international rice prices and shows that higher volatility is associated with less 
specialization. At the same time, he finds that diversification is inefficient and decreases 
household revenue. Similarly negative effects of diversification on household welfare are 
found in Bangladesh. There, Bandyopadhyay and Skoufias (2013) show that if the 
household head is in agriculture, then household members are less likely to also be 
employed in the agricultural sector if they live in areas with more rainfall uncertainty 
compared to people in areas with less variability in rainfall. 
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Given the uncertainty in livelihoods, people keep updating their expectations and 
behavior based on their experiences and newly acquired information. In Indonesia, 
Cameron and Shah (2012) study the effect of natural disasters on risk perceptions and risk 
taking and show that people who experienced a recent shock were more risk averse and 
less likely to take risks in terms of technology adoption, starting up a business or changing 
jobs. Malmendier and Nagel (2011) show that individuals who experienced low stock 
market returns during their lives had lower willingness to take financial risk, especially if 
the negative stock market shocks were more recent and the people affected were younger. 
In addition, Tokuoka (2013) shows that people learn from the experience of their family. 
Thus, a household’s saving rate increases when a sibling becomes unemployed. Similarly, 
Diagne (2008) studies whether people’s expectations are mostly explained by their own 
characteristics and the objective average labor market conditions, or by the labor market 
experience of their siblings. She finds that young people have limited labor market 
information and place disproportionate weight on social learning. On the other hand, 
Osman (2014) experimentally provides occupation information to high school students in 
Egypt, correcting prior held beliefs about average earnings and volatility. He finds that they 
respond to objective information and that risk-averse students choose occupations with 
lower earnings variability once they graduate from high school. 
 My research examines the connection between occupation choice and earnings 
volatility in a developing country setting. Unlike most studies in developing countries, I 
focus on males living in urban areas where the occupational choice set is different/larger. 
In addition, I expand on previous research on the effects of long-run risk by studying 
occupation response to volatility associated with a short-run aggregate shock. Since young 
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people have little prior information about earnings, I expect that they will be most sensitive 
to earnings volatility. In particular, I test whether young people whose fathers engaged in 
occupations with a high volatility in income after the crisis were less willing to take a 
riskier occupation.  
I find ambiguous results. If anything, the analysis shows that willingness to take 
risk in occupation choice increased after the crisis, which is contrary to the theoretical 
predictions. I also find little evidence of a trade-off between volatility and average earnings. 
This would suggest that the extra risk taken would not be necessarily associated with higher 
earnings and thus may have low (if any) welfare benefits. Overall, the Indonesian data does 
not appear to be suitable for this analysis and the results presented below should be 
interpreted with caution. Nevertheless, this study serves to describe the issues related to 
occupation choice and willingness to take risk and outline a research plan for future work. 
Next, I present a brief conceptual model that guides the estimation, a description of the 
sample and volatility definition, and finally, a discussion of the results and a conclusion. 
2. Conceptual framework 
I develop a simple conceptual model in order to illustrate the factors that affect 
occupational choices. Child 𝑖 in household ℎ chooses an occupation to maximize his utility 
function, 𝑈[𝑌𝑖𝑗|Ω]. Utility is defined over earnings in job 𝑗 and is conditional on the child’s 
information and opportunity set, Ω. Earnings are a function of the average income in a 
given job (𝑌?̅?), child ability (𝛼𝑖
𝑜), and unexpected job-specific shocks (𝜂𝑗). Child ability is 
distributed normally with a mean of 0 and a variance of 𝜎0
2. Shocks to income have a 
normal distribution with a mean of 0 and a variance of 𝜎 𝑗




𝑜 − 𝜂𝑗 , is distributed normally with a mean 𝑌?̅? and a variance 𝑠𝑗
2 = 𝜎0
2 + 𝜎𝑗
2 . A 
second-order Taylor-series approximation around the expected level of income, 𝑌?̅?, yields: 
𝑈[𝑌𝑖𝑗|Ω] = 𝑈[𝑌?̅?|Ω] + 𝑈
′[𝑌?̅?|Ω](𝛼𝑖




































× 𝛾 × 𝑠𝑗
2 
where 𝛾 is the coefficient of relative risk aversion. This expression shows that, for a risk-
averse agent, expected utility is decreasing in the variance of the labor market outcomes 
and increasing in expected returns.  
Empirically, I assume an additive random utility model of occupation choice and 
use a conditional logit regression model, where individuals choose between six occupations 
to maximize their utility: 
𝑂𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑗 = 𝛽1𝑌?̅? + 𝛽2𝜎𝑗 + 𝑍𝑖𝛿1 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑗  .    (1) 
The error term has a type 1 extreme value distribution. The vector 𝑍 is a vector of variables 
which determine the information and opportunity set of the child, Ω, such as child age and 
education. If the utility function is concave, then mean earnings and volatility should enter 
113 
 
the equation in log form.24 I expect to find a significant and positive sign for the coefficient 
associated with average earnings, 𝛽1. If people are unable to ensure perfectly against 
income volatility, then variance, 𝜎𝑗, should also be a significant determinant of occupation 
choice. I expect a negative sign since, for a given income level, risk-averse agents would 
prefer lower volatility.  
A modified model also includes an interaction term between the job variance for a 
given occupation and the variance in the parent’s occupation in order to test whether 
parental income volatility after the crisis affected willingness to take risks when making 
occupation choices: 
𝑂𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑗 = 𝑏1𝑌?̅? + 𝑏2𝜎𝑗 + 𝑏3(𝜎𝑗 × 𝜎𝑖,𝑝) + 𝑍𝑖𝑑1 + 𝑑2𝜎𝑖,𝑝 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑗  , (2)  
If individuals react only according to objective labor market conditions, earnings volatility 
in the father’s occupation should not have an additional effect on the probability of 
choosing a given occupation. If, however, risk-averse individuals learn socially and 
respond to personal experiences, then an increase in earnings volatility in the father’s 
occupation should be associated with higher likelihood of choosing a safer occupation 
(either because of the information shock and changing expectations or because of 
diversification motives).  
This conceptual framework suggests that the error terms contain unobserved 
individual ability. Yet average income and volatility in different occupations are plausibly 
exogenous and the estimates of their effects should not be subject to omitted variable bias. 
The model also shows the need to account for risk preferences. Unfortunately, the data 
does not contain information on risk preferences for the year 2000. Thus, individual risk 
                                                     




preferences are also a part of the error term. Again, they should not be correlated with the 
aggregate measures of earnings and volatility. Thus, the effects identified in the empirical 
approximation of the model should be consistent estimates of the average effect across 
people with heterogeneous risk preferences. 
The main concern in the empirical identification of the model is that occupation 
choice also depends on other job characteristics that may determine job satisfaction and 
that are correlated with volatility and earnings. If volatility during the crisis is a short-run 
and unexpected characteristic of a given job, then it will likely not be correlated with other 
factors in a systematic way. Similarly, earnings volatility in the father’s occupation would 
be endogenous in a model of sons’ occupation choice because of the likely 
intergenerational correlation of risk preferences and ability. Again, the randomness of the 
crisis, where some of the previously safest occupations experienced the largest earnings 
shocks, alleviate this problem.  
Still, considering these caveats of the analysis, this chapter does not claim to show 
causal estimates but merely associations. In order to identify the causal effects of the crisis, 
a difference-in-difference analysis could be performed using regional variation in changes 
in labor demand to estimate the impact of rising volatility on willingness to take risk. This 
type of analysis, however, is not well suited to an occupation choice model. Instead, in this 
chapter, I estimate the effect of volatility on occupation choice prior to the crisis and then 
again after the crisis. Thus, even if showing associations only, the comparison between the 
two models provides some suggestive evidence about the possible effects of the crisis.  
3. Sample construction 
For the main analysis, I use information on males only because the vast majority of 
age-eligible males are employed in all waves of the survey. Thus, my sample is less likely 
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to be subject to bias related to selection into working (especially if less risk-averse 
individuals were more likely to work). I also restrict the sample to males between the ages 
of 25 and 45 in the year 2000 in order to include only individuals who have completed their 
education and whose fathers are likely to be of working age prior to the crisis (information 
used in the second part of the analysis). I use information on individuals interviewed as 
part of the household survey as well as members of the household who live away. The 
survey collects information on the household head’s children living away, including their 
gender, age, years of education, employment status and occupation. Similarly, it also 
collects data on parents of the household head living away. This information reduces any 
potential sample selection bias which may occur if living away from your parents was 
associated with more willingness to take risks. Excluding those individuals from the 
analysis could have resulted in biased estimates of the importance of earnings volatility. 
Finally, I restrict the sample to males living in urban areas in 1997 in order to ensure the 
same/large choice set since choice of occupations in rural areas may be limited.25 Defining 
this restriction based on 1997 rather than 2000 residence accounts for the fact that there 
may be selective migration after the crisis and thus the sample does not exclude people 
who moved away from urban areas by 2000 (and does not include those who only moved 
to an urban area in 2000). 
4. Occupation categories and definition of volatility 
I calculate earnings volatility using annual data on individual monthly earnings 
from 1995 to 2000 (provided retrospectively in the different survey waves) for all 
                                                     
25 In addition, there is strong intergenerational transmission of occupations in Indonesia, especially for rural 
households. Appendix Table 1 presents the proportion of individuals who have the same occupation in 
2000 as their father did prior to the crisis in 1997. The descriptive statistics show that in rural areas, more 
than 43% of males whose fathers were agricultural workers in 1997 also engaged in agriculture in 2000. 
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employed males of working age (19 to 65) living in urban areas. I adjust nominal earnings 
reported in the survey using province-specific consumer price indices from 1995 to 2000. 
For the main analysis, I use a nonparametric measure of total earnings variability based on 
Cappellari and Jenkins (2014).  
First, I calculate the person-specific, occupation-specific volatility in earnings: 





where 𝐸𝑖𝑡 are the real occupation-specific earnings for person 𝑖 in year 𝑡. 
Next, I calculate pre-crisis occupation-specific, province-specific income volatility as the 
volatility, averaged across all individuals and across all time periods from 1993 to 1997. 
Similarly, post-crisis occupation-specific, province-specific income volatility is calculated 
as the volatility, averaged across all individuals and across all time periods from 1998 to 
2000. 
The IFLS distinguishes between 10 different occupation categories: two categories 
for professional/technical workers, a category each for administrative and managerial 
workers, clerical workers, sales workers, service workers, and agricultural laborers, and 
three separate categories for production workers. I find no significant differences in mean 
earnings or volatility between the two categories for professional/technical workers and 
combine them into one category. Similarly, no significant differences exist between the 
three categories for production workers. Of the resulting seven categories, 
administrative/managerial workers comprise less than one percent and are excluded from 
the main model estimation (Table 1). 
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Table 2 presents summary statistics for earnings volatility measures averaged 
across 12 different provinces. It shows that occupation-specific volatility increased after 
the crisis. Nationwide, sales workers had the highest earnings volatility after the crisis 
while agricultural workers had the lowest pre-crisis earnings volatility. The correlation 
between occupation-specific, province-specific earnings volatility before and after the 
crisis is low (0.08), which supports the hypothesis that the income shock was largely 
unpredictable.  
Figure 1 shows a weak positive relationship between average earnings and volatility 
in earnings for both the pre-crisis period and post-crisis period.  There is some evidence 
for a trade-off between higher earnings and higher variance in earnings:  a one percent 
increase in average earnings was associated with a 0.016 percent higher variance prior to 
the crisis and 0.027 percent higher variance after the crisis but the effects are not 
significantly different from zero.  
5. Results and Discussion 
5.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 presents population-level descriptive statistics. About 90 percent of all 
males aged 25 to 45 are employed in both 1997 and 2000 and the difference in employment 
rates for this population is not statistically significantly different from zero at the 5% 
level.26 There are, however, important differences in the proportion of people engaged in 
different occupations in 1997 and 2000. For example, the overall proportion of people 
engaged in service work increased from 7.2 to 13.7%, while the proportion of sales workers 
decreased from 15.5 to 12.3%. While these population numbers may be partly due to cohort 
                                                     
26 The numbers are even higher if looking at the population of individuals present in both survey waves and 
reporting a non-missing working status: about 93% both nationwide and in urban areas only.  
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differences between 1997 and 2000 (e.g., if young people who enter the job market in 2000 
are significantly different from those who enter the job market in 1997), some of the 
differences are likely due to behavior that responds to changing conditions during the crisis. 
For example, among the people who report an occupation in both 1997 and 2000 (88% or 
2,882 out of 3,260 present in both waves), 41% report switching jobs.  
These descriptive results suggest that important changes in occupation choices 
occurred between 1997 and 2000. In order to test if they are potentially due to lower 
willingness to take risk after the crisis, I next examine whether (a change in) volatility was 
a determinant of occupation choices in the year 2000. However, some of the behavior 
observed in 2000 could also be explained by demand-side factors as the economy was 
undergoing structural changes. As a robustness check, I control for a measure of labor 
demand – the widely used Bartik index – calculated as the product of the national 
occupation growth rate between 1997 and 2000 and the 1997 province-specific 
employment rate in a given occupation (Bartik, 1991; Blanchard & Katz, 1992; Schaller, 
2012).   
5.2 Determinants of occupation choice 
5.2.1 Results using a conditional logit model 
Table 3 presents the results for the empirical approximation of the main model in 
equation (1). The model is estimated using a conditional logit regression and table 3 
presents the coefficient estimates for the alternative-specific regressors and the associated 
p-values. Since the coefficients don’t have an easy interpretation (other than showing the 
direction of the effects), I also calculate odds ratios (OR). The interpretation of an odds 
ratio greater than 1 is that an increase in the variance of a given occupation is associated 
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with larger probability of choosing that occupation and a smaller probability of choosing 
another occupation (and vice versa). 
The base case model (2) studies the full sample of working male individuals in 2000 
and shows that volatility but not earnings are significant determinants of occupation choice. 
Yet, the sign associated with volatility is opposite to what theory predicts for risk-averse 
individuals: conditional on average earnings, if volatility increases for one occupation, then 
this occupation is chosen more.  
Interestingly, the model for 1997 doesn’t show the same patterns. In 1997, as 
expected, higher volatility in a job is associated with lower likelihood of choosing that job 
and higher earnings – with a higher likelihood. Both of these factors, however, are not 
statistically significant determinants of occupation choice in 1997. One explanation for 
these results is that prior to the crisis individuals did not make occupation decisions based 
on the long-run volatility in earnings and they were perfectly insured against this risk. Yet, 
after the crisis, they preferred riskier, not less risky occupations. 
If occupation choices are made prior to the crisis, then volatility between 1998 and 
2000 may not be a good predictor of occupation choice in 2000. Restricting the sample to 
individuals who started their current jobs recently (i.e., job tenure of less than 3 years) in 
model (3), however, shows that neither average earnings nor volatility are significant 
factors in occupation choice. Controlling for changes in labor demand during the post-crisis 
period in model (4) does not change these conclusions. However, the coefficient on the 
Bartik index is not significant, which may suggest that it doesn’t capture labor demand 
well, and so the rest of the analysis proceeds without this labor demand control and with 
120 
 
the caveat that changes in the underlying structure of the economy may be affecting the 
results.  
Overall, I cannot find strong evidence that sons of households engaged in 
occupations that experienced large shocks to income have a decreased willingness to take 
risks when choosing an occupation after the crisis. This finding could be explained in 
several ways. First, people may only respond to long-run volatility trends. With only 3 
years of post-crisis data, the volatility measure may be subject to substantial measurement 
error, leading to biased estimates of the effect of current volatility on current occupation 
choice. Yet, occupation choice of people who started their current job after the start of the 
crisis is not a function of prior occupation volatility and income and neither is occupation 
choice of people prior to the crisis affected by these long-term trends.  
Second, job choice during the period may not be governed by the utility 
maximization process presented in the conceptual model and the empirical modelling may 
not be correct. Indeed, using the Hausman test to test the independence of irrelevant 
alternatives assumption (IIA) embedded in the conditional logit regression model, I reject 
the null hypothesis of no systematic differences in the coefficients of the full choice model 
and the coefficients of a model excluding any one occupation. Next, I present the results 
from a nested logit model, which relaxes the IIA assumption and models the choice 
between agricultural and non-agricultural occupations separately.  
5.2.2 Results using a nested logit model 
As shown in the descriptive statistics, a large proportion of individuals with fathers 
who work in the agricultural sector also work in agriculture. Agriculture employment may 
depend on factors such as land and legacy. A nested logit model may thus better model the 
decision-making process, where the first branch of individual’s decision tree can be 
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represented as a choice between agricultural and non-agricultural employment. Non-
agricultural employment further branches out to professional/technical, clerical, sales, 
service, and production work. Table 4 presents the results from the nested logit model. In 
all model specifications, volatility is again associated with a large positive coefficient, 
significantly different from zero. Average earnings are not significant determinants of 
occupation choice.  
Next, I test whether earnings volatility in the parental occupation affected 
willingness to take risks when making occupation choices by including an interaction term 
between volatility and volatility in the parental occupation, as in equation (2), using a 
nested logit model. 
5.2.3 Heterogeneity in occupation choice 
This analysis is performed for the subset of individuals with working fathers and 
non-missing information on their father’s 1997 occupation. Unfortunately, more than half 
of all individuals in the sample lack information on parental work status and about half of 
those who report that their father is employed do not provide information on occupation 
type. It is unclear if there is any reporting bias (and if so, the direction which it would take) 
or if the variables are missing at random. Either way, the results should be taken with 
caution due to the small sample size.  
Table 5 presents the results of this analysis. Since I estimate a nonlinear model, the 
interaction term is difficult to interpret and neither the size nor the sign of the coefficient 
are meaningful. Instead, I calculate the average marginal effect of a change in earnings 
volatility in the father’s occupation manually using the calculus method (Cameron & 
Trivedi, 2010). To do so, I estimate the model with the interaction term as an additional 
alternative-specific regressor (and father’s occupation volatility as an additional case-
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specific regressor) and calculate the predicted probabilities of occupation choice. Then, I 
increase the value of the volatility in the father’s occupation by one one-hundredth of its 
standard deviation, re-compute the interaction term and re-estimate the model. I define the 
marginal effect as the difference in predicted probabilities in both cases, divided by the 
change in the volatility variable.  
The results suggest that prior to the crisis, an increase in earnings volatility in the 
father’s occupation did not have a significant effect on individual probability of choosing 
a given occupation. The only exception is the decreased probability of choosing work as a 
production worker. Indeed, prior to the crisis, production work was characterized with high 
volatility (ranked number 2, following agriculture work, as shown in Table 2). In the year 
2000, higher volatility in earnings in the father’s occupation was associated with higher 
probability of choosing agricultural work and lower probability of production work. The 
results are hard to interpret. After the crisis hit, production work remained one of the 
occupations with highest volatility, which would provide support to the hypothesis that 
males whose fathers were engaged in occupations that experienced large volatility in the 
post-crisis period were less willing to take risk. However, the fact that the probability of 
choosing to work in agriculture, the very volatile occupation after the crisis, increased 
contradicts this main hypothesis. The results are equally ambiguous if the sample is 
restricted only to sons who started their current job after the crisis hit (model (3)). 
In order to better understand the results on parental occupation volatility, I perform 
several sensitivity checks. An individual could be more sensitive to earnings volatility 
because of the volatility in his father’s occupation if he has a diversification motive or if 
the father’s experience serves as an information shock. Diversification motives should be 
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stronger for individuals who still live with their parents as the household may be pooling 
their resources. Alternatively, individuals who live at home may be more likely to start 
helping in the family business if the father faces high earnings volatility. On the other hand, 
those who don’t live with their parents likely act in response to the information shock only. 
Thus, in Table 5, model (4), I restrict the data to individuals who don’t live with their 
parents anymore and I find that the results are similarly ambiguous as the main case in 
model (2). 
Next, if information shocks matter, then the son’s age during the economic crisis 
should matter, too. Younger individuals should have accumulated less outside information 
and thus be more affected by an information shock from the father’s experience during the 
crisis. Thus, I expect that if information matters, parental occupation volatility would be a 
stronger predictor of their occupation choice. The analysis in models (5) and (6) don’t 
provide clear evidence for the direction of the effects on willingness to take risk. 
6. Conclusion 
Occupation choices in developing countries have been shown to be affected by 
household ability to deal with shocks and information about labor market outcomes, among 
other factors. In this chapter, I attempt to provide evidence for the association between 
occupation choice and short-run earnings volatility for urban males in Indonesia between 
the ages of 25 and 45. The results, however, are ambiguous. If anything, the analysis shows 
that willingness to take risk in occupation choice increased after the crisis, which is 
contrary to the theoretical predictions. Even so, the lack of strong trade-off between 
volatility and average earnings would suggest that the extra risk taken would not be 




The results may be explained by people not having perfect information about mean 
earnings and volatility or by making job choices based on a different utility maximization 
model. In addition, there could be other job-specific variables that affect occupation choice 
and are systematically correlated with average earnings and volatility after the crisis. While 
the short-run volatility after the crisis is different from the long-run volatility trend prior to 
the crisis, this issue could still be a potential concern, especially if I fail to account for 
changes in labor demand appropriately. Finally, the sample construction aimed to minimize 
any selection and attrition bias. One of the downsides of including individuals who don’t 
live in the household as part of the analysis, however, is that there is no information on 
type of employment (e.g., private vs. self-employed vs. government), hours worked, or 
having a secondary job. It may be the case that changes in volatility do not affect 
occupation choice but rather affect these three other dimensions of labor market 
participation. 
Thus, better data would allow answering the question of whether occupation choice 
and willingness to take risk is affected by short-term shocks to income more conclusively. 
In addition, the research could be extended to test whose labor market experience actually 
matters – the father’s or maybe an older brother’s. Responding to shocks to a father’s 
occupation is more likely to involve diversification motives. Importantly, the role of 
insurance capacity could be directly studied as people who are better able to insure against 
shocks (e.g., because they receive transfers from others or have more assets to sell) should 
be less sensitive to volatility in earnings and thus more willing to take risks. In addition, 
identifying the extent to which individuals have good information about different 
occupations is important. Studying differences in how people respond to general shocks to 
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occupations vs. individual-specific shock that a household member experiences would help 
design effective policies. If an individual is more likely to respond to personal experience, 
then an information intervention would be useful. If, however, an individual responds to 
aggregate occupation changes, other measures, such as increasing insurance capacity, 








Figure 1: Relationship between province an occupation-specific volatility and average earnings in the pre-crisis and post-crisis period
Table 1: Proportion of males between the ages of 25 and 45 engaged in each of 10 occupations by year
1997 2000 p-value 1997 2000 p-value
Employed 92.2 91.3 0.092 91.5 90.4 0.087
Among the employed:
Occupation: Professional/Technical workers 6.7 6.8 0.831 8.1 8.0 0.878
Occupation: Administrative/managerial workers 0.5 1.3 <0.001 0.7 1.5 0.019
Occupation: Clerical and related workers 7.5 6.6 0.082 10.6 8.2 0.008
Occupation: Sales workers 15.5 12.3 <0.001 19.9 15.7 <0.001
Occupation: Service workers 7.2 13.7 <0.001 7.5 16.8 <0.001
Occupation: Agricultural workers 28.1 27.3 0.395 10.0 11.0 0.298
Occupation: Production workers 34.5 32.1 0.012 43.1 38.8 0.004
Notes:
























Occupation: Professional/Technical workers 4 2.52 0.63 5 4.07 0.13
Occupation: Clerical and related workers 5 2.47 0.39 2 4.25 0.15
Occupation: Sales workers 3 2.87 0.35 1 4.26 0.16
Occupation: Service workers 6 2.21 0.79 4 4.11 0.14
Occupation: Agricultural workers 1 3.19 0.79 2 4.25 0.28
Occupation: Production workers 2 2.89 0.25 3 4.23 0.10
1995 - 1997 1998 - 2000
Table 3: Occupation choice and volatility: conditional logit model
beta OR p-value beta OR p-value beta OR p-value beta OR p-value
Log variance -0.048 0.953 0.566 0.587 1.799 0.011 0.350 1.419 0.313 0.332 1.394 0.345
Log mean earnings 0.051 1.052 0.754 0.188 1.207 0.305 -0.024 0.976 0.931 -0.022 0.978 0.937






[3] The odds ratios (OR) are calculated as the exponentiated coefficients (beta). An odds ratio greater than 1 is 
interpreted to mean that increase in the variance of a given occupation is associated with larger probability of choosing 
that occupation, and vice versa.
[1] The results are based on an alternative-specific conditional logit model. The individual-specific controls included in 
the model are age and years of education.
[2] Variance and mean earnings are defined at the occupation-province level. The regression model for 1997 uses 
mean real earnings from 1995 to 1997 and volatility estimates are based on data from 1995 to 1997. The regression 
models for 2000 use mean real earnings for the period from 1998 to 2000 and volatility estimates are based on data 






Sample with job 
tenure <3 years, 2000
Sample with job 






Table 4: Occupation choice and volatility: nested logit model
beta OR p-value beta OR p-value beta OR p-value beta OR p-value
Log variance 0.554 1.740 0.001 0.933 2.542 0.013 1.480 4.393 0.054 1.452 4.272 0.033
Log mean earnings -0.155 0.856 0.488 0.361 1.435 0.185 -0.259 0.772 0.602 -0.760 0.468 0.164




Full sample, 1997 Full sample, 2000
Sample with job 
tenure <3 years, 2000
Sample with job 
tenure <3 years, 2000
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Yes Yes Yes Yes
1723 2298 1072 1072
[3] The odds ratios (OR) are calculated as the exponentiated coefficients (beta). An odds ratio greater than 1 is 
interpreted to mean that increase in the variance of a given occupation is associated with larger probability of choosing that 
occupation, and vice versa.
[1] The results are based on an alternative-specific nested logit model, where the first nest represents choice between 
agricultural and non-agricultural employment. The individual-specific controls included in the model are age and years of 
education.
[2] Variance and mean earnings are defined at the occupation-province level. The regression model for 1997 uses mean 
real earnings from 1995 to 1997 and volatility estimates are based on data from 1995 to 1997. The regression models for 












Table 5: Model with interaction between own and father's volatility: nested logit model
(1)
Mean Sd t-stat Mean Sd t-stat Mean Sd t-stat Mean Sd t-stat Mean Sd t-stat Mean Sd t-stat
Occupation: Professional/Technical workers 0.011 0.014 0.786 -0.095 0.097 -0.979 0.112 0.092 1.217 -0.037 0.080 -0.463 0.162 0.111 1.459 -0.298 0.304 -0.980
Occupation: Clerical and related workers 0.023 0.014 1.643 0.202 0.135 1.496 -0.071 0.041 -1.732 0.201 0.118 1.703 0.278 0.167 1.665 0.145 0.170 0.853
Occupation: Sales workers -0.010 0.019 -0.526 -0.095 0.056 -1.696 0.016 0.042 0.381 -0.057 0.072 -0.792 -0.030 0.061 -0.492 -0.151 0.119 -1.269
Occupation: Service workers 0.053 0.038 1.395 -0.032 0.059 -0.542 -0.158 0.071 -2.225 0.068 0.067 1.015 -0.372 0.201 -1.851 0.218 0.148 1.473
Occupation: Agricultural workers 0.018 0.031 0.581 0.221 0.101 2.188 0.319 0.140 2.279 0.154 0.058 2.655 0.335 0.198 1.692 0.196 0.090 2.178
Occupation: Production workers -0.094 0.036 -2.611 -0.201 0.095 -2.116 -0.218 0.105 -2.076 -0.329 0.098 -3.357 -0.374 0.178 -2.101 -0.111 0.232 -0.478
Number of individuals 411 423 208 353 200 223
Notes:
Full sample, 2000
Sample with job tenure 
<3 years, 2000
Sample of nonresident 
sons, 2000
Sample of sons 
aged 25-34 , 2000
Full sample, 1997
[1] The results are based on an alternative-specific nested logit model, where the first nest represents choice between agricultural and non-agricultural employment. The individual-specific controls included 
in the model are age, years of education, and post-crisis volatility of father's 1997 occupation.
[2] Variance and mean earnings are defined at the occupation-province level. The regression model for 1997 uses mean real earnings from 1995 to 1997 and volatility estimates are based on data from 
1995 to 1997. The regression models for 2000 use mean real earnings for the period from 1998 to 2000 and volatility estimates are based on data from 1998 to 2000.
Sample of sons 
aged 35-45, 2000










Appendix Table 1: Intergenerational transmission of occupations
Urban households
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Occupation 1 : Professional/Technical workers 11.4 2.3 9.1 22.7 22.7 13.6 18.2
Occupation 2: Clerical and related workers 0 0 0 55.6 0 11.1 33.3
Occupation 3: Administrative/managerial workers 15.6 2.2 11.1 24.4 13.3 11.1 22.2
Occupation 4: Sales workers 1.8 1.8 18.2 21.8 30.9 18.2 7.3
Occupation 5: Service workers 7.5 0 17 20.8 17 9.4 28.3
Occupation 6: Agricultural workers 3.8 0 5.7 9.4 39.6 24.5 17
Occupation 7: Production workers 7.3 1.7 12.9 13.5 27.5 13.5 23.6
Rural households
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Occupation 1 : Professional/Technical workers 8.8 0 2.9 14.7 29.4 38.2 5.9
Occupation 2: Clerical and related workers 16.7 0 0 0 0 83.3 0
Occupation 3: Administrative/managerial workers 4.9 2.4 7.3 9.8 12.2 46.3 17.1
Occupation 4: Sales workers 0 2 16 8 26 36 12
Occupation 5: Service workers 3.3 1.1 0 5.5 11 71.4 7.7
Occupation 6: Agricultural workers 2 0 3.5 3 42.8 43.3 5.5
Occupation 7: Production workers 2.7 1.4 6.8 6.2 26.7 42.5 13.7
Father Occupation in 1997
Child Occupation in 2000
Father Occupation in 1997




CHAPTER 5: Lessons learned 
Indonesia has made significant progress in improving access to schooling for its 
children, reaching nearly universal primary school enrollment for both boys and girls and 
steadily increasing secondary school enrollment rates over time. The East Asian Financial 
Crisis of late 1990s briefly halted this progress as parents were unable to pay the school 
fees or demanded from their children more time spent working inside or outside the house. 
While school enrollments recovered soon after the crisis, the children who were affected 
by the short-run budget constraints likely faced long-term consequences. In this 
dissertation, I study two main questions in order to understand the crisis implications for 
children. First, I examine whether only children with low expected returns from education 
selected out of schooling during the crisis or whether children who had the potential to do 
well in school dropped out as well. Second, I explore how parents allocate education 
resources between their children at the intensive margin and thus study whether parents are 
likely to invest more in the better-performing child.  
My research on school dropout supports the previous literature that has described 
the importance of short-run constraints for school enrollments in Indonesia. For example, 
Frankenberg, Thomas, and Beegle (1999) show that school dropout rates in 1998 increased 
significantly, especially for children in the lowest income quartile, young children (7 to 12) 
in rural areas and older children in urban areas. My research expands on this literature by 
exploring to what extent low skills were a determinant of school dropout and identifying 
the impact of school dropout on mathematics and general cognition test scores about three 




I find that children who drop out of school during the crisis come from families 
with lower per capita expenditures. They drop out at every age and school level, although 
the highest proportion of dropouts leave school as they transition between primary and 
junior high school or junior high school and senior high school. This is consistent with 
binding budget constraints as school fees are substantially higher in high school than 
primary school. It could also be evidence for lower ability as children need to pass exams 
in order to go to the next level of schooling. That dropouts select out of school based on 
their ability is shown by the fact that the 1997 (i.e., prior to dropping out) distribution of 
mathematics scores for dropouts is shifted to the left of that of the comparison group. 
I use a value-added model, controlling for mathematics test scores in 1997, to 
estimate the effect of school dropout on test outcomes in 2000. I find significant negative 
effects of missing schooling on both school-acquired and general cognitive skills, as 
measured by mathematics test scores and Raven’s Progressive matrices assessment scores, 
respectively. The OLS estimates suggest that missing an average of three years of 
schooling is associated with 0.46 standard deviations lower mathematics scores and 0.35 
standard deviations lower Raven’s scores. 
Past test scores, however, may not fully account for all unobservables that drive 
selection into schooling. A more general approach to estimating the effect of dropout while 
dealing with endogeneity concerns is to use an instrumental variables (IV) model. Prior to 
the crisis, there was a long-run declining trend in non-enrollment rates at each age for both 
girls and boys. During the crisis this trend was reversed. Using data from the national socio-
economic survey (Susenas) for 1993 to 1998, I calculate linear predictions of 1998 non-




observed non-enrollment rates as the source of crisis-induced identifying variation. This 
group-level instrument varies at the age-gender level and is a good predictor of individual 
decision to drop out, which is not correlated with ability or other individual unobservables. 
For mathematics scores, I find IV estimates that are 1.6 times larger. These results are 
consistent with children primarily dropping out because of short-run binding resource 
constraints during the Indonesian crisis and suggest that parents pulled children out of 
school even if they had the potential to do well in school.  
Interestingly, children do seem to sort out of school based on expected gains in their 
general cognitive skills. Estimating an endogenous switching regression model, I find 
evidence for comparative advantage where children who drop out during the crisis expect 
to lose less in terms of general cognitive skill accumulation compared to a random 
individual made to drop out. The effect of treatment on the treated for Raven’s scores is 
thus lower than the OLS results (-0.26 standard deviations) but still significantly different 
from zero. Yet, it is reduced by about 40% and loses statistical significance after controlling 
for child work status. This result suggests that children of lower cognition and lower 
potential to improve their cognition at school are more likely to drop out of school and start 
working, whether they have lower mathematics learning abilities or not. This finding may 
be due to parents making decisions about the schooling of their children based on 
observation of children’s general cognition, rather than their school performance.  
Next, I study how parents invest in their children when their children stay in school. 
Parents may reinforce skill differences between siblings, investing in the child that is more 
likely to benefit from further resources, compensate for initial differences, investing in the 




by skill differences. Using a structural model, I estimate the parental preference for equality 
parameter implied by the constant elasticity of substitution utility function. I estimate a 
system of equations comprised of production functions for children’s test scores and an 
investment equation, representing the first-order condition, derived from a utility-
maximization problem for a household with two children.  
I find that, on average, parental education spending is not a function of children’s 
test scores. However, parents seem to be more sensitive to the human capital of younger 
female children and would penalize them for having lower scores compared to their older 
siblings of either gender. This result holds using a sibling fixed effects estimation as well. 
The fixed effects model shows no differences in investment by child gender and order 
before the crisis. This study cannot separately identify whether the crisis changed 
preferences or existing preferences became more important under limited resources, but it 
suggests that not all children were equally well insured from the crisis since after the crisis, 
parents were more sensitive to the human capital of younger girls. 
In order to better understand the source of the differences in investments, I 
decompose the investment variable into fees and other education expenses. Using the 
sibling fixed-effects model, I find that the main source for the differences in education 
spending between siblings appears to be monthly fees. There is evidence that higher fees 
are an indication of better school inputs. My results would therefore be consistent with 
young female children attending schools of worse quality. 
 My findings on resource allocation between children support previous work by 
Cameron and Worswick (2001) and Thomas et al. (2004) which has shown that girl 




after crop loss, households with girls (but not boys) of school age reduce education 
expenditures. Thomas et al. (2004) study household expenditures before and after the Asian 
Financial crisis and find that households with more boys experienced lower reductions in 
the education budget shares compared to those with more girls. They also find that 
households tended to protect the education of the older children at the expense of the 
younger ones. Previous studies considered investment at the intensive and extensive 
margin, not distinguishing between gender bias in school enrollment and gender bias in 
school spending.  I separate the two effects by studying only investments at the intensive 
margin for children who continue to go to school. In addition, I directly incorporate 
children’s test scores in the parental investment decision problem and show whether 
parents respond to differences in children’s school performance in a reinforcing, 
compensatory or neutral manner.  
Schooling in Indonesia has significant returns. One year of extra education is 
associated with an increase in hourly wages of 6.5% to 10.8% (Duflo, 2001). In addition, 
the literature on labor markets in the US as well as in developing countries (Glewwe, 2002; 
Hanushek & Woessmann, 2008) suggests that skills, especially school-acquired skills, 
have independent effects on labor outcomes. Therefore, much can be gained by insuring 
children against income volatility in order to prevent school interruptions when children 
who would have stayed in school in the absence of an income shock might otherwise be 
forced to drop out. Girls, in particular, may be more vulnerable to resource constraints as 
parents reduce their investments in them and potentially provide them with worse quality 
of education. Thus, targeted government programs may be effective in protecting them 




Chapters 2 and 3 studied schooling decisions during a period of resource 
constraints. These chapters argued that underinvestment in human capital may lead to 
suboptimal labor market outcomes in the long run. However, the crisis may also affect 
labor market choices and outcomes directly in the short-run. In chapter 4, I examine 
determinants of occupation choice of Indonesian males after the East Asian Financial Crisis 
and provide some indirect tests of whether the economy-wide shock increased people’s 
preference for an occupation with lower earnings volatility. If shocks are associated with 
reduced willingness to take risks when choosing an occupation, then this may help explain 
the high intergenerational transmission of income in developing countries, even as 
education rises, and the difficulties of breaking the cycle of poverty.  
Yet, the results show that willingness to take risk in occupation choice increased 
after the crisis, which is contrary to the theoretical predictions. I also find little evidence of 
a trade-off between volatility and average earnings. This would suggest that the extra risk 
taken would not be necessarily associated with higher earnings and thus may have low (if 
any) welfare benefits. Overall, however, the Indonesian data does not appear to be suitable 
for this analysis. Better data would allow answering the question of whether occupation 
choice and willingness to take risk is affected by short-term shocks to income more 







Akresh, R., Bagby, E., de Walque, D., & Kazianga, H. (2012). Child Ability and Household 
Human Capital Investment Decisions in Burkina Faso. Economic Development and Cultural 
Change, 61(1), 157–186. 
Alderman, H., & King, E. M. (1998). Gender differences in parental investment in education. 
Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, 9, 453–468. 
Ashraf, Q., & Galor, O. (2013). The “Out of Africa” Hypothesis, Human Genetic Diversity, and 
Comparative Economic Development. American Economic Review, 103(1), 1–46.  
Atkin, D. (2012). Endogenous Skill Acquisition and Export Manufacturing in Mexico (No. 
18266). National Bureau of Economic Research.  
Ayalew, T. (2005). Parental Preference , Heterogeneity , and Human Capital Inequality. 
Economic Development and Cultural Change, 53(2), 381–407. 
Baird, S., McIntosh, C., & Ozler, B. (2011). Cash or Condition? Evidence from a Cash Transfer 
Experiment. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 126(4), 1709–1753.  
Bandyopadhyay, S., & Skoufias, E. (2013). Rainfall variability, occupational choice, and welfare 
in rural Bangladesh. Review of Economics of the Household, (June).  
Baranov, V., & Kohler, H.-P. (2014). The Impact of AIDS Treatment on Savings and Human 
Capital Investment in Malawi (Working paper No. PSC 14-3). 
Barham, T., Macours, K., & Maluccio, J. A. (2013). More Schooling and More Learning ? Effects 
of a Three-year Conditional Cash Transfer Program in Nicaragua after 10 Years (Working 
paper No. IDB-WP-432). 
Bartik, T. (1991). Who benefits from state and local economic development policies?. W.E. 
Upjohn Institute. 
Becker, G. S., & Lewis, H. G. (1973). On the interaction between quantity and quality of 
children. Journal of Political Economy, 81(2), S279–S288.  
Becker, G. S., & Tomes, N. (1976). Child Endowments and the Quantity and Quality of Children. 
Journal of Political Economy, 84(4), S143–S162. 
Behrman, J. R. (1988). Intrahousehold Allocation of Nutrients in Rural India : Are Boys 
Favored ? Do Parents Exhibit Inequality Aversion ? Oxford Economic Papers, 40(1), 32–54. 
Behrman, J. R., & Deolalikar, A. B. (1993). Unobserved Household and Community 
Heterogeneity and the Labor Market Impact of Schooling : A Case Study for Indonesia. 




Behrman, J. R., & Deolalikar, A. B. (1995). Are There Differential Returns To Schooling By 
Gender? the Case of Indonesian Labour Markets. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and 
Statistics, 57(1), 97–117.  
Behrman, J. R., Parker, S. W., & Todd, P. E. (2009). Medium-Term Impacts of the 
Oportunidades Conditional Cash Transfer Program on Rural Youth in Mexico. In S. Klasen 
& F. Nowak-Lehmann (Eds.), Poverty, Inequality, and Policy in Latin America (pp. 219–
270). Cambridge, MA, United States: MIT Press. 
Behrman, J. R., Pollak, R. A., & Taubman, P. (1982). Parental Preferences and Provision for 
Progeny. Journal of Political Economy, 90(1), 52–73. 
Behrman, J. R., Pollak, R. A., & Taubman, P. (1995). From parent to child Intrahousehold 
allocations and integrenerational relations in the United States. 
Behrman, J. R., Rosenzweig, M. R., & Taubman, P. (1994). Endowments and the Allocation of 
Schooling in the Family and in the Marriage Market : The Twins Experiment. Journal of 
Political Economy, 102(6), 1131–1174. 
Bernal, R., & Keane, M. P. (2010). Quasi-structural estimation of a model of childcare choices 
and child cognitive ability production. Journal of Econometrics, 156(1), 164–189.  
Björkman-Nyqvist, M. (2013). Income Shocks and Gender Gaps in Education : Evidence from 
Uganda. Journal of Development Economics, 105, 237–253. 
Blanchard, O. J., & Katz, F. (1992). Regional evolutions. Brookings Papers on Economic 
Activity, 1. 
Blundell, B. R., Pistaferri, L., & Preston, I. (2008). Consumption Inequality and Partial Insurance. 
American Economic Review, 98(5), 1887–1921. 
Bommier, A., & Lambert, S. (2000). Education Demand and Age at School Enrollment in 
Tanzania. The Journal of Human Resources, 35(1), 177–203. 
Breierova, L., & Duflo, E. (2004). The impact of education on fertility and child mortality: Do 
fathers really matter less than mothers? (Working paper No. 10513). Retrieved from 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w10513 
Brinch, C. N., & Galloway, T. A. (2012). Schooling in adolescence raises IQ scores. Proceedings 
of the National Academy of Sciences, 109(2), 425–30.  
Cameron, A. C., Gelbach, J. B., & Miller, D. L. (2008). Bootstrap-based improvements for 
inference with clustered errors. Review of Economics and Statistics, 90(3), 414–427. 




Cameron, L. (2009). Can a public scholarship program successfully reduce school drop-outs in a 
time of economic crisis? Evidence from Indonesia. Economics of Education Review, 28(3), 
308–317.  
Cameron, L. A., & Worswick, C. (2001). Education Expenditure Responses to Crop Loss in 
Indonesia : A Gender Bias. Economic Development and Cultural Change, 49(2), 351–363. 
Cameron, L., & Shah, M. (2012). Risk-Taking Behavior in the Wake of Natural Disasters Risk-
Taking Behavior in the Wake of Natural Disasters (Working paper No. 6756). 
Cappellari, L., & Jenkins, S. P. (2014). Earnings and labour market volatility in Britain. Labour 
Economics, 30, 201–211.  
Card, D. (2001). Estimating the Return to Schooling : Progress on Some Persistent Econometric 
Problems. Econometrica : Journal of the Econometric Society, 69(5), 1127–1160. 
Carneiro, P., Heckman, J. J., & Vytlacil, E. J. (2011). Estimating Marginal Returns to Education. 
American Economic Review, 101(October), 2754–2781. 
Carneiro, P., Lokshin, M., Ridao-cano, C., & Umapathi, N. (2011). Average and Marginal 
Returns to Upper Secondary Schooling in Indonesia (Working paper No. 5878). 
Carroll, C. D., & Samwick, A. A. (1997). The nature of precautionary wealth. Journal of 
Monetary Economics, 40, 41–71. 
Cascio, E. U., & Lewis, E. G. (2006). Schooling and the Armed Forces Qualifying Test Evidence 
from School-Entry Laws. Journal of Human Resources, 41(2), 294–318. 
Case, A., & Deaton, A. (1999). School inputs and educational outcomes in South Africa. 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, (August), 1047–1084. 
Cawley, J., Heckman, J., & Vytlacil, E. (2001). Three observations on wages and measured 
cognitive ability. Labour Economics, 8, 419–442. 
Chaudhury, N., Hammer, J., Kremer, M., Muralidharan, K., & Rogers, F. H. (2006). Missing in 
Action : Teacher and Health Worker Absence in Developing Countries. Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, 20(1), 91–116. 
Chou, S.-Y., Liu, J.-T., Grossman, M., & Joyce, T. (2010). Parental Education and Child Health: 
Evidence from a Natural Experiment in Taiwan. American Economic Journal: Applied 
Economics, 2(5), 33–61.  
Conti, G., Heckman, J. J., Yi, J., & Zhang, J. (2011). Early Health Shocks , Parental Responses , 
and Child Outcomes. 
Cunha, F., & Heckman, J. J. (2006). Interpreting the evidence on life cycle skill formation. In 




Cunha, F., Heckman, J., & Schennach, S. (2010). Estimating the Technology of Cognitive and 
Noncognitive Skill Formation. Econometrica : Journal of the Econometric Society, 78(3), 
883–931.  
Das, J., Dercon, S., Habyarimana, J., & Krishnan, P. (2007). Teacher Shocks and Student 
Learning : Evidence from Zambia. Journal of Human Resources, 42(4), 820–862. 
Davidson, R., & MacKinnon, J. G. (2010). Wild Bootstrap Tests for IV Regression. Journal of 
Business & Economic Statistics, 28(1), 128–144.  
De Brauw, A., & Hoddinott, J. (2011). Must conditional cash transfer programs be conditioned to 
be effective? The impact of conditioning transfers on school enrollment in Mexico. Journal 
of Development Economics, 96(2), 359–370.  
De Janvry, A., Finan, F., Sadoulet, E., & Vakis, R. (2006). Can conditional cash transfer 
programs serve as safety nets in keeping children at school and from working when exposed 
to shocks? Journal of Development Economics, 79(2), 349–373.  
Deininger, K. (2003). Does cost of schooling affect enrollment by the poor? Universal primary 
education in Uganda. Economics of Education Review, 22(3), 291–305.  
Diagne, M. (2008). Learning from siblings ? Family experience , young adults ’ labor market 
expectations and human capital investment in South Africa. Working paper. 
Duflo, E. (2001). Schooling and Labor Market Consequences of School Construction in 
Indonesia : Evidence from an Unusual Policy Experiment. The American Economic Review, 
91(4), 795–813. 
Duryea, S., Lam, D., & Levison, D. (2007). Effects of Economic Shocks on Children’s 
Employment and Schooling in Brazil. Journal of Development Economics, 84(1), 188–214.  
Eckstein, Z., & Wolpin, K. I. (1999). Why youths drop out of high school: The impact of 
preferences, opportunities, and abilities. Econometrica, 67(6), 1295–1339. 
Edmonds, E. V. (2006). Child labor and schooling responses to anticipated income in South 
Africa. Journal of Development Economics, 81(2), 386–414.  
Ejrnaes, M., & Portner, C. C. (2004). Birth Order and the Intrahousehold Allocation of Time and 
Education. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 86(4), 1008–1019. 
Emran, M. S., & Shilpi, F. (2011). Mobility in Rural Economy Evidence from Nepal and 
Vietnam. Journal of Human Resources, 46(2). 
Ferreira, F. H. G., & Schady, N. (2009). Aggregate Economic Shocks, Child Schooling, and 
Child Health. The World Bank Research Observer, 24(2), 147–181.  
Filmer, D. (2000). The structure of social disparities in education : gender and wealth. World 




Filmer, D., Friedman, J., & Schady, N. (2008). Development, modernization, and son preference 
in fertility decisions. World Bank Policy Research (No. 4716). 
Filmer, D., & Schady, N. (2009). School Enrollment, Selection and Test Scores (Working paper 
No. 4998). 
Fiszbein, A., & Schady, N. (2009). Conditional Cash Transfers, Reducing Present and Future 
Poverty. The World Bank. 
Fortson, J. G. (2011). Mortality risk and human capital investment: the impact of HIV/AIDS in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. Review of Economics and Statistics, 93(February), 1–15. 
Frankenberg, E., Lillard, L., & Willis, R. J. (2002). Patterns of Intergenerational Transfers in 
Southeast Asia. Journal of Marriage and Familt, 64(3), 627–641. 
Frankenberg, E., Sikoki, B., & Suriastini, W. (2003). Contraceptive Use in a Changing service 
Environment : Evidence Indonesia during the Economic Crisis. Studies in Family Planning, 
34(2), 103–116. 
Frankenberg, E., Smith, J. P., & Thomas, D. (2003). Economic Shocks , Wealth , and Welfare. 
The Journal of Human Resources, 38(2). 
Frankenberg, E., Thomas, D., & Beegle, K. (1999). The Real Costs of Indonesia’s Economic 
Crisis:Preliminary Findings from Indonesia Family Life Surveys. Working paper No. 99-04. 
Garces, E., Thomas, D., & Currie, J. (2002). Longer-Term Effects of Head Start. American 
Economic Review, 92(4), 999–1012. 
Glewwe, P. (1999). Why Does Mother ’ s Schooling Raise Child Health in Developing 
Countries ? Evidence from Morocco. The Journal of Human Resources, 34(1), 124–159. 
Glewwe, P. (2002). Schools and Skills in Developing Countries: Education Policies and 
Socioeconomic Outcomes. Journal of Economic Literature, 40(2), 436–482. 
Glewwe, P., & Jacoby, H. (1994). Student Achievement and Schooling Choice in Low-Income 
Countries: Evidence from Ghana. Journal of Human Resources, 29(3), 843–864. 
Gorbachev, B. O. (2011). Did Household Consumption Become More Volatile ?, American 
Economic Review. 101(August), 2248–2270. 
Grossman, M. (2006). Education and Nonmarket Outcomes. In Handbook of the Economics of 
Education, Volume 1 (Vol. 1, pp. 577–633).  
Gunnarsson, V., Orazem, P. F., Sanchez, M. A., & Sa, M. A. (2006). Child Labor and School 
Achievement in Latin America. The World Bank Economic Review, 20(1), 31–54.  
Hanushek, E. a, & Woessmann, L. (2008). The Role of Cognitive Skills in Economic 




Hanushek, E. A., Lavy, V., & Hitomi, K. (2008). Do Students Care about School Quality? 
Determinants of Dropout Behavior in Developing Countries. Journal of Human Capital, 
2(1), 69–105.  
Heath, R., & Mobarak, M. (2011). Supply and Demand Constraints on Educational Investment : 
Evidence from Garment Sector Jobs and the Female Stipend Program in Bangladesh. 
Working paper. 
Heckman, J. J., & Masterov, D. V. (2007). The Productivity Argument for Investing in Young 
Children. Review of Agricultural Economics, 29(3), 446–493. 
Heckman, J. J., Stixrud, J., & Urzua, S. (2006). The Effects of Cognitive and Noncognitive 
Abilities on Labor Market Outcomes and Social Behavior. Journal of Labor Economics, 
24(3), 411–482. 
Hull, G., & Schultz, K. (2001). Literacy and Learning Out of School : A Review of Theory and 
Research. Review of Educational Research, 71(4), 575–611. 
Jacoby, H. G., & Skoufias, E. (1997). Risk, Financial markets, and Human capital in a 
Developing country. Review of Economic Studies, 64(3), 311–335. 
Jayachandran, S., & Lleras-Muney, A. (2009). Life expectancy and human capital investments: 
evidence from maternal mortality declines. Quarterly Journal of Economics, (February). 
Jensen, R. (2010). The (perceived) returns to education and the demand for schooling. Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, (May), 515–548. 
Jensen, R. (2012). Do Labor Market Opportunities Affect Young Women’s Work and Family 
Decisions? Experimental Evidence from India. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
127(2), 753–792.  
Jones, G. W., & Hagul, P. (2001). Schooling in Indonesia: Crisis-Related and Longer-Term 
Issues. Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, 37(2), 207–231.  
Joshi, S., & Schultz, T. P. (2007). Family Planning as an Investment in Development: Evaluation 
of a Program’s Consequences in Matlab, Bangladesh (No. 951). Yale University Economic 
Growth Center Discussion paper. Retrieved from 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=962938 
Keane, M. P., & Wolpin, K. I. (1997). The Career Decisions of Young Men. Journal of Political 
Economy, 105(3), 473–522. 
Kevane, M., & Levine, D. I. (2000). The changing status of daughters in Indonesia. Working 
paper. 
Krishna, A. (2013). Stuck in Place: Investigating Social Mobility in 14 Bangalore Slums. Journal 




Lanjouw, P., Pradhan, M., Saadah, F., Sayed, H., & Sparrow, R. (2001). Poverty , Education and 
Health in Indonesia : Who Benefits from Public Spending ? Working paper No. 2739. 
Leight, J. (2014). Sibling Rivalry: Endowment and Intrahousehold Allocation in Gansu Province , 
China. Working paper. 
Levinsohn, J., Berry, S., & Friedman, J. (1999). Impact of the Indonesian Economic Crisis: Price 
Changes and the Poor. 
Li, M., Poirier, D. J., & Tobias, J. L. (2004). Do dropouts suffer from dropping out? Estimation 
and prediction of outcome gains in generalized selection models. Journal of Applied 
Econometrics, 19, 203–225. 
Lloyd, C. B., El Tawila, S., Clark, W. H., & Mensch, B. S. (2003). The Impact of Educational 
Quality on School Exit in Egypt. Comparative Education Review, 47(4), 444–467.  
Lochner, L. (2011). Non-production benefits of education: crime, health and good citizenship 
Working paper No. 16722. 
Lucas, B. A. M., & Mbiti, I. M. (2012). Access, Sorting, and Achievement: The Short-Run 
Effects of Free Primary Education in Kenya. American Economic Journal: Applied 
Economics, 4(4), 226–253. 
Magruder, J. R. (2010). Intergenerational Networks, Unemployment, and Persistent Inequality in 
South Africa. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 2(1), 62–85. 
Majlesi, K. (2014). Demand for Low-Skilled Labor and Parental Investment in Children’s 
Education: Evidence from Mexico. Working paper. 
Malamud, O., & Pop-Eleches, C. (2011). Home Computer Use and the Development of Human 
Capital. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 126(2), 987–1027.  
Malmendier, U., & Nagel, S. (2011). Depression Babies: Do Macroeconomic Experiences Affect 
Risk Taking? The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 126(1), 373–416.  
Maralani, V. (2008). The Changing Relationship between Family Size and Educational 
Attainment over the Course of Socioeconomic Development: Evidence from Indonesia. 
Demography, 45(3), 693–717. 
Menon, N. (2009). Rainfall Uncertainty and Occupational Choice in Agricultural Households of 
Rural Nepal. Journal of Development Studies, 45(6), 864–888.  
Mincer, J. (1974). Schooling, experience, and earnings. 
Morduch, J. (1995). Income Smoothing and Consumption Smoothing. Journal of Economic 




Moulton, B. R. (1990). An Illustration of a Pitfall in Estimating the Effects of Aggregate 
Variables on Micro Units. Review of Economics and Statistics, 72(2), 334–338. 
Nguyen, T. (2008). Information , Role Models and Perceived Returns to Education : 
Experimental Evidence from Madagascar. Working paper. 
Oreopoulos, P. (2007). Do dropouts drop out too soon? Wealth, health and happiness from 
compulsory schooling. Journal of Public Economics, 91(11-12), 2213–2229.  
Osili, U. O., & Long, B. T. (2008). Does female schooling reduce fertility? Evidence from 
Nigeria. Journal of Development Economics, 87, 57–75.  
Osman, A. (2014). Occupational Choice under Credit and Information Constraints. Working 
paper. 
Oster, E., & Steinberg, B. M. (2013). Do IT service centers promote school enrollment? Evidence 
from India. Journal of Development Economics, 104, 123–135.  
Pagan, A., & Vella, F. (1989). Diagnostic tests for models based on individual data: a survey. 
Journal of Applied Econometrics, 4, S29–S59.  
Parish, W. L., & Willis, R. J. (1993). Daughters , Education , and Family Budgets Taiwan 
Experiences. Journal of Human Resources, 28(4), 863–898. 
Park, C. (2003). Interhousehold Transfers between Relatives in Indonesia : Determinants and 
Motives. Economic Development and Cultural Change, 51(4), 929–944. 
Parker, S. W., Rubalcava, L., & Teruel, G. (2008). Evaluating conditional schooling and health 
programs. In Handbook of Development Economics, Vol. 4 (Vol. 4).  
Paxson, C., & Schady, N. (2007). Cognitive Development among Young Children in Ecuador 
The Roles of Wealth, Health, and Parenting. Journal of Human Resources, 42(1), 49–84. 
Paxson, C., & Schady, N. R. (2002). The Allocation and Impact of Social Funds: Spending on 
School Infrastructure in Peru. The World Bank Economic Review, 16(2), pp. 297–319.  
Permana, I. B., & Westoff, C. (1999). The two-child norm in Indonesia. Working paper. 
Pitt, M. M., & Rosenzweig, M. R. (1990). Estimating the Intrahousehold Incidence of Illness : 
Child Health and Gender-Inequality in the Allocation of Time. International Economic 
Review, 31(4), 969–989. 
Pitt, M. M., Rosenzweig, M. R., & Hassan, N. (1990). Productivity, Health, and Inequality in the 
Intrahousehold Distribution of Food in Low-income Countries. The American Economic 
Review, 80(5), 1139–1156. 
Pradhan, M. (1998). Enrolment and Delayed Enrolment of Secondary School Age Children in 




Pradhan, M., Suryadarma, D., Beatty, A., Wong, M., Alishjabana, A., Gaduh, A., & Arth. (2011). 
Improving Educational Quality through Enhancing Community Participation Results from a 
Randomized Field Experiment in Indonesia. Working paper No. 5795. 
Pritchett, L. (2002). Targeted Programs in an Economic Crisis: Empirical Findings from the 
Experience of Indonesia. Working paper. 
Psacharopoulos, G., & Patrinos, H. A. (2004). Returns to investment in education: a further 
update. Education Economics, 12(2), 111–134.  
Raut, L. K., & Tran, L. H. (2005). Parental human capital investment and old-age transfers from 
children: Is it a loan contract or reciprocity for Indonesian families? Journal of Development 
Economics, 77(2), 389–414.  
Rodríguez-Oreggia, E., & Freije, S. (2012). Long term impact of a cash transfers program on 
labor outcomes of the rural youth in Mexico. Working paper No. 230. 
Rosen, J. A., Glennie, E. J., Dalton, B. W., Lennon, J. M., & Bozick, R. N. (2010). Noncognitive 
Skills in the Classroom : New Perspectives on Educational Research. 
Rosenzweig, M. R. (1986). Birth Spacing and Sibling Inequality : Asymmetric Information 
within the Family. International Economic Review, 27(1), 55–76. 
Rosenzweig, M. R., & Binswanger, H. P. (1993). Wealth, Weather Risk and the Composition and 
Profitability of Agricultural Investments. The Economic Journal, 103(416), 56–78.  
Rosenzweig, M. R., & Schultz, T. P. (1982). Market Opportunities , Genetic Endowments , and 
Intrafamily Resource Distribution : Child Survival in Rural India. The American Economic 
Review, 72(4). 
Rosenzweig, M. R., & Schultz, T. P. (1983). Estimating a Household Production Function : 
Heterogeneity , the Demand for Health Inputs , and Their Effects on Birth Weight. Journal 
of Political Economy, 91(5), 723–746. 
Rosenzweig, M. R., & Wolpin, K. I. (1980). Testing the quantity-quality fertility model: the use 
of twins as a natural experiment. Econometrica : Journal of the Econometric Society, 48(1), 
227–240.  
Rosenzweig, M. R., & Wolpin, K. I. (1993). Credit Market Constraints, Consumption Smoothing, 
and the Accumulation of Durable Production Assets in Low-Income Countries: Investments 
in Bullocks in India. Journal of Political Economy, 101(2), 223.  
Rosenzweig, M. R., & Zhang, J. (2009). Do Population Control Policies Induce More Human 
Capital Investment? Twins, Birth Weight and China’s “One-Child” Policy. Review of 
Economic Studies, 76(3), 1149–1174.  




Schaller, J. (2012). Booms, busts and fertility: Testing the Becker model using gender-specific 
labor demand. Working paper. 
Setiawan, B. (2000). Chapter 2: Indonesia. The Poor at Risk: Surviving the Economic Crisis in 
Southeast Asia. Retrieved from http://www.iar.ubc.ca/centres/csear/SSN/TOC.htm 
Shenoy, A. (2014). Risk and Economic Under-Specialization : Why the Pin-Maker Grows 
Cassava on the Side. Working paper. 
Shore-Sheppard, L. (1996). The Precision of Instrumental Variables Estimates with Grouped 
Data. Working paper No. 374. 
Sparrow, R. (2007). Protecting Education for the Poor in Times of Crisis: An Evaluation of a 
Scholarship Programme in Indonesia. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 69(1), 
99–122.  
Strauss, J., Beegle, K., Sikoki, B., Dwiyanto, A., Herawati, Y., & Witoelar, F. (2004). The Third 
Wave of the Indonesia Family Life Survey: Overview and Field Report. 
Suryadarma, D., Suryahadi, A., Sumarto, S., & Rogers, F. H. (2006). Improving Student 
Performance in Public Primary Schools in Developing Countries: Evidence from Indonesia. 
Education Economics, 14(4), 401–429.  
The World Bank. (2015). WDI Database Archives. Retrieved from 
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/variableSelection/selectvariables.aspx?source=wo
rld-development-indicators 
Thomas, D., Beegle, K., Frankenberg, E., Sikoki, B., Strauss, J., & Teruel, G. (2004). Education 
in a crisis. Journal of Development Economics, 74(1), 53–85.  
Todd, P. E., & Wolpin, K. I. (2003). On the Specification and Estimation of the Production 
Function for Cognitive Achievement. The Economic Journal, 113(485), F3–F33. 
Todd, P. E., & Wolpin, K. I. (2007). The Production of Cognitive Achievement in Children : 
Home , School , and Racial Test Score Gaps. Journal of Human Capital, 1(1), 91–136. 
Tokuoka, K. (2013). Saving response to unemployment of a sibling. Journal of Economic 
Behavior & Organization, 89, 58–75.  
Townsend, R. (1994). Risk and Insurance in Village India. Econometrica, 62(3), 539–591. 
Willis, R. J., & Rosen, S. (1979). Education and Self-Selection. Journal of Political Economy, 
87(5), S7–S36. 
Wolfe, B. L., & Haveman, R. H. (2002). Social and Nonmarket Benefits From Education in an 
Advanced Economy. Conference Series - Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, 47, 97–131. 
Wooldridge, J. (2010). Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data (Second edi). 
